

GENERAL

1944

File No. 109

F.O.

371

to H. 8337

N
341

CLOSED
UNTIL
1972

42757
42757

1944

W 109 / G

2

GENERAL
REFUGEE

3 JAN 1944

W 109/109/E⁴⁸

Mr. Stevenson
Cairo

18/79/43 No. 74

Dated: 16 Dec.

Received:

Last Paper.

W 17851/225/E⁴³

References.

W 17306/225/E⁴³

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

42757

(Action
completed.)

(Index.)

EC 29/2

kh

Next Paper.

(285)

Jewish Refugees in Yugoslavia.

Refers to his despatch 64 (W 17306/225/E⁴³) about the Jewish refugees on the island of Rab, & informs that the British liaison officer at the Partisan Headquarters in the Lika region has been approached by a Jewish delegation with a view to credits being made available for relief of Jews on the Dalmatian mainland. (Minutes.)

See 3rd para of Myron's letter to Henriquez on 6/7/46. Treasury are against the despatch of funds for the relief of either the people on Rab or in Dalmatia. We must however get the papers with the draft telegram & also Mr. Henriquez' reply to this letter which has now, I think, arrived.

A. Balser
5/6/44

See now dft tel: ~~see~~ at 6/7/43/-

attached. Mr. Myron (see his

26349 F.O.F.

his letter to Mr. Hemingway)
makes the point that we
cannot set a precedent for
an unlimited flood of demands
for assistance. Certainly
such a view seems justified
until we are in more effective
occupation of the Balkans & can
send out ONRRA officials to
assess the local requirements.

If however we take this
negative line, we shall have
to recast the draft tel at
N7103/- to Cairo so as to
take in the despatch within &
cancel the draft letter to Sir
H. Emerson proposing that he
should consider appealing to Jewish
organizations for funds for Rab
& elsewhere

J. Waller

6/1
We can now await reply from Mr.
Stevenson, & ensure letter to Sir H.
Emerson. Aug R. 6/1

Sutton Reft.

Draft tel sent on N. 17416.

10/7/11

Aug R.
10/11

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN ON THIS PAGE.

3914
W Rep
W 109 / G
3
BRITISH EMBASSY TO YUGOSLAVIA
CAIRO.
3 JAN 1944

18/79/43

16th December, 1943.

No. 74

Sir,

W 17306 / 228 / G
With reference to my despatch No. 64 of the 7th December about the Jewish refugees on the island of Rab, I have the honour to report that a telegram was received a few days ago by S.O.E. from the British Liaison Officer at the Partisan headquarters in the Lika region stating that he had been approached by a Jewish delegation with a view to credits being made available for the relief of destitute Jews on the Dalmatian mainland.

2. The Jewish delegation said that they held a fund of four hundred gold Napoleons. As the local peasants refused to sell food for gold, the delegation requested that they might be supplied with three million Italian lire for immediate use, the gold fund to serve as a security. According to the British Liaison Officer this scheme had the approval of the political organisation of Partisan headquarters.

3. This request was telegraphed by S.O.E. here to their London office, who have now replied that they have referred the matter to you as they cannot advance any money from their own funds. If, however, a Jewish organisation were willing to put up the necessary sterling, S.O.E., London, would be prepared to act as carriers of the three million lire asked for.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect,
Sir,

Your most obedient humble Servant,

The Right Honourable
Anthony Eden, M.C., M.P.,
etc., etc., etc.

Ralph Skrine Stevenson

16 (39)
SEAL OF THE UNITED STATES

File Number:—

W 109

RECEIVED

GENERAL

1944

1944

GENERAL
REFUGEES

W 285 /G

6 JAN 1944

W285/109/G. 48
Th^{rs} Bliss (m.b.w.)
to H. Randall
T574D
Dated: 31 Dec
Received:

Jewish refugees on The Island of Rahu
Comments on the draft letter to Sir
Herbert Emerson regarding an
appeal for funds to assist Jewish
refugees.

Last Paper.

N220 (109)

(Minutes.)

References.

W17416/225/G43

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

see now the tel: to Mr
Stenson on 17/10/3/225/
W209/109/G43
? await reply

J. Walker

How see W1041/109/G
9/1
AmR.
10/1

(Action
completed.)

(Index.)

8/2/44

kw

Next Paper.

(2867)
(W1041)

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN ON THIS PAGE.



51
Telephone : GROSVENOR 4060.

In any further communication on this subject, please quote

and address,

not to any person by name,

but to—

The Director-General,
Ministry of Economic Warfare,
Berkeley Square House
Berkeley Square, W.1.

W/refs.
5
109
MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE.
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square

W.1.
W285
JAN 1944
16
225
17416
225
943

Your Reference.....

Dear Randall,

31st December, 1943.

You sent for concurrence a draft letter to Sir Herbert Emerson regarding an appeal for funds to assist Jewish refugees on the Island of Rab. A priori such a proposal would appear inadmissible according to the rule against remittances to persons in the country of their own nationality; since these refugees are presumably Yugoslavs in Yugoslavia. But this rule is sometimes waived when the remittances concerned do not cost us foreign exchange. In this case, if the currency is to be lire, issued by the Badoglio Government, I do not see any great objection, from the M.E.W. point of view, to the proposal.

No doubt you have had in mind in furthering this appeal the effect the publicity will have on the Jewish community both here and in the U.S. with regard to projects to assist Jews in other parts of Europe. We need look no further than the recent request from the U.S. authorities to agree to a licence for transfer of funds to rescue Jews from France and Roumania. Shall we not lay ourselves open to recriminations from the U.S.A. if we allow an appeal to be made for funds which, I understand, will be used to further the escape of Jews from Yugoslavia, when we have resisted a proposal to license funds under strict safeguards to assist in the rescue of Jews from France and Roumania? However, all this is mainly your affair, and not that of M.E.W.

There is also the question of the machinery by which the sterling subscribed in this country will be transferred into lire (if lire is in fact the ultimate currency), but that of course is a question for the Treasury.

Since writing the above I have seen a copy of Mynor's letter to Henriques referring to the draft telegram to H.M. Ambassador to Yugoslavia, which I presume refers to the same project. I agree with the views expressed by Mynors, and with his emendation to the draft telegram.

I am sending copies to Mynors and Henriques.

A.W. Randall Esq.,
Foreign Office, Refugee Dept.
3, Cleveland Row,
S.W.1.

Yours sincerely,

W. L. G.

DO NOT WRITE IN THESE SPACES

File Number:—

W ¹⁰⁹
~~286~~

GENERAL

1944

1944

REFUGEE
GENERAL

W 286/G

6 JAN 1944
PPH 1000 9

W 286/109/48

M/S Cairo

Telegram no. 24

Dated: 4 Jan.

Received:

Refugees from Yugoslavia

For operational reasons refugees from Dalmatian Islands are being shipped via Italy to H.E. No objection is anticipated to accommodation in Egypt. Menna has been asked to take administrative responsibility. Presumes we concur?

Last Paper.

W 109 (258)

(Minutes.)

References.

W 5709/14842/48

W 513/21/48

Now W 512/21/48

See minutes & action
on R 184/2/92

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

H Walker

7/1

Ans R.

7/1

I am directed that this letter be
copied to Mr. Wade (T97)

Jan. L. Henderson

14/1

C.C.'s Dept for any obs.

None, see now W 541/131/48

2 14/1

(Action
completed.)

EC 6/3

(Index.)

Klv.

Next Paper.

(W 541/131/48) (991)

26349 F.O.P.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN ON THIS PAGE.

7

Dear Henderson

This is the tel.
which caused my some
message. It came
to me with the bundle
attached.

I don't think M. of S.
had better assume our
concurrence in MERRA's
handling his problem
at our expense. Less
reason have ~~we~~ agreed.

In any case I sh.
like to see the authority
decide.

details remain -
essentially they are
in M.E.S. rel. No.
2399 to which our
3520 was the reply.

Yours
D.L.

Dear Howard,

Place in my mind
on W 541/131/48

Yours ever

D.K. Wood. I.L.H.

2/14 14/1

[CYPHER]

W286 8
DEPARTMENTAL NO. 2.

FROM MINISTER OF STATE (RESIDENT) CAIRO TO
FOREIGN OFFICE

No. 24

D: 1.10 p.m.G.M.T.5th January, 1944.

4th January, 1944.

R: 2.50 p.m.B.S.T.5th January, 1944.

@@@ @@@ @@@

IMPORTANT

SECRET

For operational reasons refugees from Dalmatian Islands are being shipped via Italy to the Middle East. Minimum number is estimated at 20,000. Egyptian Government has been approached and no objection is anticipated to accommodation in Egypt. Army camps at El Shatt, Sinai, are available. Merrra has been asked to take administrative responsibility. In view of your telegram No. 3,520 as regards Dodecanesians presume you concur. W 15709 / 12/1/44

2. Refugees are families of Yugoslav partisans and mainly women and children.

3. Suggest accounting and other arrangements broadly on lines already adopted in the case of Dodecanesians. Do you agree?

4. Strengthening of staff imperative to meet this and other commitments. Further telegram follows.

[Copies sent to Mr. Smyth].

O.T.P.

File Number:—

W109

1944

5
GENERAL

9
W 301

REFUGEES

7 JAN 1944

Registry
Number } W 301/109/48

FROM Mr. Gregory,
(Trading with the
Enemy Department) to
No. Mr. Randall.

Gen 1302

Dated 31st Dec:1943

Received
in Registry 7th Jan:1944

W : Refugees.

Financial assistance for Jewish refugees in
Yugoslavia.

Refers to Foreign Office letter of 19th
December 1943 (W 17103/225/G).

Trading with the Enemy Department would
require some time to consider this as
Yugoslavia is classed as enemy territory. Should
a change of policy be contemplated, considers
that the Remittances to Enemy Territory Committee
should be given an opportunity to express its
views.

Last Paper.

W 286

(Minutes.)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

See now W. 109/109/G &
W 285 109/G & minutes & action
on the former.

Before going any further
we must await reaction of
H.M. Ambassador to Yugoslavia

Walker

C. C. Dept. 10/11/43
Southern
L. su.

Arch.
10/11

(Action
completed.)

(Index.)

10/2 228
9/15/44
Next Paper.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN ON THIS PAGE.



Enter 10

TRADING WITH THE ENEMY DEPARTMENT
(Treasury and Board of Trade).

Telephone No.:
HOLBORN 4300.

Telegraphic Address:
"TRADEENEMY, LONDON"

Any reply should be addressed
to—
"THE CONTROLLER GENERAL."

Your Ref.:

W 17103/225/G

Our Ref.:

T/E

en.1002

24, KINGSWAY,

LONDON, W.C.2.

31st December, 1943.

W 301

Dear Randall,

7 JAN 1944

You wrote me on the 1st December on a draft telegram which you were proposing to send to our Ambassador to Yugoslavia. It referred to a request for financial help for Jewish refugees in the Mihailovic area of Yugoslavia. I believe Henriques explained to you on the telephone before Christmas that the subject matter of this telegram raised a question of general principle which we should require a little time to consider. I have now seen the letter which Henry of the Treasury wrote Henriques on the 20th December and copied to you. In the third paragraph of that letter an addition to your telegram is suggested. I agree with that addition and hope you will feel able to insert it in the telegram.

I also note that requests for financial aid in more or less similar form have been received in respect of the Jewish population in Rome and also in the island of Rab, off the coast of Yugoslavia. We feel compelled at present to consider all these territories as being enemy territory. The remittance of money to persons in enemy territory is a matter closely controlled by the interested Departments, of whom we are one.

Questions of policy and cases of difficulty are regularly considered in the Remittances to Enemy Territory Committee, of which I am Chairman and which meets here. The Foreign Office is represented on that Committee through the Prisoners of War Department. If it is felt desirable to put some new question of policy

A.W.G. Randall Esq.,
Foreign Office,
S.W.1.

policy should be considered, I feel that that Committee should have an opportunity of expressing its view. Of course, as far as I am concerned, a representative of the Refugee Department of the Foreign Office would be welcome in the Committee's deliberations on any question affecting the relief of refugees who are still in enemy territory. I need hardly say, however, that the difficulties in the way of approving the remittance of funds to enemy territory for this purpose are in general fairly substantial.

Yours sincerely,

J. R. S. Jefferys

File Number:—

W

109

LEAGUE OF
NATIONS AND
WESTERN.

GENERAL.

REFUGEES

W 868/G

W 868/109/848

F.O. memo to
(M: O'Neill)

Dated: 8 Jan

Transfer of German population
Minutes of First meeting of
Inter departmental Committee
held on Dec. 7th 1943

Received:

Last Paper.

W 286

References.

(Minutes.)

See Mr Randall's Minute with Reg.

194. L. Hudson

20/1.

(Print.)

Mr Troutbeck

(How disposed of.)

It should not be taken for granted

that the transfers will be in theory
frictionless. There are strong arguments in
favor of making them themselves
voluntary - the form of pressure being
that if a person decides to stay where he
is, he must take the consequences,
which will be the deactivation of
his children.

Mr. Randall.

(Action
completed.)

(Index.)

CC 26/1

W.

Next Paper.

W 991.

26349 F.O.P.
In that case the
machinery to be established

Mr Troutbeck
20/1

by UNRRA (trains, inland water transport, sorting camps etc.) might possibly be directed to this proposed use. But the actual charter of UNRRA speaks of returning "prisoners and exiles", and the organization for doing this could not be turned over to any European Settlement Organization until the primary object has been attained.

Hugh Lowell
22/11

3, 20, 100
No. 100
22/11

1 L. 11

25/11

Amik.
11/11

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN ON THIS PAGE.

Ref

12

WJ668

Foreign Office,

S.W.1.

8th January, 1944.

(Call this
be entered.
"Refugees"
Green
Ansk.

With Mr. C. O'Neill's Compliments.

On 5(5) it may be
said that the practical
application of UNRRA organisation
to the whole problem of displaced
persons is now under discussion,
and that it would be premature
A. Walker, Esq. to circulate a note.

It seems to me doubtful, however, whether any
such organisation could be employed to
transfer (forcibly, presumably) persons who
are being removed for political reasons.
Ansk. 17/1

Minutes of First Meeting of Interdepartmental Committee on the
Transfer of German Populations.

1. The first meeting of the Committee took place at 3.0 p.m. on 7th December, in the Foreign Office. There were present:

| | | |
|------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------|
| Mr. J.M. Troutbeck, | Foreign Office | (Chairman) |
| Mr. E.W. Playfair, | Treasury | |
| Mr. J.E. Meade, | War Cabinet Offices | |
| Lt. Col. A.N. Patrick, | War Office | |
| Mr. M. Turner, | Ministry of Economic Warfare | |
| Mr. A. Walker, | Refugees Department, Foreign Office | |
| Mr. I.L. Henderson, | " " " " | |
| Mr. G.W. Harrison, | Central " " " | |
| Lord Hood, | E. & R. " " " | |
| Mr. T.H. Marshall, | Foreign Office Research Department | |
| Mr. C. O'Neill, | Foreign Office | (Secretary). |

2. The Chairman began by suggesting that the work of the Committee must proceed on two assumptions:

- (1) that if possible transfers of population should be carried out in such a way as to avoid inflicting very severe economic dislocation on Germany, and
- (2) that it was impossible to ignore the possible suffering by and cruelty to refugees involved in the transfers contemplated, if only because of the reaction that such suffering might have on public opinion in Allied countries.

The Committee agreed with these assumptions.

3. The Chairman went on to suggest that the investigations of the Committee might be made under seven heads. These were:

- (1) An estimate of the long-term capacity of Germany to absorb the transfer of populations,
- (2) An estimate of the short-term measures, such as temporary accommodation and billeting, feeding and transport, which the transfers would involve,
- (3) An estimate of the time factor, including the total period over which transfers might best be spread,
- (4) an estimate of any financial commitments which the transfers might involve to the United Nations,
- (5) An estimate of the international machinery, if any, which would be required in the way of international commissions or police forces, and the number of personnel which might be involved,
- (6) An estimate of the possibility of transferring some of the refugees to areas outside Germany, e.g. Siberia,
- (7) An estimate of the economic dislocation which the loss of German populations to be transferred might involve in the succession states such as Poland and Czechoslovakia.

The Committee agreed that this was the best way to approach the problem.

4. The Chairman drew attention to Article 9(c) of the present Draft German Armistice which reads:

"In the event of the United Nations requiring the evacuation of all or any part of the German civilian inhabitants of the

territories/

territories or areas concerned [these territories include those which the Committee has to deal with], the German authorities will issue the necessary instructions and will make the necessary arrangements for the evacuation and subsequent reception of such persons as may be specified."

5. In the course of the general discussion the following points were made:

(1) It was important for the Committee to bear in mind the connection of its work with the recommendations of the Malkin Report on Reparations and Economic Security. That Report recommended that in effect the bulk of Germany's capacity for reconstruction should be devoted to reconstruction in devastated areas of the United Nations. This would mean that Germany's capacity to resettle, and above all to house, large refugee populations in her own territory would be severely restricted.

(2) German war casualties were very relevant to the Committee's enquiry. It might even prove that the total working population lost by war casualties would be greater than the total working population included in the populations whose transfer to Germany was being considered. This might very much simplify the long-term problem.

(3) Germany's capacity to absorb immigrants from transferred territories would be affected by the large numbers of Germans who had been settled during the war in adjoining countries and would no doubt be driven into the Reich.

(4) Housing was likely to be the crux of the whole matter, in the early period at least.

(5) Some discussion took place of the machinery which would probably be dealing with general questions of repatriation and resettlement in Europe after the war, and in particular the function of UNRRA in this respect; and it was considered whether this machinery might not deal also with the transfer of German populations. Mr. Walker undertook to inform the Committee of the extent of UNRRA's commitments on this subject, and to circulate a note on the decisions taken at Atlantic City in so far as they dealt with this point.

(6) It was further pointed out that the question of the destination of relief supplies might be affected by such moves of population as the Committee was dealing with, and it was suggested that the Relief Department might be represented at a later meeting of the Committee to deal with this point.

(7) Reference was made to an F.O.R.D. study of the Transfer of German Populations and the precedent provided by the Greek-Turkish transfers, and the Chairman undertook to have the paper circulated to the Committee.

(8) Reference was made to the recently published I.L.O. study on Displaced Populations in Europe, and the Chairman undertook to see if copies of this could be secured for the Committee.

6. After considering how best to proceed with its work, the Committee agreed

(1) that Mr. Turner and Mr. Marshall should co-operate to produce a paper on the capacity of Germany to absorb refugee populations. The scope of this paper was left to the discretion of Mr. Turner and Mr. Marshall, but it was decided it should deal with the problem of housing, and should provide an estimate by occupations of the populations which it might be desired to displace.

(2) that Mr. Playfair should prepare a preliminary paper dealing with the financial issues involved, and covering, if possible, the question of the property of refugees and the way in which to deal with it.

(3)/

(3) A preliminary paper dealing with the possible international machinery and police forces that would be needed would be prepared in the Foreign Office. This paper should have regard to any precedent provided by the joint occupation of Upper Silesia after the last war.

(4) A paper dealing with the possible absorption of refugees in areas other than Germany, e.g. Siberia, should be prepared in the Foreign Office. It might be necessary to consult the Dominions Office on this subject.

(5) A paper dealing with the economic consequences to Poland and Czechoslovakia of the transfer of German populations from the areas concerned would be produced by F.O.R.D.

(6) Each of the above papers when ready would be sent to the Secretary in sufficient numbers for distribution to the Committee.

7. No date was settled for the next meeting of the Committee.

Foreign Office.
9th December, 1943.

File Number :—

W 109

W1832/G 16

11 19 44

W1832/109/PLS

Mr. C. Peake
(Com.)

to Mr. Randall

Dated: 1 Feb.

Received:

Movement of displaced persons into Holland.

This note from Lt. Col. Haefke of Supreme Hqs Allied Expeditionary Force covering a report by the Chief of the Dutch Military Mission on the question of the repatriation of deportees from Germany.

Last Paper.

W1597

(Minutes.)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

The Netherlands Govt anticipate that the armistice will be followed by the invasion or the attempted invasion into Holland of large numbers of displaced persons, mostly Dutch, Belgian & French.

The directives relating to the draft armistice terms will therefore need to take into include the provision of means to control such large scale movements.

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

SC 19/2

KL

Next Paper.

U2030.

1) Gen. Haefke
2) Mr. Troubeck
This is being done in
with for all countries bordering
on Germany.

25695 8/43 F.O.P.

Jan R.
14/2

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN ON THIS PAGE.

17

W. A. HALL.

With the com. limits of
Mr. Charles Seake.

1. 2. 14.

W/832 18

US - SECRET
BRITISH - SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED HIGH COMMISSION FOR GERMANY

European Contact Section

1/15/3/800

29 January 1944

1. Movement of Displaced Persons into HOLLAND.

2. Chief Staff Officer, Civil Affairs (2 copies).
Brigadier 1st, 7th (Adv. Division).

The attached report which has been sent to me by the Chief of the Dutch Military Mission, was prepared by him at the request of H. C. Division (1 of 1). 2. copy sent.

3. It is felt that the report may be of value to you. If you consider that any further information of this kind should be sent to you I shall be grateful if you will let me know.



D. MACFIE
Lieutenant-Colonel
Chief of European Contact Section
For Lieutenant-General
Chief of Staff.

Copy to be sent to
H. C. Division.

1. General Situation

The situation in the Netherlands is becoming increasingly chaotic. The Dutch government has been deported to Germany and the country is now in the hands of the Germans.

One of the main problems is the large number of refugees who have been deported to Germany and the Netherlands.

Part of these refugees are being held in camps and it is estimated that there are about 100,000 in the Netherlands.

± 300,000 in Germany

± 400,000 in the Netherlands

besides a number of workers from other countries, occupied by the Germans.

Therefore one must reckon with the worst - especially if chaotic conditions were to set in in the Netherlands - that in the first days of a German occupation there will be an unorganised movement of possibly a million people towards the Eastern frontier of the Netherlands.

2. Organised Repatriation

There is a strong need to organize the repatriation of an increasing number of refugees, one of the purposes for which the DUTCH WAR RELIEF and REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION (D.W.R.A.) is instituted.

The intention of this body is to register the refugees, to enable them to work and bring them back to the countries they belong to. The D.W.R.A. is working in co-operation with the "Allied Forces and Airborne Forces" organization.

It is estimated, however, that the number of refugees cannot be reduced below 100,000; this probably means 100,000 (100,000) in the Netherlands.

As far as the D.W.R.A. is concerned, a special committee official has been nominated to handle the problem under the heading of Social Affairs.

3. Immediate Preparations Outside the Netherlands

It is not known where these refugees will be taken - or perhaps being prepared by the Allied Forces to deal with the present and future problems.

These measures might consist in:

- a. inspecting, registering and holding the refugees in conditions so as to make the Dutch authorities able to solve the problem.
- b. sending out an international committee to Western Germany as soon as possible - even before the arrival of Allied troops - to take over a number of camps, for instance in the region of the RHEIN (Rhine) Canal, to put up stragglers.
- c. sending these - also before arrival of Allied troops - "road clearing organizations" with the task of guiding refugees, who are on their way to HOLLAND into the right channels.
- d. preparing a number of camps in the Eastern part of HOLLAND to put up refugees, preparing if possible the relief in these camps as well.

1. The following is a list of the...

2. The following is a list of the...

3. The following is a list of the...

4. The following is a list of the...

5. The following is a list of the...

6. The following is a list of the...

7. The following is a list of the...

8. The following is a list of the...

9. The following is a list of the...

File Number :-

4109

19x⁴

W203/ /G 20

13

W2031/109/1/18
FO minute

Dated: 28 Jan

Displaced Persons in Occupied Germany:

Record of a meeting held on 28 Jan to consider problems arising in connection with Displaced Persons and Allied Prisoners of War on the Occupation of Germany.

Received:

Last Paper.

(Minutes.)

W2030

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Off. to Mr. Peake
from Mr. Randall
15/2

As far as I can recall
Brig. Belcher stated that he
& his dept. were preparing a
scheme for P/W. & D.P.'s for
presentation to S.C.A.E.F. which
was to be ready in about
six weeks. The record does not
seem to mention this.

Walker

Let us get it clear in
a letter from me to
Mr. Peake, informing him that we
are doing Armistice directives, which
we will send him in draft. & that
we could see for Armistice
directives from SHAEF.

25695 8/43 F.O.P.

Draft & W

AmR

11/2

11/2

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

SC 19/2

no.

Next Paper.

F 2190.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN ON THIS PAGE.

Is the point raised in para 2 of Mr
 Randall's letter to Mr Blake in fact not
 covered by the minutes of 28 January
 (page 1. para 4.) ? Margaret Pitt 12/2

✓ ~~12/3~~
 Mr Walker.

Yes! Sorry.
 Anst.
 14/2

Written in this Margin.

KW2/40

SECRET

22

4/2/44

Mr. A. W. G.

Randall
Refugee Dept.

CS 111 - WE

102315

III

W203 (Refugees) 23

Record of a Meeting held at the Foreign Office on 28th January to consider problems arising in connexion with Displaced Persons and Allied Prisoners of War on the occupation of Germany.

There were present :-

Sir Michael Palairret

Mr. A.W.G. Randall

Sir George Rendell

Mr. C.B. Peake

Mr. W. St. C. Roberts

Lord Hood

Mr. G.B. Jones

General Rep

Mr. R.L. Speaight

Mr. E.A. Walker

Brigadier J.R.J. Becher

Lieutenant Colonel R.C. Brooks A.A.G. SHAEF.

Lieutenant Colonel H.J.

Phillimore

Major H.C. Ellis

Major F.D. Higham

Major S.B.R. Green

Mrs. M.J. See

Foreign Office,

Prisoners of War Department,
in the Chair.

Foreign Office, Refugee Department

Foreign Office.

Political Adviser to S.C.A.E.F.

Foreign Office, Prisoners of War
Department.

Foreign Office, Economic and
Reconstruction Department.

Foreign Office, French Department.

Foreign Office, Refugee Department

Brigadier A. SHAEF.

A.A.G. SHAEF.

War Office P.W.2.

War Office C.A.15.

War Office C.A.5.

War Office C.A.6.

Foreign Office, Prisoners of War
Department.

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2. Mr. Randall thought that the first concern of the meeting was to consider the departmental machinery which would have to be set up in order to give the necessary directions to S.C.A.E.F. for dealing with displaced populations. It was obvious that one purpose of this machinery would be to assure a smooth junction between the military and the political aspect of the problem. As this involved both British and Allied civilians and Allied prisoners of war it was fairly clear that the Foreign Office must initiate the directive. What was not clear was which department of the War Office should concert this directive with the Foreign Office.

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A second paper dealing with Allied prisoners of war and displaced persons was now being prepared and would be ready in about six weeks. In this S.H.A.E.F. proposed to recommend:-

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/Mr. Peake

Mr. Peake said that in order that the first military period should be merged smoothly into the period when civil administration was re-established a directive would be welcomed by Supreme Allied Commander as soon as possible.

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11. Sir George Rendel explained briefly the general set up and admitted that it was not ideal. In addition, he said, planning was unfortunately very behind schedule. But once the initial difficulties had been overcome U.N.R.R.A. would be able to work with the military on a basis of co-operation and non-interference.

12. There were three main reasons for S.C.A.E.F. inviting U.N.R.R.A. to co-operate on civil administration from the beginning:

a) When the first stage was over much of the reconstruction work would be in the hands of U.N.R.R.A. Confusion and anomalies could best be avoided by uniformity and continuity of policy to cover the different stages. This uniformity and continuity could be brought about by having a nucleus of representations of U.N.R.R.A. working under S.C.A.E.F. during the military period.

b) The problem of displaced persons was essentially international, and U.N.R.R.A. was an international organisation, equipped with information and technical skill of the highest value.

c) During the Conference at Atlantic City the Russians showed every intention of making use of U.N.R.R.A. As many of the worst problems in connexion with displaced persons and Allied prisoners of war would revolve around the Russians, it would be very much to the advantage of S.C.A.E.F. to have the co-operation from the start of an organisation in which the Russians were interested. Mr. Peake said that the S.A.C. would welcome the help of U.N.R.R.A. at an early stage.

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- 27
15. In connexion with paragraph 7 Lord Hood wished to know what would be the position of a large number of displaced persons at present located in the south of France, where, possibly, there might be no Allied military authority. Would these be the concern of the French National Committee or of a civil affairs organisation such as U.N.R.R.A.?
 16. It was thought that all France would be under S.C.A.E.F. for a time at least. The consent of each local government would, however, have to be sought before U.N.R.R.A. could operate within its territory.
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- S.H.A.E.F
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Distribution to :-

Those present
and Lieutenant-Colonel Horner, C.A.S.
Room 110,
Victoria Hotel,
Northumberland Avenue.

Record of a Meeting held at the Foreign Office on 28th January to consider problems arising in connexion with Displaced Persons and Allied Prisoners of War on the occupation of Germany.

There were present :-

Sir Michael Palairret

Mr. A.W.G. Randall

Sir George Rendel

Mr. C.B. Peake

Mr. W. St. C. Roberts

Lord Hood

Mr. R.L. Speaight

Mr. E.A. Walker

Brigadier J.R.J. Becher

Lieutenant Colonel R.C. Brooks

Lieutenant Colonel H.J.

Phillimore

Major H.C. Ellis

Major F.D. Higham

Major S.B.R. Green

Mrs. M.J. Sée

Foreign Office,

Prisoners of War Department,
in the Chair.

Foreign Office, Refugee Department
Foreign Office.

Political Adviser to S.C.A.E.F.

Foreign Office, Prisoners of War
Department.

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Department.

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Foreign Office. General Dept.

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and Lieutenant-Colonel J. Horner, C.A.F.
Room 110,
Victoria Hotel,
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Registry
No.

E.A.W.

As
Draft.

Mr. Charles Peake,
SHAEP,
Norfolk House.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Mr. W. Roberts.

first.
Mr. 12/1

*We should ~~now~~
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the scheme for
displaced persons
as soon as
it is ready;
as would ~~that~~ for
Roberts War.
Prisoners &*

35
FOREIGN OFFICE (Refugee Department),

3, Cleveland Row,

St. James's, S.W.1.

to
15 February, 1944.

[Dear Charles]

You will, of course, by now have seen the record of the meeting which was held here in my room on the 28th January under the Chairmanship of Palairret to discuss problems arising over displaced persons and Allied prisoners of war on the occupation of Germany.

~~I distinctly recall - and so does Walker - that Beecher said, right at the very end of the meeting, that he was preparing a scheme for prisoners of war and displaced persons for presentation to the Civil Affairs branch of S.C.A.E.F. but I see no mention of this in the record and should therefore be grateful if you could ~~confirm~~ clear up this point, or suggest how we could get the matter straight.~~

~~I should add that~~ We are doing certain Armistice directives (Articles 13, 44, 45 and 49) which we will send you in draft; and that we count on seeing ~~the~~ pre-Armistice directives/

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informal contact is the
best method of avoiding
overlapping.

ALGR

Yours

(S) Alice Randal

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

36

FOREIGN OFFICE (Refugee
Department),
3, Cleveland Row,
St. James's,
S.W. 1.

(W 2031/109/G)

15th February, 1944.

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Becher said that he was preparing a scheme for prisoners of war and displaced persons for presentation to the Civil Affairs branch of S.C.A.E.F. We should be very glad to see the scheme for displaced persons as soon as it is ready; as would Roberts that for Prisoners of War.

We are doing certain Armistice directives (Articles 13, 44, 45 and 49) which we will send you in draft; the pre-Armistice directives from SHAEF obviously have a bearing on both the questions we are handling, the removal of prisoners of war and displaced persons, and it seems to me that this informal contact is the best method of avoiding overlapping.

Yours,

C.B.P. Peake, Esq., C.M.G., M.C. (s) Alec Randall

File Number :—

109

W2485/G

16

W2483/109

Col. de Resumier.
(P.H.P. case)

do Mr. Tebb.

Dec: 30.

Jan: 3.

Last Paper.

(Minutes.)

References

(Print.)

Enclosures (How disposed of?)
1st. General Kirby
(wo) from
R.

as well

Displaced persons Problem.
(military operations in Germany
and Poland.)

Encloses memo. dated 28/12 from
General Kirby (CA. WO) concerning a
paper on the problem of repatriation
and relief of displaced Allied
nationals liberated by operations in
Germany & Poland.

I think it would be very desirable that
P.H.P. Committee should tackle this complex problem
which is at present being dealt with piece-meal by
a number of different bodies:

(a) COSSAC has produced plans on the repatriation
of prisoners of war and the displaced persons problem.

(b) The Prisoners of War Department of the
War Office have produced a plan (quite independently
of General Kirby's paper within) for the repatriation
of British, U.S and Soviet prisoners of war.

(c) Sir Michael Palairret's committee have
produced a report on the problem of displaced persons.

(d) The Committee of Allied Foreign Ministers
have submitted to us proposals for the establishment
of a Repatriation Commission to which no definite
reply was returned pending the outcome of the
Atlantic City Conference.

(e) The Atlantic City Conference resolved to
establish as part of U.N.R.R.A. a standing technical
committee on displaced persons to assist in the
repatriation and return of such persons, ~~including~~ and
prisoners, if a national government so desires. This
machinery is not yet of course in existence.

Decisions seem to be required (a) as to what
machinery is to be used (b) as to the broad policy
to be pursued, order of priorities etc.

During the military period COSSAC will be
responsible and he must be provided with adequate
machinery to implement it. At present there is a
serious gap in this machinery because ~~at present~~
nobody is making plans or providing staff for the
care/

(Action
completed.)

(Index.)

Next Paper.

F2769.

care and repatriation of ^{all} prisoners or internees of ~~the Allies~~ other than British, American and Russian.

Once the High Commission has taken charge some machinery on the lines suggested by General Kirby will be required. His proposed Displaced Civilians section may be unnecessary if the U.N.R.R.A. Technical Committee takes shape and functions properly.

Formulation of a clear-cut policy involves consultation between a number of Governments and possibly the only way of achieving this will be to bring the matter up at the E.A.C. and get them to establish a special Sub-Commission which would call in representatives of the other Allied Governments residing in London.

The first step would seem to be for PHP ^{to} prepare a paper for submission to the ACA ^{and} ^{then}

5th January, 1944.

Myself ?
P.W.
Central
Eastern
Northern
French
W. Highland
Sir W. Kirby

I regret to say that the F.H.F. Sub-Committee are extremely reluctant to agree with General Kirby's suggestion that they should take on the consideration of this problem. They point out (with truth I think) (a) that they are completely overwhelmed at the moment. (b) That the problem of displaced persons is really only to a limited extent within their terms of reference. It was fully realised of course that some body should take on the task of co-ordinating the various plans now being excogitated, but it was suggested either that Sir Michael Palatret might be charged with this task or that some manifestation of the Law Committee should do it or even that it should fall to the lot of the recently proposed Post-Hostilities Economic Planners.

Mr. Donald first.

8th January, 1944.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN ON THIS PAGE.

It is not clear to me that PHP

can with justification completely wash their hands of this particular problem.

On the other hand regulation of the movements of displaced persons is likely for some months after the end of hostilities to be very much a military operation.

The unregulated movement of several hundreds of thousands of persons, moving sometimes singly, sometimes in large bodies, in all sorts of directions will present an infinity of trouble for the S.A.C. who will require carefully drafted and detailed directives for issue at the moment hostilities cease. I incline therefore to the view that in this case a start had best be made by the W.O. in consultation with F.O. as part of the general plan for making a start in directives. The ^{best} forum may prove to be a sub-committee of A.C.A.O.. When they have completed their work, it should be possible to see what residual work remains to be done by PHP in planning a Displaced Persons Section of the Political Commission on the P of 1 ^{Ref} _{Person}.

Commission of the Control Commission

Displaced persons would be wholly
outside the province of PHP (c) if it even
comes into being. *Nikol*

It has now been arranged
that a meeting shall take place
on Jan. 26th, under Sir M. Palam's
chairmanship, to discuss informally the
directions to be drafted for
the pre-Armistice and Armistice
period in regard to all Displaced
Persons in liberated or enemy
territories. As a result of this
meeting we hope to arrive at
joint W.O. - F.O. directions, and
will prefer to send them when
made, to A.C.A.O., by whom their
submission further will be carried
out.

A.W.G.R.

26/1

Ed R. Jeff. - 27/1

Revised.
See within H. Roberts's minutes ^{+ FO memo} of 24/1

See also within Genl. Kierley's
letter to M. Jellie of 1/1

? X *J. Walker*
15/2

Genl. K.

16/2

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

SECRET

U
RLM/RT/43/184. *mi* *pp* *39*

MR. H.M.G. JEBB.

With reference to my Minute No. RLM/RT/43/182, I attach a memorandum which I have received from General Kirby together with the paper therein referred to.

I think General Kirby's approach is much more on the right lines than Sir Michael Palairret's, in that he is asking us to seek a ruling from the Ministerial Committee on a broad policy with a view to this being put to the E.A.C.

If you approve I suggest that I should circulate to the Committee draft Terms of Reference directing preparation of a paper setting out the problem and making recommendations. General Kirby's paper could be circulated as an annexe to these Terms of Reference. We could then possibly solve Sir Michael Palairret's problem by inviting him to be present at a meeting of the P.H.P. Sub-Committee when the draft paper is being discussed.

I shall be grateful for your instructions and for the return of the attached papers in due course.

R. M.
R. LE MESURIER.

30th December, 1943.
1, Richmond Terrace,
S.W.1.

Copy.
(W 2485/109/G)

The War Office,
Hotel Victoria,
Northumberland Avenue,
LONDON, W.C.2.

40

28th December, 1943.

Memorandum for:-

The Chairman,
Post-Hostilities Planning Sub-Committee.

Repatriation and Relief of Allied Nationals - Germany
and Poland.

1. Attached is a paper giving my outline views on the problem of Repatriation and Relief of Displaced Allied Nationals liberated by military operations in Germany and Poland.

By Displaced Allied Nationals is meant prisoners-of-war, and all categories of displaced Allied civilians.

2. In my view this problem is scarcely being considered to date on a sufficiently comprehensive basis by the various bodies concerned. COSSAC and the War Office Directorate of Prisoners-of-War are, I understand, preparing papers on this subject. These together with the Palairt Committee's report and the attached paper might well be found to contain some divergencies of view. An United Nations statement on broad policy is therefore urgently needed, and it is for this reason that I trust your Sub-Committee, having considered the problem, will forward its recommendations to the Ministerial Committee on Armistice Terms and Civil Administration for submission to the European Advisory Commission.

The D.P.W. would wish to be represented at any discussion of this paper which may take place before your Committee and to reserve his right to dissent from any of the detailed proposals in it which may be in conflict with the plans now being concerted between him and C.O.S.S.A.C.

(Signed)
D.C.A.

REPATRIATION AND RELIEF OF ALLIED NATIONALS LIBERATED BY
MILITARY OPERATIONS IN GERMANY AND POLAND
OUTLINE PROPOSALS

The Problem

1. The problem considered in this paper is the policy and method to be adopted by the United Nations for taking over from the German authority, in accordance with the Armistice Terms, several million displaced Allied nationals. It is to be stressed that problems will arise before the signature of an Armistice, since numbers of P/Ws and civilians of all categories, are likely to escape to the Allied lines or become liberated at the commencement of military operations in Europe. Provision for their relief and evacuation should, therefore, be made well in advance.

Before these nationals are evacuated from Germany and Poland they must continue to be fed, clothed as necessary, and provided with medical attention. They must also be identified, registered and separated into different national categories. A system of transit or staging camps appears to be essential.

Plans for the evacuation of British P/Ws are in an advanced state of preparation between D.P.W. at the War Office and C.O.S.S.A.C. But the numbers thus involved - vide the Appendix to this paper - are a small percentage only of the total Allied P/Ws. Allied civilian displaced personnel present a problem even greater. Since these problems may eventually be given to a Commission for Control of Germany it would be for the D.C.A. at the War Office to formulate detailed plans for the execution of an agreed policy as far as the War Office would then be concerned.

The need for an efficient intelligence and control system and for reasonable communications and transportation and provision of essential supplies including food, blankets, clothing and hospitalization facilities cannot be over-emphasized.

It is apparent, however, that the solution to these problems must be based on an United Nations policy and this paper indicates that this policy should be co-ordinated by one responsible body.

Main difficulties likely to be encountered.

2. The main difficulties of the problems may be summarised as below:-

- (a) control of the huge numbers involved.
- (b) the provision of food, medical attention, clothing and accommodation either by the German authorities or by the United Nations, or both, over a period of months.
- (c) sorting, registration, identification of all persons concerned and the issue of identification papers, (on the lines laid down in the Palairot Committee's Report - ARB/DP/40 of 20th October, 1943).
- (d) transportation, including ambulance trains.
- (e) repatriation and rehabilitation.
- (f) evacuation of stateless persons and provision of reception areas for them.

/(g)

- (g) the return home of persons who have been moved in their own country (e.g. in Poland) and the removal of German colonists who have been given their homes.
- (h) the prevention of epidemics of disease.
- (i) the provision of communications to the Camps and by which the Allied nationals can get in touch with their families outside Germany.

3. It must be noted also that the Russians present a problem of their own since they are non-subscribers to the Prisoners of War Convention and do not admit to the existence of Soviet prisoners of war. For this reason also, large numbers of Russians P/Ws in Germany have been used for labour, other than in P/W Labour Camps. Difficulties with the Soviet authorities might well be encountered in the administration and control of displaced Soviet nationals.

4. Owing to the vast size of the territories involved, and to inadequacy of rolling stock, the problem of transportation will provide a very real difficulty, from the point of view of inspecting teams, the movement of other Allied personnel on repatriation within and from the frontiers of Germany.

5. The distinct categories into which the Allied nationals should be sorted, need to be laid down on the highest level and should include - Prisoners of War, civilian internees, expatriates, deportees, stateless persons and/or Jews, "Axis workers", political prisoners, refugees, etc. The priority for repatriation should also be clearly stated, i.e. ex P/Ws and key men needed for reconstruction in their own countries should be given first priority.

6. From experience in Italy it is clear that large numbers of ex P/Ws and civilians of all categories may again be liberated or escape to the Allied lines as soon as military operations commence. It is therefore essential that Repatriation and Relief Staffs should be mobilised prior to the commencement of these operations and that this personnel should be placed under orders of the Commanders-in-Chief in order that the Allied nationals may be given relief as soon as they are encountered.

7. In the event of the early capitulation of Germany before much, or even any, of her country is under Allied control, the roads might become badly blocked by Allied nationals, many of whom might well be starving and destitute, trying to get home. A "stay-put" policy should, therefore, be adopted and an order to this effect broadcast constantly, and appropriate leaflets dropped.

To this end provision should be inserted in the Armistice Terms to govern the feeding and administration of P/Ws and displaced persons by the Germans in territories still occupied by them. The following terms would undoubtedly mitigate the military and economic confusion necessarily attendant on mass migrations. They are that the German authorities should (a) issue and publicise a "stay-put" order for P/Ws and displaced persons, (b) continue the administration of the P/Ws and displaced persons, (c) recognise and undertake their duty of feeding and medically caring for the P/Ws and displaced persons, (d) supply clothing, accommodation and cooking utensils and medical services for P/Ws and displaced persons who have wandered from their camps or residences and been rounded up into transit centres, (e) give to the appropriate authority details of the whereabouts of P/Ws and displaced persons and place all their records at the disposal of the United Nations.

It is, however, unlikely that the "stay-put" order could be successfully enforced for more than a small percentage, especially of Allied civilian nationals. Although it might be possible to enforce it in some of the camps, it would be extremely difficult to carry it out with regard to those Allied civilian nationals not kept in captivity by the Germans, whose first thought, on the signature of an Armistice, would be to make for home quickly. The Commanders-in-Chief should, therefore, be prepared to establish, through their C.C.A.Os., transit camps, stocked with food, clothing and medical supplies, where all Allied nationals could be accommodated, sorted out and passed to the control of the relevant Repatriation Staffs for repatriation. Some of the personnel intended for the Repatriation Staffs should be available to serve temporarily on the staffs of these camps, including British and American intelligence officers, C.S.D.I.C. personnel, International Red Cross personnel and representatives of the Allied Governments concerned.

8. It is clear from experience in Italy that a "stay-put" policy may involve considerable discontent among the inmates of the camps who will, not unnaturally, expect to be sent home immediately after the signature of an Armistice. In order to avoid discontent becoming widespread it would be necessary to have plans in existence for early evacuation and repatriation of the occupants, as in the case of British and American P/W, and in the meantime the conditions in the camps and the general standard of food should be maintained and, if possible, improved.

9. As already indicated plans exist for the repatriation of British and American P/Ws and D.P.W. is understood to be satisfied that these P/Ws can be repatriated within a comparatively short period of time. If the other Allied Governments know that the repatriation of our P/Ws is taking place before that of their own P/Ws, serious repercussions may occur. Whilst it is clear that the repatriation of British, American and Russian P/Ws must be an easier matter than the repatriation of the nationals of those countries which have been occupied by the enemy, in order to avoid the dissatisfaction referred to above, it is recommended that a small scale repatriation of all Allied P/Ws should be authorised at the same time as the larger scale repatriation of British and American P/Ws.

10. In the event of an emergency, i.e. the complete breakdown of law and order in Germany after the cessation of hostilities, it might not be possible for the German Government to provide food, etc. for the P/W and Internment Camps.

The question thus arises whether it is necessary to accumulate any stockpile of food and/or clothing for import for P/Ws and displaced civilian persons in Germany and Poland. Against any such attempt are the following factors:-

- (a) At present Germany is believed to have adequate food for a time for all persons situated therein.
- (b) The transport available might well prove a limiting factor to such imports.
- (c) The German authorities, having been made responsible for such feeding and knowing that food might be imported, would tend to become less zealous in fulfilling this obligation.

On the other hand the following factors favour such a provision:-

- (d) On a collapse, hoarding of food on a gigantic scale seems almost inevitable. Thus even in Sicily, which was approximately self-sufficient in food, very difficult conditions are developing owing to hoarding.

- (e) As already stated, any "stay-put" order will almost certainly be avoided by vast numbers. The subsequent establishment of discipline and orderly migration will be rendered easier if food supplies are available at the transit camps, which will have to be established.
- (f) The Palairot Committee have urged in the strongest terms the necessity of importing food relief for P/Ws and other displaced persons. The report issued by the U.N.R.R.A. Conference also recommends that food should be imported into Germany for the relief of the Displaced Populations; and it is understood that the Director General of U.N.R.R.A. is prepared to assist in dealing with the problem if invited to do so by the Military Authorities.

11. One of the difficulties confronting the Repatriation Staffs will be the identification of the Allied nationals other than British and American P/Ws. It is understood that the International Red Cross have in their possession nominal rolls of all Allied P/Ws and civilian internees in Germany, which have been communicated to the Governments concerned. These, together with the statistics of displaced populations compiled by the Palairot Committee, should ease their task considerably.

12. Full use should be made of the plans for repatriation and rehabilitation of Allied nationals that are being submitted to the Palairot Committee by the Allied Governments. These plans should be fully prepared and co-ordinated before military operations commence.

Proposed Machinery.

13. During the first stage of military occupation the responsibility for the machinery to be set up for relief and repatriation should rest with each of the Commanders-in-Chief in their own theatres of operations; and close liaison should be maintained between them. They should have attached to their Headquarters a nucleus of the organisation outlined below, which, during the later stages, might develop into a "United Nations PW and Displaced Persons Sub-Commission" under the authority of the Control Commission or the High Commission for Germany.

This Sub-Commission should be divided into two Sections:-

- (a) a P/W Section to deal with all problems of Allied P/Ws,
- (b) a Displaced Civilians Section to deal with all problems not included in (a) above.

It is suggested that each of these Sections should be divided into sub-sections as follows:-

- | | | |
|---|---|--|
| (1) British and Imperial | } | The early setting up of a Combined Committee - British, American and Russian - is being strongly advocated by D.P.W. and COSSAC, for dealing with their P/Ws only. |
| (2) United States | | |
| (3) Russian | | |
| (4) French | | |
| (5) Northern European (Poland, Scandinavia, Denmark, Holland and Belgium). | | |
| (6) Southern European (all Mediterranean countries (with the exception of France) and the Balkans). | | |
| (7) Miscellaneous (Orientals and nationals of countries not included in the above). | | |

The Displaced Civilians Section should also contain sub-sections for stateless persons and Jews.

14. In Great Britain P/Ws are considered to be a War Office responsibility whereas Displaced civilian persons of all categories other than P/Ws come under the Foreign Office. Thus when the Allied Control Commission was set up for Italy the PW Sub-Commission became a part of the Military Section of that Commission, the Displaced Persons Sub-Commission being under the Political Section.

Owing to the fact, however, that the work of the organisations for dealing with P/Ws and civilian displaced persons must be very closely linked and that in the early stages it will not always be possible to differentiate between these two categories, it is recommended that in the case of Germany these two organisations should be "two sections of one Sub-Commission", as indicated above.

15. The provision and training of the personnel for the nucleus Repatriation Staffs, referred to above, is a matter needing urgent consideration; and whether this is, or is not, a Civil Affairs commitment, wholly or in part, will have to be decided on a high level. An important factor in the provision of personnel is the decision as to which "manpower ceiling" is to provide the staff. It is clear, however, that all the Allied Governments should be represented; that numbers of intelligence officers and C.S.D.I.C. personnel will be required; and that International, British and American Red Cross personnel could be of considerable assistance. In the "High Commission stage" it might be possible to hand much of the responsibility for the Displaced Persons Section of the Sub-Commission to U.N.R.R.A., provided that U.N.R.R.A. is not an independent agency to the Control Commission but would be under its direction.

16. In view of the situation disclosed above, it is apparent that a policy to be decided by the United Nations should be made known with as little delay as possible in order that the machinery may be set up for the relief and repatriation of these Allied nationals. It is, therefore, suggested that the matter should be considered by the Post-Hostilities Planning Sub-Committee in the first instance, and thereafter by the Ministerial Committee on Armistice Terms and Civil Administration and the Ministerial Committee on Supplies in Liberated and Conquered Areas, for submission to the European Advisory Commission through the British representative, with particular reference to the following points:-

- (a) Formation of and organisation, establishments and responsibility for the Repatriation and Relief Staffs.
- (b) Terms for retention in the Armistice Terms for Germany.
- (c) Plans and machinery for repatriation and evacuation of all categories.
- (d) Policy with regard to food supplies other than those available in the country.

NOTE. In the preparation of this paper plans for the repatriation of enemy and neutral displaced persons have not been considered, since it is felt that priority must be given to Allied nationals. Plans can only be made for the repatriation of enemy and neutral nationals after those for Allied nationals have been fully prepared.

APPROXIMATE NUMBERS OF ALLIED P/Ws REPORTED IN GERMAN HANDS

| NATIONALITY | FIGURES SUPPLIED BY | NUMBERS |
|--|-------------------------------|------------------|
| British (including Foreigners serving with British Units). | D.P.W. | 140,000 |
| France | M.I.3. | 1,200,000 |
| French P/Ws transferred to Labour | M.I.3. | 250,000 |
| Russia (guess work only)* | GOSSAC | 2,000,000* |
| Belgium and Luxembourg | Palalret Committee | 70,000 |
| Netherlands | " " | 150,000 |
| Yugoslavia | " " | 133,207 |
| Poland | " " | 400,000 |
| Czechoslovakia | Central Statistical Office | 6 |
| Norway | " | 46 |
| Greece | " | 74 |
| TOTAL: | | <u>4,343,333</u> |

American figures
unknown.

Registry
No. U 17/17/G

H.M.G.J.

Draft.

General Kirby,
WAR OFFICE.

(from Mr. Jebb).

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

45
FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

[Dear General] 14th January 1944

Many thanks for

~~I reply to the memorandum which you~~
~~addressed to me on the 28th December about~~
displaced persons.

I discussed this memorandum both with my Committee and with the Foreign Office, and very much regret to say that my Committee were unanimous in thinking that they were not qualified to undertake the task which you suggest.

The Foreign Office for their part are now inclined to think that in the circumstances a start had better be made by the War Office in consultation with them, as part of the general scheme for getting out directives based on the terms of surrender. The best forum for such an operation might prove to be a sub-Committee of the A.C.A.O.

When such work has been completed, it should be possible to see what, if anything, remains to be done by P.H.P. in connexion with the planning of a Displaced Persons Section/

*Administration
Civil Affairs
Organisation*

section on the Political Sub-Commission
(or the Prisoners-of-War Sub-Commission)
of the Control Commission.

M
12/1

Yours sincerely

(Sd) Hood

for Gladwyn Jebb

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

(U 17/17/G).

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.
14th January, 1944.

46

[Dear General]

Many thanks for the memorandum which you sent me on the 28th December about displaced persons.

I discussed this memorandum both with my Committee and with the Foreign Office, and very much regret to say that my Committee were unanimous in thinking that they were not qualified to undertake the task which you suggest.

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When such work has been completed, it should be possible to see what, if anything, remains to be done by P.H.P. in connexion with the planning of a Displaced Persons Section on the Political Sub-Commission (or the Prisoners-of-War Sub-Commission) of the Control Commission.

Yours sincerely
(Sd) O. Flood
for (Edwyn Jebb)

Major-General

S.W. Kirby, C.B., C.I.E., O.B.E., M.C.,
War Office.

The War Office, if they accept the main responsibility for this problem of Displaced Persons, will expect constant assistance and guidance from the F.O. Almost every Department in the office is concerned with this question in one way or another, but I think one Department ought to be definitely charged with handling it. Most of the papers are at present entered E & R but we have neither the ~~manpower~~ ^{manpower} to deal with it properly, nor is it a subject which ought to be the main responsibility of this Department.

Subject to Mr. Randall's views (who may feel that his Department, which is now dealing with concrete cases as they arise, ought to take it on), I suggest that the subject should be transferred to the Relief Department in view of the fact that the U.N.R.R.A. Repatriation Committee is the body which will eventually have to clear up the mess. P/W Department are of course also closely interested, but I believe Mr. Roberts is ~~anxious~~ ^{anxious} if possible to segregate P/W's from Displaced Persons generally.

Yoo

Mr. Randall

17th January, 1944.

Mr. Roberts

Mr. Hall Patch

I discussed this with Mr. Dudley and Mr. Hall-Patch. The following are, subject to the Committee, the conclusions at which we arrived:-

(1) Our experiences in Italy show that the

disposal need/

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

Minutes.

displaced persons problem must arise as soon as invasion takes place, and will be of a considerable scale in any other area.

(3) The organization must be able to cope with the displaced persons problem from the very outset and for as long as the "military period" lasts must be military.

(4) The maintenance and registration of displaced persons is laid on UNRWA and in order to enable UNRWA to take over smoothly they should, as near as possible, as possible, be associated with the military organization and have an opportunity of interacting with it.

(4) The foregoing principles should be applied rigidly to the organization of UNRWA. In the case of UNRWA the Director-General of UNRWA should have an advisory role in military authorities with a view to giving the representative associated with the displaced persons Sub-Committee, while for Western Europe there should be contact between UNRWA and CIBAC.

(5) The temporary reception of displaced persons and their registration is full of potential difficulties, as the comparatively short example of Italy amply demonstrates. These difficulties could arise and lead to direct negotiation with the particular governments concerned. (Note: From momentary view, viz. the political difficulties - e.g. the quarrel between Tito's followers and the Yugoslav Government, the conflict of interest which seems bound to arise over the many thousands of Italian nationals in France, the presence of Italian - German war refugees and the need for international bodies to deal with them in a practical manner, so far as Italy is concerned, the Italian Office, in consultation with the UNRWA, should be the Russian Government; and the UNRWA should be enabled to deal with the Italian Government).

It is recommended that a special instruction be issued to the UNRWA regarding the displaced persons and

done/

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

under categories of displaced persons; the local committee for settling them is the same and it is only for a certain term of time that it can be decided that this or that person is a refugee and that it is the duty of the Inter-governmental Committee. In view of this, it is in view of the fact that as the result of the feelings with displaced persons are concerned (handling them in the U.S.A., for example) are correctly the people in local committees, or at least the activities of the local committees, it would appear that it is the duty of the displaced persons committee, and the local committees, to deal with the displaced persons, and the local committees, should, in the case of the U.S.A., be able to handle them in the case of the U.S.A., and the local committees, should be able to handle them in the case of the U.S.A.

A.W.G. Randall.

1 January, 1944.

→ This sounds an excellent arrangement and I am very grateful.

Do you want to take over any of the papers in his bundle?

Wood

23/1

Reference
W2485/109K
417/G
3/1/44

V3646/G

etc

Minutes.

49

Relief and repatriation of Allied nationals
- Germany and Poland
V2485

Mr. Randall and I attended a meeting of various branches of the War Office on January 19th at which an attempt was made to take this difficult question a stage further.

The Director of Prisoners of War explained that, as Allied Forces penetrated into the Continent, Commanders-in-Chief would find considerable numbers of Allied p/w's and displaced persons in their zones and that, unless preparations were made for dealing with them, the organisation which will be responsible for British, American and Russian p/w's would be encumbered with these two other categories and that in consequence the interests of British and American p/w's would suffer.

It was generally agreed that in the military phase it would be impracticable to deal only with Allied civilians leaving Allied p/w's out of consideration, that for a considerable time the maintenance and administration of both groups would be the responsibility in Western Europe of the Supreme Allied Commander and that general directives for his guidance must be prepared by the E.O. and W.O. in consultation. A paper containing an outline plan, or at any rate the principles which should govern such a plan, should accordingly be drawn up, and in

this paper the ^{Minutes.} commitment which
H.M.G. desire that the military
machine shall assume must be
clearly stated. This could be put
before the Chiefs of Staff who
would then, in so far as they
accepted the directive, lay the
commitment on the Allied
Supreme Command.

After the meeting the Director
of Prisoners of War and I reported
the position to Sir W. Strang who
agreed that a start sh^d. be made
in the E.O. as soon as possible to
formulate the directives. He
thought that the question whether
draft directives sh^d. be
referred to the European Advisory
Commission, ought to be reserved
for further consideration. He
suggested that as a first step
the E.O. Depts concerned sh^d.
meet under the chairmanship
of an A.S. S. of S. - perhaps
Sir de Pabinski - to discuss
and draft a paper in con-
sultation with reps of W.O.
and C.O.S.S.A.C.

W. Strang

24/1/44

I suggest Dept
E.O. & A. Depts
General Depts
Mr. Reynolds

Please see attached copy of
minutes to Mr. Roberts - a
discussion which I have written on
this subject. W. the for

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Control in Ed. Kellett results in
agreed that D.C.A. will co-operate,
then the way would be clear for
the meeting over which Sir M. Palamit
(who is chairman of the Inter. Allied
Displaced Persons Advisory Committee)
could preside.

A.W.G. Rendell

21/1

I agree with the programme proposed
to do it.

If by any chance R.M.

✓ 23/1

Palamit cannot take this on, we
might perhaps get Prof. Rendell to do it:
he ought anyhow to participate in the
work of the C.A. *W.G. Rendell*

Sir M. Palamit has agreed
to preside at a meeting on
Jan. 28.

A.W.G.

26/1

Ester 4. 51

Mr. Pitt-Rivers.

Subject: Displaced Persons. I would
 propose to send the attached paper to Colonel Kellard
 and in consultation with him try to secure a copy
 of the paper for the Displaced Persons
 Commission. I think that the following should
 be included in any such paper:-

Members of the Commission

General

S. and R. Commission

British Commission

CCCCC

It is also proposed that the Director in
 London be given a copy.

During the meeting there was a report that the
 Committee had decided to send a mission to the
 Displaced Persons Commission in the hope of
 the Committee will be able to have the blessing of the
 Committee.

The first point which I would like to make is the
 fact that the Committee of the Displaced Persons
 Commission has decided to send a mission to the
 Displaced Persons Commission in the hope of
 the Committee will be able to have the blessing of the
 Committee. It is to be pointed out that the
 Committee of the Displaced Persons Commission will
 be able to have the blessing of the Committee
 of the Displaced Persons Commission generally,
 but the distinction will not be made in the
 Committee of the Displaced Persons Commission.

A.W.G. Randall

1st March, 1941.

In the stage of military operations Allied
 POWs other than British, American and
 Russian will, like displaced persons, be
 the responsibility of in Western Europe.

of General Eisenhower's staff is:
S.C.A.E.F., if the view expressed at
General Jepp's meeting is accepted. The
directive which is to be given to S.C.A.E.F.
must, therefore, cover both classes.

see record
wh. you sh^d have rec^d?

I agree that no machinery for
handling this group or of the displaced
persons on the continent has yet
been decided on. But S.C.A.E.F.
are now collating the necessary inf.
and will prepare a plan for all
other Allied p/w's. They will re-
commend that a P/W Executive
shall be formed ready to function as
soon as hostilities cease, the British
/U.S. Sections being mobilised at an
early date. The Executive wd. be
attached to S.C.A.E.F. and each
Allied Govt. wd. nominate a rep^{re}.
to sit (at the moment to be decided
on) on it. Close liaison wd. have
to be maintained between it and the
organisation which is eventually to deal
with displaced persons.

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

as Hrod
✓ 27/1

M
27/1

(M. B. Davis
24/1/44

The use of the term 'espionage persons' is, also, restricted. It is restricted to civilians who, on various occasions, have received from the military authorities, information that they are in Germany in which they find the selves, and must, therefore, be subjected to some kind of active espionage.

The purpose of this report is-

- (1) to present a picture of the displaced persons problem as it will arise and develop in the course of operations and subsequently;
- (2) to suggest a policy on immediate and should give the directive and by which day this directive should be formulated; and
- (3) to suggest the organization of organizations which shall carry out the directive.

4) The Picture

[illegible]

and the United States, that their interests will be very
solicitous about their rights, and should in their actions,
there will be a constant pressure of this Government and
the United States Government for the rights to be made
for coming for their and, so far as possible, remove the to
other restrictions.

Police,

[illegible][illegible]

100

Affairs of the War Office should take a major part in formulating the directive. Finally, however, the problem must create political complications and necessitate co-operation with foreign governments. This gives the Foreign Office an important interest from the outset of the short-term period and still more as that passes into the long-term period. Accordingly it is suggested that Civil Affairs, War Office, and the Foreign Office should together produce a draft directive, in consultation with such other departments as they may consider advisable.

(c) Execution

Since it is accepted that the problem of displaced persons in general is a military problem, the execution of whatever policy may be decided upon will fall to the services in the field and be the responsibility of the Supreme Command. A distinction will be drawn at the outset between British, American and Russian prisoners of war, for whom organisation and directives already exist. As regards other Allied prisoners of war, the position is not yet clear, and indeed it may be difficult to sort out Allied prisoners of war from the mass of displaced persons in general. This, however, is a detail which can be settled when the directive is finally drawn up. The point to get clear now is that in the first period the directive will be issued to and carried out under the Supreme Military Authority, and that therefore originally the period will be drawn up in consultation with, and then completed should go to, CCSAC. What may be called the second period, which will be carried out not active military operations, will, if so decided, be administered by a Control Commission. If so, then this could have a Displaced Persons Sub-Commission on the model of that existing in Italy now. At this stage, and perhaps even earlier, it would seem advisable to introduce into the displaced persons organisation representatives of the Intergovernmental Refugee Committee and of U.N.R.R.A., since it must be foreseen that at the close of the military period there will be large bodies of refugees requiring food, shelter, means of transport back to their homes, some authority to look to in view of their statelessness, and some organisation to negotiate for their reception in some other country if they can neither stay where they are nor be replaced in their original country of residence. These functions can be assumed by U.N.R.R.A. and the Intergovernmental Committee, and in order that the transition from the Control Commission to what may be called the U.N.R.R.A. régime may be effected without friction at a time when Supreme Command judges it opportune, it would seem desirable that both these civilian organisations should be associated with the directives. By the time this period is reached the directives may have been modified and it will be presented to the organisations through the regular channels after agreement has been reached on the conditions concerned, the co-ordination of views in this respect being undertaken by the Foreign Office.

WORKING DRAFT, S. 1.

1st January, 1944.

SECRET

RLM/RT/43/182

54

MR. H.M.G. JEBB.

I attach a Minute which I have received from Sir Arthur Longmore together with a letter from Sir Michael Palairret to which he refers.

I should have thought myself that the matters with which the Displaced Persons Sub-Committee deal fall into the category of 'detail' as opposed to 'outline' planning, which should fall within the scope of the D.C.A. and not of the P.H.P. Sub-Committee. If we are going to concern ourselves with the details of the Prisoners of War Sub-Commission of any Control Commission and its relations with the bodies dealing with Displaced Persons, it seems to me that we shall be embarking on detailed planning of the Control Commission which is precisely what we are not supposed to do.

I shall be grateful if you will return these two papers with your comments.


R. LE MESURIER.

30th December, 1943.
1 Richmond Terrace,
S.W.1.

Lieut. Colonel Le Mesurier

55

The attached has arrived from Sir Michael Palisiret. I have shown it to the Admiral and the General who seem pleased with the idea but before replying I think the matter should be referred to the Chairman if not to a Private Meeting.

Presumably P.H.P.I. will provide the representation if so decided.

hwb
29/.

1 Richmond Terrace,
29th December, 1943.

Prisoners of War Department,
Foreign Office,
Devonshire House,
Piccadilly,
W.1.

18th December, 1943.

My dear Longmore,

Would it not be a good thing if there were some sort of liaison between your organisation and the Displaced Persons Sub-Committee? I do not suggest that the latter should ever participate in your discussions (which are no doubt of a secret and confidential character), but it seems to me that it would be a very good plan if you could delegate somebody to attend our meetings and to keep us on the right lines when the effect on the problem of military operations has to be considered. We are each dealing with different aspects of the same question, and I am rather afraid of our overlapping or of making divergent recommendations.

Yours ever,

Michael Palairt

(M. Palairt)

Air Marshal
Sir Arthur Longmore, G.C.B.,
1 Richmond Terrace,
Whitehall,
S.W.1.



The War Office,

Room 107,
Hotel Victoria, 37
Northumberland Avenue,
LONDON, W.C.2.

C.A.7/BM/69/2

SECRET

18th January, 1944.

Dear *Jebb*

Wgts 55
Jan 26.

Many thanks for your letter of 14th January. The decision taken yesterday at the A.C.A.C. meeting that the Directives, etc., based on the draft German armistice terms, Sections 44 to 50, are to be written by a Working Party under the Chairmanship of the Foreign Office, I think, settles this question.

The D.P.W., General Jepp, was holding an internal War Office meeting to-morrow, as he is extremely anxious on the subject of allied prisoners of war. I have informed him of the A.C.A.C. recommendation and suggested that he asks to his meeting a representative of the Foreign Office, so that nothing will be proposed or done as a result of Jepp's meeting which would in any way interfere with the Foreign Office control on this subject.

Yours sincerely,

St. John

Gladwyn Jebb, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign Office,
Downing Street,
S.W.1.

This paper is being transferred to Refugee Dept

File Number :—

W/09

12/11/1911

W3156 / G 58

17

W3156/109/g¹⁵
Mr. Charles Peake
to Mr. Randall

Displaced Persons + Allied
prisoners of war.

Dated: 22 Feb.

Refers to FO letter of 15/2 (W203/g)
+ gives points which are being
worked on in the preparation of an
outline plan.

Received:

Last Paper.

W2770

(Minutes.)

References.

W203/109/g

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

The "plan" will deal
with matters falling under
articles 13, 44, 45 + 49.
which we (2 P, D) are dealing
with

W D. P. Raker
P/D Dept
Mr. Troubeck
E+R, Dept. 1/3
+ Walker
1/3

with this subject a sub-section
of your discussion?

| (Action completed.) | (Index.) |
|---------------------|----------|
| 22/2/50 | W. |

Next Paper.

4/3
I have now submitted a fresh directive
all

directive on p.o.w.s & internees and a
diff memo for the Soviet Govt as requested
at Mr. Troubridge's meeting of March 2.
-copy sent on March 8 to Mr. Randall.

I might add that Mr. Roberts's
directive was drawn up in
consultation with SCAEF.

Mr. Troubridge. Yes, thank you.
I presume you have
seen it.
10/3

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN ON THIS PAGE.

13) Enter 9.

NORFOLK HOUSE,
ST. JAMES'S SQUARE,
S.W.1.

59

W 3156

22nd of February, 1944

Dear Mac,

Your letter W 3156/4 of the 12th of February about displaced persons and Allied prisoners of war. The Civil Affairs Section have only recently formed a sub-section to deal with the displaced persons problem. This sub-section, having done some research on the subject, is engaged on the preparation of an outline plan. Among the points which are being worked on in this outline plan are:-

- (i) Preventive measures, e.g. to secure a starve fast.
- (ii) Emergency measures, e.g. limitation of movement, public health control, security control, etc.
- (iii) The employment of national labour officers in the various camps of which a few of these national officers are likely to be found.
- (iv) The use of Voluntary Societies to the fullest extent where the military situation permits.
- (v) Early and smooth transition to civilian life.
- (vi) Maximum use of local resources in handling the problem.
- (vii) Responsibility for this problem of war.

As soon as this outline plan has been approved, I will send you a copy of it. Meanwhile, it would be premature to indicate policy except to say that what I am at present doing is to deal with these displaced persons and to not start fact within Army zones, in order to prevent movements of his troops being hampered.

Yours ever

Charles Drake

M. A. G. Drake, Esq.
1, Cleveland Road, S.W.1.

File Number :—

W/09

W 3439 / G

GENERAL

20

W 3439/109/8 H⁸

F.O. minute

Dated: 1 March

Received. 6 MAR 1944

Refugees in enemy camps.

Dft to Mr Peake raising a point which has been pressed by refugee enthusiasts among M.P.s, as to whether The Allied Supreme Command will take steps to release refugees in enemy camps

Last Paper.

W 3156

(Minutes.)

see within.

References.

Mr. G. Hall
to Sec. 8/3

1. J. R.

7/3

- L. J. R.

9/3.

(Print.)

(How disposed of)

Dft. to Mr Peake
from Mr. Kandal
11/3

(Action completed.)

95 1013

(Index.)

W

Next Paper.

W 4233

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN ON THIS PAGE.

Registry

No.

W.
W3439/109/c

Draft.

Mr. Randall

to Mr. Peake.

Dear Charles,

The Refugee enthusiasts among M.P.s have been pressing a point which I ought to mention to you - that in the Allied advance into the Continent there will be found many centres of refugees, put in camps by the enemy. The Germans will probably not be able to afford transport to remove these people, but they may well, unless checked, murder them instead of deporting them. Will, we are asked, the Allied Supreme Command take steps to rescue these people.

In reply the S. of S. has (after we consulted the War Office) said that the S.A.C. is perfectly alive to the humanitarian demands likely to be made upon him, but that we could not ~~fix~~

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

limit his freedom of action by any
defective on this matter, so far as the
period of active military operations
is concerned.

We should, however, be glad
to know whether you haven't,
to know whether you would like us to get
a list of camps where refugees are
concentrated. One big centre is Vittel,
unless the occupants have been deported
by now, as was ~~report~~ rumored. It is
not easy to do anything in advance, of
course, but we think we should be able to
give the assurance that the possibilities
are being kept in mind.

AmK

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

FOREIGN OFFICE (Refugee Department),

3, Cleveland Row,

6/11

St. James's, S.W.1.

1st March, 1944.

Dear Charles,

The refugee enthusiasts among members of Parliament have been pressing a point which I ought to mention to you - that in the Allied advance into the Continent there will be found many centres of refugees, put in camps by the enemy. The Germans will probably not be able to afford transport to remove these people, but they may well, unless checked, murder them instead of deporting them. Will, we are asked, the Supreme Allied Command take steps to rescue these people?

In reply the Secretary of State has (after we consulted the War Office) said that the Supreme Allied Command is perfectly alive to the humanitarian demands likely to be made upon him, but that we could not limit his freedom of action by any directive on this matter, so far as the period of active military operations is concerned.

We should, however, be glad to know whether you have or, if you have not, would like us to get a list of camps where refugees are concentrated. The big centre is Vittel, unless the occupants have been deported by now, as was rumoured. It is not easy

to/

Charles Peake, Esq.,
Norfolk House.

File Number:—

W109

GENERAL

W 5031/G 63

W 5031/109/88 H8

Sir S. Hoare
Madrid

Telegram no. 494

Dated: 30 March

Received

Last Paper.

W 5030

References.

W 1657/16/48

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

DFA CR. Rait M. I. G. W.O.
from Mr Walker (for the
Raidah) April 4

(Action
completed.)

(Index)

SC 128

Next Paper.

Relief and rescue of Refugees

Refers to FO despatches 84 and 85
(W 1657/16/48) informing that arrangements
have been made at Winton to issue a Treasury
licence for expenditure by a Lisbon T.D.C.
rept in Spain of considerable sums to
communicate with refugees in occupied
territory.

(Minutes.)

Q. With to Lieut. Colonel C. M. Rait
(M.I. 9, W.O. Room 537, Hotel Victoria)
in the form of the attested aft, enclosing
copies of the L.L. and of the despatches Nos
84 and 85 to Madrid.

I am, L. Henderson
3/4.

Control D. I. G.

Walker

I agree. But there is great
factual force in these objections

Walker

I. L. H.

4/4

Reminded Colonel Rait, who pointed to
Raidah B. reply

I. L. H.

B. H. April 11th 12/4

Walker

11/4

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN ON THIS PAGE.

[CYPHER]

W503/ 64
DEPARTMENTAL NO.1.

FROM MADRID TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir S. Hoare
No. 494

D.11.12 a.m.G.M.T. 31st March, 1944.

30th March, 1944.

R.12.45 p.m.B.S.T. 31st March, 1944.

Repeated to Lisbon Saving.

T T T T T

DEDIP

IMPORTANT.

W 1657/16/48

Your despatches Nos 84 and 85.

MOST SECRET.

United States Embassy here have received a telegram from Washington notifying them of arrangements made to issue a Treasury licence for expenditure by a Lisbon J.D.C. representative in Spain, of considerable sums of money to communicate with refugees in enemy occupied territory "by any means deemed expedient" in order to arrange clandestine evacuation of persons in danger of their lives and to take any other action considered appropriate. These arrangements apparently are to be under Dr. Schwartz the J.D.C. agent in Lisbon and instructions add that objective of keeping foreign exchange from the enemy should [gp. omitted ? be] treated as subordinate to saving lives, regarded by War Refugee Board as the most important consideration.

2. In reply, United States Embassy have telegraphed

a) that J.D.C. employé concerned is unsuitable for this task on security grounds.

b) that the whole position in Spain of J.D.C. and any other American [gp. undec. ? world] organisation would be prejudiced by such clandestine operation

c) that the Germans might make use of such a project to infiltrate their own agents through Spain into North Africa and other United Nations territory and

d) that the scheme might jeopardise existing arrangements to evacuate British and Allied airmen from France. The Embassy therefore urges that the proposal should be submitted for approval of Joint Chiefs of Staff on account of point d) and on account of military significance of requisition order at the moment.

3. I wholehearted agree with United States Ambassador's reply and consider points c) and d) of primary importance. Since the network for assisting the escape of British and American airmen is primarily directed by the War Office in London, I would suggest that M.I.9. be consulted.

/I.....

I also consider that when and if project is submitted to Joint Chief of Staff we should do everything possible to kill it as the opening of new clandestine line in the interests of refugee work would be quite fatal at this stage to other more important work being done for British and American fighting personnel.

4. Please repeat to Washington as my telegram No. 119.

[Repeated to Washington under Foreign Office telegram No. 2728].

O.T.P.

Registry

No. 7 5031/109/G

I.I.H.

Draft.

Lt.-Col. C.H. Reit,
War Office (H.I.9),
Room 537,
Hotel Victoria.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

(from Mr
Randall)

7/10
2/4
Campbell
first.

65
FOREIGN OFFICE (Refugee Department),

11, Cleveland Row,

St. James's, S.W.1.

4th April, 1944.

Dear Colonel Reit,

I enclose a copy of telegram No. 494 of 30th March from Madrid together with copies of Foreign Office despatches to Madrid Nos. 84 and 85 referred to therein, about the desire of the United States War Refugee Board to facilitate the escape of refugees from Nazi-controlled territory into Spain.

Dr. Schwartz of the American Joint Distribution Committee (a Jewish institution for spending on behalf of Jewish refugees monies collected by Jewish voluntary societies in America) is known to us as a reputable person engaged in the work of relief and rescue of Jewish refugees. While we see force in arguments (c) and (d) in the telegram, we think that we should draw attention to the fact that the War Refugee Board is sponsored by the President himself and that

H.L.G./

H.M.G. are committed to co-operate as far
as possible with the Board in the work of
rescue. We therefore feel that ^{for H.M.G.} to ask the
Joint Chiefs of Staff to "kill" the scheme
forming the subject of this telegram would
place H.M.G. in an invidious and embarras-
sing position vis-à-vis both the United
States Government and ~~Jewish~~ ^{Arabic and American} organisations
interested in refugees. ~~we would there-~~
~~fore suggest that a letter to the British~~
~~Joint~~
Representative with the Chiefs of Staff
should be sent on the lines of the enclosed
draft ^{in which} ~~and~~ should be glad to receive your
views as soon as possible.

4/4

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No.

66

Draft.

British Representative
with the
Joint Chiefs of
Staff,
Washington.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

without suggesting
any constructive
alternative

Please see my ~~immediately following~~
~~telegram~~ ~~containing~~
~~I enclose a copy of Madrid telegram~~

No. 404 of 30th March about the desire of
~~United States~~
the War Refugee Board to facilitate the
escape of Jewish refugees from Nazi-control-
led territory into Spain.

We have consulted with the War Office
(M.I.9.) who agree with us that since the
War Refugee Board is sponsored personally
by the President and H.M.G. are committed
to co-operate with the Board as far as
possible in refugee work, to attempt to
"kill" the scheme referred to in the
telegram will place H.M.G. in an invidious
and embarrassing position vis-à-vis both
the United States Government and ~~Jewish~~
~~British or American~~
organisations interested in refugees.

While fully aware of the force of the
arguments (c) and (d) put forward in the
telegram, we would like to suggest that ~~if~~
~~an attempt~~
~~should be made to find~~
~~possible~~ some means should be found of
combining the rescue work which the War
Refugee Board wishes to see undertaken with

cur/

our present clandestine activities for the rescue of Service personnel.

We should be grateful for your views as soon as possible regarding the project of the War Refugee Board and the reactions of the Board and the lines on which you think that your United States colleagues should be approached to the representations which the U. S. Ambassador has sent to Washington.

I. L. H.

4/4

Refugees in danger of their lives in German-controlled territory have. It is understood.

been able to use our "escape routes." It would be contrary to

the policy of Anglo-American co-operation in refugee policy if this were to be entirely

stopped and in the interest.

to general policy H.M.G. would, in fact, like to see the more refugee escapes facilitated, so far as is consistent with our military interests.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

FOREIGN OFFICE (Refugee Department), 67

3, Cleveland Row,

St. James's, S.W.1.

W 5031/100/G

4th April, 1944.

Dear Colonel Rait,

I enclose a copy of telegram No. 494 of 30th March from Madrid together with copies of Foreign Office despatches to Madrid Nos. 84 and 85 referred to therein, about the desire of the United States War Refugee Board to facilitate the escape of refugees from Nazi-controlled territory into Spain.

Mr. Schwartz of the American Joint Distribution Committee (a Jewish institution for spending on behalf of Jewish refugees monies collected by Jewish voluntary societies in America) is known to us as a reputable person engaged in the work of relief and rescue of Jewish refugees. While we see force in arguments (c) and (d) in the telegram, we think that we should draw attention to the fact that the War Refugee Board is sponsored by the President himself and that His Majesty's Government are committed to co-operate as far as possible with the Board in the work of rescue. We therefore feel that for His Majesty's Government to ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff to "kill" the scheme forming the subject of this telegram would place His Majesty's Government in an invidious and embarrassing position vis-à-vis both the United States Government and British and American organisations

Interested/

Lt.-Col. C.M. Rait,
War Office (M.I.9.),
Room 537,
Hotel Victoria.

interested in refugees. Accordingly we would suggest that a message to the British Representative with the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be sent on the lines of the enclosed draft on which I should be glad to receive your views as soon as possible.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) H.A. WALKER.

(for A.W.G. Randall)

File Number :—

W/12

10/11

W5710 /G 68

25

W5410/109/8 H8
FD minute

Prisoners of War + Internees in
German Hands.

Draft directive to Supreme
Commanders, A.E.F., + The Soviet
Military Commanders.

Received:

Last Paper.

W5031

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Dft. to M. Gousser

Copied as per 2) in 4/4

Dft. to H. W. Wiant

Copied from M. Strang

1) Copied to 36 W. 20/8

2) Copied to 36 W. 20/8

3) Copied to 36 W. 20/8

4) Copied to 36 W. 20/8

5) Copied to 36 W. 20/8

6) Copied to 36 W. 20/8

7) Copied to 36 W. 20/8

8) Copied to 36 W. 20/8

9) Copied to 36 W. 20/8

10) Copied to 36 W. 20/8

11) Copied to 36 W. 20/8

12) Copied to 36 W. 20/8

13) Copied to 36 W. 20/8

14) Copied to 36 W. 20/8

15) Copied to 36 W. 20/8

16) Copied to 36 W. 20/8

17) Copied to 36 W. 20/8

18) Copied to 36 W. 20/8

(Minutes.)

1) See also within M. Gousser's letter
to Sir W. Strang of 6/4; and

(2) H. W. Wiant's letter of 6/4

(3) Nod. 158 to J.H. W. 7/3

P/W Dft. M.B. 17/4

M. Trougher
1/11
18/4

15/4

Just R.

15/iv

Just.

18/3

(Action
completed.)

(Index)

Next Paper.

Dft. to H. Goussier
com. H. Goussier

Dft. to H. Goussier
com. H. Goussier
H. Goussier

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN ON THIS PAGE.

SECRET

26th March, 1944.

I gather that the Chiefs of Staff are taking at their meeting on March 30th the paper from the U.S. Chiefs of Staff about the post-war repatriation of prisoners of war from Germany (C.C.S.(44)50).

It may be useful for you to have the following comments from the point of view of the A.C.C.

Each of the three drafts of the Instrument of Surrender for Germany now before the A.C.C. contains an article for dealing with United Nations' prisoners of war and civilians who are under restraint. It is our view, which we believe is shared in Washington, that it is the business of the A.C.C. not only to submit draft articles for the Instrument of Surrender but also to draft broad directives for the guidance of Commanders-in-Chief in giving effect to those articles.

It was in virtue of this that the A.C.C. Official Committee at its meeting on the 22nd March agreed with the procedure which I proposed to them for obtaining Russian association in informal discussions on the matters covered by the Directive about prisoners of war which had been approved at the same meeting. I enclose the draft of the letter to the Soviet representative which I prepared after the meeting of the Official Committee. The despatch of this letter has been suspended in view of C.C.S.(44)50.

There is, however, in my view nothing in the communication from the U.S. Chiefs of Staff which stands in the way of my now taking the action approved by the A.C.C. Official Committee.

The /

Brigadier H.L.C. Jacob, C.B.E.,
War Cabinet Offices.

The position will be that I shall be communicating to my Soviet and U.S. colleagues on the R.A.C. a British draft directive about United Nations prisoners of war. I shall not be sending it to them as a joint Anglo-American draft and shall say nothing which would commit the United States authorities either for or against the draft. When my United States colleague receives his copy of the draft directive, he will no doubt refer it to the military advisers on his delegation, who will no doubt in turn refer it to Washington. It will be then that the United States Chiefs of Staff will have an opportunity of expressing a view on the draft, and any differences of opinion can be ironed out in the tripartite discussions, under the aegis of the Commission, which I proposed in my letter to M. Goussiev.

If we have to get the formal approval of the American Chiefs of Staff to the draft directive before we can even show it to the Russians, there will be unnecessary delay. It is, I believe, the view both of the Foreign Office and the War Office that informal discussions with the Russians and the Americans should be started as soon as possible, and I hope that the Chiefs of Staff will not feel that prior formal agreement on the draft directive with the American Chiefs of Staff is a necessary preliminary to the establishment of contacts with the Russians. It would, indeed, be contrary to the whole spirit of the R.A.C. to adopt any such procedure except in cases where there is a strong Anglo-American operational interest.

W. STRANG

Secret

22nd March, 1944.

I enclose herewith the preliminary draft which they have prepared. I propose in due course to circulate this draft for *draft* consideration, in the meantime, to have informal conversations

Each of the three drafts of the Instrument of Surrender for Germany now before the European Advisory Commission contains a provision for the maintenance, release and repatriation of United Nations' prisoners of war and civilians who are under restraint. These provisions are all drafted on similar lines and it should not be difficult for the Commission to reach agreement upon the terms of an article on this subject for inclusion in the Instrument of Surrender.

In the case of this provision of the Instrument, as of many others, it will be necessary for the three Governments to issue instructions to their respective military commanders in Germany as to the manner in which they should give effect to it. It is essential that the instructions issued to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force and to the Soviet Commander on this matter should be identical; and the directive embodying these instructions should be passed by the European Advisory Commission and approved by the three Governments. The fact that a large number of the British and United States prisoners are held in areas which will fall within the proposed Soviet zone of occupation, and that a large number of Soviet prisoners are held in areas falling within the proposed Anglo-American zones, gives the three Governments a common interest in reaching early agreement on joint plans.

The competent authorities here have been giving thought to the terms of the required directive and I enclose a copy

of the/

His Excellency,
Monsieur A. A. Gousov,
etc. etc. etc.

of the preliminary draft which they have prepared. I propose in due course to circulate this draft for consideration by the European Advisory Commission. But our military authorities are wondering whether it would be possible, in the meantime, to have informal conversations with Soviet and American military representatives here both as regards the draft directive and as regards the more detailed plans which will have to be drawn up later, on the basis of the directive. They have already had informal contacts with United States officers and they have now asked me to enquire whether it would be possible for a Soviet military representative to join in informal tripartite conversations in the immediate future. They have certain facts and explanations in connection with this draft directive which they would like to place before the Soviet military representative..

I very much hope that you will be able to authorize one or more of the military advisers to your Delegation to join in these talks at an early date. It would be convenient if they could be held at Lancaster House. The Secretariat of the Commission could furnish an interpreter and any other assistance that might be required. The British representative would be Major General A.C. Gepp.

I am sending Mr. Winant a copy of this letter and asking him whether he can arrange for United States military representatives to take part in the proposed consultations.

~~W. STRANG~~

Two examples I have seen with horizontal cut to wood and as

2000

1990

SECRET

28th Marc , 1944.

I gather that the Chiefs of Staff are taking at their meeting on March 30th the paper from the U.S. Chiefs of Staff about the post-war repatriation of prisoners of war from Germany (C.C.S.(44)50).

It may be useful for you to have the following comments from the point of view of the A.C.C.

Each of the three drafts of the Instrument of Surrender for Germany now before the A.C.C. contains an article for dealing with United Nations' prisoners of war and civilians who are under restraint. It is our view, which we believe is shared in Washington, that it is the business of the A.C.C. not only to submit draft articles for the Instrument of Surrender but also to draft broad directives for the guidance of Commanders-in-Chief in giving effect to those articles.

It was in virtue of this that the A.C.C. Official Committee at its meeting on the 22nd March agreed with the procedure which I proposed to them for obtaining Russian assent in informal discussions on the matters covered by the Directive about prisoners of war which had been approved at the same meeting. I enclose the draft of the letter to the Soviet representative which I prepared after the meeting of the Official Committee. The despatch of this letter has been suspended in view of C.C.S.(44)50.

There is, however, in my view nothing in the communication from the U.S. Chiefs of Staff which stands in the way of my now taking the action approved by the A.C.C. Official Committee.

The /

Brigadier M.I.C. Jacob, C.B.E.,
War Cabinet Offices.

The position will be that I shall be communicating to my Soviet and U.S. colleagues on the E.A.C. a British draft directive about United States prisoners of war. I shall not be sending it to them as a joint Anglo-American draft and shall say nothing which would commit the United States authorities either for or against the draft. When my United Nations colleague receives his copy of the draft directive, he will no doubt refer it to the military advisers on his delegation, who will no doubt in turn refer it to Washington. It will be then that the United States Chiefs of Staff will have an opportunity of expressing a view on the draft, and any differences of opinion can be ironed out in the tripartite discussions, under the aegis of the Commission, which I proposed in my letter to M. Gourev.

If we have to get the formal approval of the American Chiefs of Staff to the draft directive before we can even show it to the Russians, there will be unnecessary delay. It is, I believe, the view both of the Foreign Office and the War Office that informal discussions with the Russians and the Americans should be started as soon as possible, and I hope that the Chiefs of Staff will not feel that prior formal agreement on the draft directive with the American Chiefs of Staff is a necessary preliminary to the establishment of contacts with the Russians. It would, indeed, be contrary to the whole spirit of the E.A.C. to adopt any such procedure except in cases where there is a strong Anglo-American operational interest.

W. STRANGE

Secret

72
22nd March, 1944.

high
Each of the three drafts of the Instrument of Surrender for Germany now before the European Advisory Commission contains a provision for the maintenance, release and repatriation of United Nations' prisoners of war and civilians who are under restraint. These provisions are all drafted on similar lines and it should not be difficult for the Commission to reach agreement upon the terms of an article on this subject for inclusion in the instrument of Surrender.

In the case of this provision of the Instrument, as of many others, it will be necessary for the three Governments to issue instructions to their respective military commanders in Germany as to the manner in which they should give effect to it. It is essential that the instructions issued to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force and to the Soviet Commander on this matter should be identical: and the directive embodying these instructions should be passed by the European Advisory Commission and approved by the three Governments. The fact that a large number of the British and United States prisoners are held in areas which will fall within the proposed Soviet zone of occupation, and that a large number of Soviet prisoners are held in areas falling within the proposed Anglo-American zones, gives the three Governments a common interest in reaching early agreement on joint plans.

The competent authorities here have been giving thought to the terms of the required directive and I enclose a copy

of the/

His Excellency,
Monsieur F. I. Gousev,
etc. etc. etc.

of the preliminary draft which they have prepared. I propose in due course to circulate this draft for consideration by the European Advisory Commission. But our military authorities are wondering whether it would be possible, in the meantime, to have informal conversations with Soviet and American military representatives here both as regards the draft directive and as regards the more detailed plans which will have to be drawn up later, on the basis of the directive. They have already had informal contacts with United States officers and they have now asked me to enquire whether it would be possible for a Soviet military representative to join in informal tripartite conversations in the immediate future. They have certain facts and explanations in connection with this draft directive which they would like to place before the Soviet military representative.

I very much hope that you will be able to authorise one or more of the military advisers to your Delegation to join in these talks at an early date. It would be convenient if they could be held at Lancaster House. The Secretariat of the Commission could furnish an interpreter and any other assistance that might be required. The British representative would be Major General A.C. Gopp.

I am sending Mr. Wissant a copy of this letter and asking him whether he can arrange for United States military representatives to take part in the proposed consultations.

W. STRANG

NS-10

DRAFT DIRECTIVE TO SUPREME COMMANDER, ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY
FORCE AND THE SOVIET MILITARY COMMANDER ON PRISONERS OF WAR
AND INTERNEES IN GERMAN HANDS.

1. [Herein insert reference to the article of the Instrument of Surrender dealing with prisoners of war.]
2. The Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and the Soviet Military Commander are charged with the duty of ensuring that the terms of the armistice in this respect are faithfully fulfilled in their respective zones of occupation, and that all prisoners of war and internees of the United Nations are repatriated at the earliest possible date consistent with military operations. For this purpose they will work in close co-operation.
3. In the event of the supreme German authority for any reason being unable to fulfil its undertakings, the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and the Soviet Military Commander will take whatever steps they may consider necessary, including the provision of aircraft, to ensure that all prisoners of war and internees of the United Nations are adequately fed, clothed, housed and medically cared for until such time as they are repatriated.
4. The policy as regards all such prisoners of war and internees will be that they shall remain in their camps and similar places where they may be held until arrangements are made for their repatriation or evacuation.
5. (a) Repatriation of United Nations prisoners of war and internees will receive priority over that of displaced persons. Such priority, however, will not preclude the possibility, should circumstances permit, of simultaneous repatriation of both prisoners of war, internees and displaced persons;
(b) The priority of evacuation and repatriation of all United Nations prisoners of war and internees will be determined after consultation between the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and the Soviet Military Commander, and will be dependent upon the following considerations:-
 - (i) the military operation of the occupation of Germany by the forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the British Commonwealth and the United States of America;
 - (ii) the lines of communication;
 - (iii) transportation facilities;
 - (iv) the location of the various nationalities of the prisoners of war and internees;
 - (v) the immediately available facilities of the respective countries to receive their prisoners of war and internees.
(c) The plans for repatriation will be concerted by the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and the Soviet Military Commander in their respective zones;
(d) The Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and the Soviet Military Commander will each have attached to his headquarters representatives of all United Nations any of whose nationals are prisoners of war or internees in his zone of occupation, and representatives of these nations will have rights of access to their prisoners of war and internees wherever they may be.
6. Each nation will require certain procedures to be carried out regarding documentation, pay, reporting of casualties, provision of information, etc., and these points will be covered by instructions to their respective representatives.

Registry
No:

Draft.

M. Gousser.

Copy under cover
to Mr. Winant.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

(with enc.)

Copy (2)

1. Col. Elmes
D.P.W. from office
2. Col. A.A. Worsatta
Army Council
Secretariat, L.O.
General Kelly, W.O.
3. Mr. Platte
5. (with enc.)

4. Brigadier Jacob
M.C.O.

2nd April
March, 1944.

Secret.

Each of the three drafts of the Instrument of Surrender for Germany now before the European Advisory Commission contains a provision for ^{dealing with} ~~the maintenance, release and repatriation of~~ United Nations' prisoners of war and ^{with} civilians who are under restraint. These ^{draft} provisions are ^{all directed to similar ends} ~~all drafted on similar~~ lines and ^{I should like that it would not} ~~it should not~~ be difficult for the Commission to reach agreement upon the terms of an article on this subject for inclusion in the Instrument of Surrender.

In the case of this, ~~as of other~~ ^{as of many others,} provisions of the Instrument, ^{it} it will be necessary for the three Governments to issue instructions to their respective military commanders in Germany as to the manner in which they should give effect to ~~the terms of the Instrument of Surrender.~~ It is essential that the instructions issued to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force and to the Soviet Commander ^{on this matter} should be identical and ~~that~~ the directive embodying these instructions should be passed by the European Advisory Commission and approved by the three Governments ~~as soon as possible.~~ The fact that a large ^{number} ~~proportion~~ of the British and U.S. prisoners are held in areas which will ~~probably~~ fall within the ^{proposed} Soviet zone of occupation, and that a large number of Soviet prisoners are held in ~~areas~~ ^{proposed} falling within the proposed Anglo-American zones, gives the three Governments a common interest in reaching early agreement on joint plans./

plans.

The competent authorities here have been giving thought to the terms of the required directive and I enclose a copy of the preliminary draft which they have prepared. I propose in due course to circulate this draft for consideration by the European Advisory Commission. But our military authorities are wondering whether it ^{could} ~~would~~ be ^{arranged} ~~possible~~, in the meantime, to have informal conversations with Soviet and American military representatives here both as regards the terms of the draft directive and as regards the more detailed plans which will have to be drawn up ^{later} on the basis of the directive. ~~They have already had informal contacts with U.S. officers and they have now asked me to enquire whether it would be possible for a Soviet military representative to join in informal tripartite conversations in the immediate future.~~ They have certain facts and

I very much hope that you will be able to authorise one or more of the military advisers to your Delegation to join in these talks at an early date. ~~The talks would be on the same basis as the informal discussions which are now being started on the subject of the military articles in the three drafts.~~ It would be convenient if they could be held at Lancaster House. The Secretariat of the Commission could furnish an interpreter and any other assistance that might be required. The

^{also writing to}
I am ~~sending~~ Mr. Winant ~~a copy of this letter~~ and asking him whether he can arrange for U.S. military representatives to take part in the proposed consultations.

W.P.
27/3

in connection with
draft directive
this problem
explanations which
they would like to
place before
those concerned
as background for
the draft directive
to the Soviet
military
representative in
order to enable
the proposal to make
no the draft
directive.

The British representative
would be happy to

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

8.2.44

SECRET

8th April, 1944.

Each of the three drafts of the instrument of surrender for Germany now before the European Advisory Commission contains a provision for dealing with "Allied Prisoner" prisoners of war and with civilians who are under restraint. These draft provisions are all directed to similar ends, and I should have thought it would not be difficult for the Commission to reach agreement upon the terms of an article on this subject for inclusion in the instrument of surrender.

In the case of this provision of the instrument, as of many others, it will be necessary for the three Governments to issue instructions to their respective military commanders in Germany as to the manner in which they should give effect to it. It is essential that the instructions issued to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force and to the Soviet Commander on this matter should be identical, and the directive embodying these instructions should be issued by the European Advisory Commission and approved by the three Governments. The fact that a large number of the British and United States prisoners are held in areas which will fall within the proposed Soviet zone of occupation, and that a large number of Soviet prisoners are held in areas falling within the proposed Anglo-American zones, gives the three Governments a common interest in reaching early agreement on joint plans.

The competent authorities here have been giving thought to the terms of the required directive and I enclose a copy of the preliminary draft which they have prepared.

Yours sincerely,

His Excellency,
Monsieur A. A. Goussier,
etc. etc. etc.

proceed in due course to circulate this draft for consideration by the European Advisory Commission. But our military authorities are wondering whether it could be arranged, in the meantime, to have informal conversations with Soviet and American military representatives here both as regards the draft directive and as regards the more detailed plans which will have to be drawn up later, on the basis of the directive. They have asked us to enquire whether it would be possible for Soviet military representatives to join in informal tripartite conversations in the immediate future. They have certain facts and suggestions in connection with this draft directive which they would like to place before the Soviet military representatives.

I very much hope that you will be able to authorize one or more of the military advisors to your delegation to join in these talks at an early date. It would be convenient if they could be held at Lancaster House. The Secretariat of the Commission could furnish an interpreter and any other assistance that might be required. The British representative would be Major General A. J. Kemp.

I am also writing to Mr. Mount asking him whether he can arrange for United States military representatives to take part in the proposed consultation.

W. STRANG

Registry
No:

15410/109/E

Secret

2nd April
March, 1944.

Draft.

Mr. Winant.

^{which I have sent}
I enclose a copy of a letter to M. Gousev,
proposing informal talks among U.S., Soviet
and British military representatives on the
subject of ^{the directive} ~~instructions~~ ^{issued} to be ~~given~~ to the
Commanders-in-Chief as regards the execution
of the provisions ⁱⁿ of the surrender terms ^{on the subject of} about
United Nations' prisoners of war and civilians
under restraint.

The Prisoners of War Directorate at the
War Office have already had talks with
General Betts ^{on this subject} ~~and their thoughts have developed~~
~~along the same line.~~

^{very}
I ^{very} much hope that you will find it possible
to fall in with the procedure suggested in my
letter to M. Gousev. ~~We ought, if we can, to~~
~~organise these talks under the aegis of the~~
~~Commission.~~

W.P.

22/3

Copies (with and
as per letter to
M. Gousev

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Secret

78

3rd April, 1944.

I enclose a copy of a letter which I have sent to Monsieur Gousev, proposing informal talks among United States, Soviet and British military representatives on the subject of the directive to be issued to the Commanders-in-Chief as regards the execution of the provision in the surrender terms about United Nations' prisoners of war and civilians under restraint.

The Prisoners of War Directorate at the War Office have already had talks with General Betts on this subject.

I very much hope that you will find it possible to fall in with the procedure suggested in my letter to Monsieur Gousev.

W. STRANG

His Excellency,
The Hon. J. G. Winant,
etc. etc. etc.,
American Embassy.

Enter 79

S.O. 11

~~This should be copied~~
to ~~D.P.W.~~ } War Office.
~~D.C.A.~~

W 5419

Col. A.A. Huxtable W.O.
Brigadier Jucor W.C.O. 4th April, 1944.

S. 5041

W.S. 64

Dear Sir William Strang,

I acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 4th April concerning the draft directive to be issued to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force and to the Soviet Commander on the prisoners of war and interests of the United Nations in the German Reich.

I have extracted the military advisers of our delegation to study the draft which you have so kindly sent to me. As soon as they finish studying it, I shall let you know.

Yours sincerely

F. Grouser

Sir William Strang,
Chief Representative of the British Empire
to the Geneva Advisory Commission.

20
Copies for
Mr. Gousev's letter
W.S.
7/4

WS410

London, April 6, 1944.

Dear Sir William:

I have read with interest the copy of your letter of April 4th to Ambassador Gousev, proposing informal talks among United States, Soviet and British military representatives on the subject of the directive to be issued to the Commanders-in-Chief in connection with United Nations' prisoners of war and civilians under restraint.

I shall be glad to follow your suggestion, and I am designating Brigadier General Wickersham to act as the American representative in discussions with Major General E. C. Gepp and the Soviet representative.

Sincerely

John S. W. Maitland

Sir William Strang, K.C.M.G.,
Foreign Office, S.W.1.

Secret

8th April, 1944.

Thank you for your letter No. 509A. of April 6th.

I have now heard from Mr. Winant that he is willing to follow the suggestion made in my letter of April 4th, and that he is designating Brigadier-General Wickersham to act as American representative in the proposed informal military discussions about United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees.

W. STRANG

His Excellency
Monsieur F.T. Gousev,
etc., etc., etc.,
Soviet Embassy.

Q 21

82

P.L. 214

TOP SECRET CYPHER TELEGRAM
DESPATCHED BY TELETYPE

W5410

OZ 1809
TOO 051725Z
TOD 051900Z

From: W.C.O. London.
To: J.S.M. Washington.

NOD 158.

5th April, 1944.

OZ 1809.

Reference J.S.M. 1615.

Since directive on prisoners of war must go to E.A.C. as being linked up with draft article about prisoners of war in terms of surrender it is necessary to handle this subject with care at C.C.A.C. We have no objection to informal exchange of views at C.C.A.C. though subject would hardly seem within charter of that body. But there are dangers in official discussion of same subject in two places and in addition we must try as a general rule not to present Russians with joint Anglo-American front. Subject to above you may explain our views at C.C.A.C. Meanwhile our draft directive has been communicated to U.S. and Soviet Delegations on E.A.C.

T.O.O. 051725Z.

Circulation:

Short DON/NOD.

10.12.83

W 5410

Secret

109
9

1st May, 1944.

I wrote to you on April 4th suggesting informal talks among Soviet, United States and British military representatives on the subject of the directive to be issued to the Commanders-in-Chief regarding United Nations prisoners of war and civilians under restraint.

You were good enough to tell me in your letter of April 6th that when your military advisers had studied this question you would let me know.

You told me when I saw you on April 15th that you hoped to be able to give me an answer in the near future.

Our military authorities are anxious to make progress with this question, and I should be glad to learn whether you are yet in a position to agree to the opening of the proposed discussions.

W. STRANG

His Excellency,
Monsieur P. T. Gousev,
etc. etc. etc.

File Number :—

W.C. 9

1944

84

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Group F.O

Class 371

Piece 42757

Following document(s) retained in the
Department of origin under Section 3 (4)
of the Public Records Act, 1958

W 5800 / 109 / 48

W5824/G

85

W5824/109/G

Mr. Easterman, World Jewish Congress, to Mr. D. Hall.

ALE/MR/61/74

Dated 13 April

Rec'd 15 April

Evacuation of Jewish children from France. States that there are two to three thousand Jewish child in France, registered with the German authorities, 6,000 are known to be in hiding. Approval has been given by the French to a suggested plan to investigate the point in Southern France, to effect the escape of Jewish children to Switzerland & Spain.

Last Paper.

W5800

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Dft. to Mr. Easterman from Mr. Hall

Dft. to Mr. Easterman from Mr. Takoudin

236

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

5827/A

Next Paper.

5817

(Minutes.)

See within 1) Letter from M. Bess to Mr. Easterman World Jewish Congress No 463 of 16/5.

Plans for escape & rescue of Jewish children in France cannot be undertaken by the World Jewish Congress. The question

has is being handled by the Intergovernmental Committee with Neutral Countries.

There are also other means by which children reach Switzerland but these cannot be investigated by the World Jewish Congress. C. Chesterton

We can't have the World Jewish Congress sitting in here. Lately we have been in consultation with M.I. 9 over our "escape route" from France to Spain, & they assure us that if these are overloads we shall risk failure. This is very much vital to the war-effort. This aspect of the affair is being handled with the Joint Staff Mission in Washington. Then the Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees is handling a plan elaborated by the Swiss authorities. For the W.J.C. to come into this complicated & delicate business would

7

feel sure only all to the
confusion, and I think that Mr
Eastman should be told of no
that the question of creating refugees
is being discussed between us
the U.S. Govt, & it is also being
handled by the I.V.C., and
that our view of this we think
it would not add to our
difficulties to have other agencies
brought in. The French C.R.
is a member of the Commission
of the I.G.C. & they can give
such assistance as they can give
should be within the I.G.C.
The S.H.

Franklin is resigning.
Eaton's absence is regrettable.
Mr. Eastman might call on Dr.
Kullmann, the Deputy-Director (who
we would have before us)

J. ref.

2/14/41

See within letter from
Mr. Playfair (J) to Mr. Wadden of 14/41

See Mr. Eastman's letter to
Mr. Leland's reply &

2. Refer to Eastman's 5th answer
as received & for 14/41 we could increase
a copy, as it does not refer to it in return
that Mr. Eastman is a member
and we can do it as we see fit

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN ON THIS PAGE.

Mr. Mack.

Attached is a letter from Mr. Eastman, Sec. Gen. of the World Jewish Congress, together with a copy letter from the Commission National 'a l' Diction. The point seems to be that while the French are willing to assist, they can do nothing unless we agree to co-operate. I mentioned this to Mr. Hoxley a few days ago when Mr. Eastman first broached the subject.

Dr. Hall

13.4.

~~Mr. Mack.~~

Mr. Hoxley. 13.4.

15
WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS.

EUROPEAN DIVISION

AID/M7/C1/94.

2
CONGRESS HOUSE.

87
55, NEW CAVENDISH STREET,

LONDON, W.1.

TELEPHONE WELBECK 13 4

April 18th, 1944.

Secret and Personal.

Donald Hall, Esq.,
Foreign Office,
Whitehall, S.W. 1. *h*

Dear Mr. Hall,

W5824

As I had the opportunity of explaining to you verbally, the World Jewish Congress is most anxious to have the authority and co-operation of His Majesty's Government with a view of assisting them in a scheme to rescue Jews, particularly children, from France to Spain.

We would propose to send to France one or two men of whose integrity we would assure ourselves, in order, in the first instance, to investigate closely the position of Jewish children in Southern France and to ascertain, on the spot, what means there are to provide for their safety from seizure by the Germans and the possibility of transferring as many of them as possible across the frontier into Spain.

As I informed you, there is a lack of precise information about what is actually happening to

the Jews in the South of France, and especially to the thousands of children whose parents have been either deported or murdered. Our Lisbon representative, Mr. Isaac Weissman, has informed us that about 2,000 to 3,000 Jewish children in France have been registered by the German authorities. Measures for the transfer of these children to Switzerland have been taken by the Intergovernmental Committee. There are, however, about 6,000 Jewish children in hiding, chiefly in the South of France. They are in daily peril of being seized by the Germans.

Considerable rescue action is being conducted through Switzerland and there are also possibilities of rescuing some of these children through Spain and Portugal. It is essential, however, (a) to render the position of the children more secure while they are in France - for example, by arranging for their transfer from one place to another, providing them with papers and securing their better protection; and (b) to organise the escape of as many as possible to Spain.

As you know, we have consulted the appropriate French authorities in this country and, in accordance with the copy letter which I handed to you, they have expressed their approval of our project and have indicated their willingness to co-operate. It is essential, however, to have the approval, authority and co-operation of the appropriate services of His Majesty's Government before

anything can be done and in order to facilitate the mission we have in mind.

I should add that there would be no difficulty so far as concerns the reception and maintenance of any children who might be brought to Spain. We are assured, also, that the co-operation of relief organisations in Portugal and Spain, as well as Allied representatives in Spain, would be forthcoming.

I shall be greatly obliged if the matter could be urgently considered by the appropriate authorities and I hope that they will be able to give their approval to the project and facilitate the proposed work which is so important and vitally urgent.

Yours sincerely,

A. L. Easterman.

A. L. Easterman,
Political Secretary.

W5824/9

REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE

Le Commissaire National
a l'Interieur.

Londres, le 16 mars, 1944.

No. 465/-

Cher Monsieur Cohen,

Comme suite a notre entretien de ce jour, je m'empresse de vous confirmer que le Commissariat a l'Interieur est tres desireux de vous aider a realiser le dessein d'evacuer des enfants menaces par la Gestapo.

Ce principe etant acquis, j'ai demande a nos services speciaux comment pouvait etre envisagee la mise a execution de ce dessein.

Voici la reponse que j'ai recue:

"L'idee de proceder a l'evacuation d'enfants israelites a toute notre approbation et nous sommes tres desireux de donner un appui favorable a ce projet.

Comme vous le savez, l'activite de mes services n'est cependant pas tournee vers un but de ce genre, et je ne peux pas envisager de faire executer le dessein auquel vous vous interessez par les organismes dependant de mes services pour la raison qu'ils correspondent par leur forme et par leur fonctionnement a un objet tout different. Ce serait d'une part, compromettre les missions militaires dont j'assume la charge, et faire courir d'autre part aux enfants a evacuer des risques supplementaires qu'il est peut-etre possible de leur eviter.

L'oeuvre avec laquelle vous etes en rapport est certainement en mesure de trouver et de designer les trois ou quatre personnes necessaires et suffisantes pour organiser les evacuations envisagees. Nous serons, bien entendu, prêts, apres avoir pris a l'egard de ces personnes toutes les precautions de securite d'usage, a les faire beneficier de notre experience et de nos conseils et, eventuellement, si nous avons l'accord des autorites britanniques, a proceder a leur instruction."

Croyez, cher Monsieur Cohen, a mes sentiments tres sympathiques,

GEORGES BORIS.

M. Albert Cohen,
World Jewish Congress,
1, Harley Street,
Cavendish Square,
Londres, W.1.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No. 7 100/100/6

90

C.C.

X
Draft.

CONFIDENTIAL
M
24 100/100/6

Confidential

Mr. Secretary,
World Jewish Congress
Executive Director,
Council House,
100 Colindale Ave.,
N.W., London, W.9.

Dear Mr. Secretary,

Thank you for your letter AIE/EF/62/4
Secret and Personal 12 April 1962.

(Dated 12 April 1962)

The Department has received a few
requests for the ^{but formal} ~~formal~~ ^{for the} ~~for the~~
release of refugee children in France. You
are aware, I think, that the location of the
transfer of these children is being handled
by the Intergovernmental Committee with
neutral countries ^{and} ~~the~~ ^{especially that} ~~of the~~
Swiss, ~~is being handled~~ ^{also} ~~is being handled~~. The
whole question of occupying countries is under
discussion at the present time between A.I.C.
and the United States Government. In view
of this, it is considered that to have other
agencies present in would only add to the
~~difficulties~~ ^{complexity of the problem.}

French Department
(C. Mack).

Mr. Loxley.
22/4

The French Committee is a member of
the Executive Committee of the Intergovern-
mental Committee and such assistance as they
can give ^{within the Intergovern-}
mental Committee. In Sir Robert
Loxley's

we consider.

Weerson's absence in Washington you may like
to call on Dr. Hutton, the Deputy Director
and discuss the matter with him.

ps. sincerely A.W.G.R.
and Donald Hall

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

FOREIGN OFFICE, 91

24th April, 1944.

(W 5824/109/G)

Confidential.

Dear Mr. Easterman,

Many thanks for your letter ALE/MF/61/94 Secret and Personal of the 13th April.

The Departments concerned have now considered the suggestions you put forward for the rescue of refugee children in France. You are aware, I think, that the question of the transfer of these children is being handled by the Intergovernmental Committee with neutral countries and that, their assistance, especially that of the Swiss, is being sought. The whole question of escaping refugees is also under discussion at the present time between His Majesty's Government and the United States Government. In view of this, it is considered that to have other agencies brought in would only add to the complexity of the problem.

The French Committee is a member of the Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee and such assistance as they can give should, we consider, be within the Intergovernmental Committee framework. In Sir Herbert Emerson's absence in Washington you may like to call on Dr. Kullman, the Deputy Director and discuss the matter with him.

Yrs sincerely

Edmond Kullman

A.L. Easterman, Esq.,
World Jewish Congress,
55, New Cavendish Street,
W.1.

WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS.

EUROPEAN DIVISION.

ALE/MF/61/94.

987.
18/5

Refugee Dept

CONGRESS HOUSE,

92

55, NEW CAVENDISH STREET,

LONDON, W.1.

TELEPHONE: WELBECK 1314

May 18th, 1944.

T. G. Tahourdin, Esq.,
Foreign Office,
Whitehall,
S.W. 1.

WS8 24

Dear Mr. Tahourdin,

With reference to my telephone conversation with you this afternoon, I enclose copy of my letter to Mr. Donald Hall on the subject I discussed with you.

I shall be glad if you will kindly let me know if you have any information on the subject of this letter.

Yours sincerely,

A. L. Easterman

A. L. Easterman,
Political Secretary.

the Jews in the South of France, and especially to the thousands of children whose parents have been either deported or murdered. Our Lisbon representative, Mr. Isaac Weisman, has informed us that about 2,000 to 3,000 Jewish children in France have been registered by the German authorities. Measures for the transfer of these children to Switzerland have been taken by the Intergovernmental Committee. There are, however, about 6,000 Jewish children in hiding, chiefly in the South of France. They are in daily peril of being seized by the Germans.

Considerable rescue action is being conducted through Switzerland and there are also possibilities of rescuing some of these children through Spain and Portugal. It is essential, however, (a) to render the position of the children more secure while they are in France - for example, by arranging for their transfer from one place to another, providing them with papers and securing their better protection; and (b) to organise the escape of as many as possible to Spain.

As you know, we have consulted the appropriate French authorities in this country and, in accordance with the copy letter which I handed to you, they have expressed their approval of our project and have indicated their willingness to co-operate. It is essential, however, to have the approval, authority and co-operation of the appropriate services of His Majesty's Government before

ALE/MP/61/94.

April 13th, 1944.

Secret and Personal.

Donald Hall, Esq.,
Foreign Office,
Whitehall, S.W. 1.

Dear Mr. Hall,

As I had the opportunity of explaining to you verbally, the World Jewish Congress is most anxious to have the authority and co-operation of His Majesty's Government with a view of assisting them in a scheme to rescue Jews, particularly children, from France to Spain.

We would propose to send to France one or two men of whose integrity we would assure ourselves, in order in the first instance, to investigate closely the position of Jewish children in Southern France and to ascertain, on the spot, what means there are to provide for their safety from seizure by the Germans and the possibility of transferring as many of them as possible across the frontier into Spain.

As I informed you, there is a lack of precise information about what is actually happening to

anything can be done and in order to facilitate the mission we have in mind.

I should add that there would be no difficulty so far as concerns the reception and maintenance of any children who might be brought to Spain. We are assured, also, that the co-operation of relief organisations in Portugal and Spain, as well as Allied representatives in Spain, would be forthcoming.

I shall be greatly obliged if the matter could be urgently considered by the appropriate authorities and I hope that they will be able to give their approval to the project and facilitate the proposed work which is so important and vitally urgent.

Yours sincerely,

A. G. Lasterman,
Political Secretary.

Registry
No. W 5824/109/G

C.C.

hl
Draft.
✓

Mr. Easterman,
World Jewish Cong-
ress.

(from Mr. Tahourdin)
29/5

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

95
FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

28 May, 1944.

Dear Mr. Easterman,

With reference to our telephone conversation and your letter to me of May 18th, I find that Mr. Donald Hall duly replied to your letter to him on April 24th.

Sir Herbert Emerson has now returned from Washington and you may like to call on him if you have not already discussed the matter with Dr. Kullman.

T.G.R.
yours sincerely
(Sd) T. G. Talaordin

96

(W 5824/109/G).

FOREIGN OFFICE,
S.W.1.

23rd May, 1944.

Dear Mr. Easterman,

With reference to our telephone conversation and your letter to me of the 18th May, I find that Mr. Donald Hall duly replied to your letter to him on the 24th April.

Sir Herbert Emerson has now returned from Washington and you may like to call on him if you have not already discussed the matter with Dr. Kullman.

Yours sincerely, .

(sd) (T.G. Tahourdin)

A.L. Easterman, Esq.,
World Jewish Congress,
55, New Cavendish Street,
W.1.

File Number :—

W 109

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

97

Group Fo

Class 371

Piece 42757

Following document(s) retained in the
Department of origin under Section 3 (4)
of the Public Records Act, 1958

W 6117 / 109 / 43

W6401/G 98

W6401/109

Major Genl. EP Gepp
(W.O.)

to Sir Wm Strang
0103/5550 (P.W.)

Dated: 17 April
Received:

Prisoners of War and Internees

Refers to F.O. letter of 4/4 to H. Gousser
forwarding draft directive to
SNAEF, requesting that Soviet
Military representatives should join
in informal conversations. Would
be grateful for anything further
we can do to get (Minutes) conversations
started

Last Paper.

26117

References.

W54

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Att. to Major Genl.
Gepp (att.)
from Sir Wm Strang

P.O. 28/4
28/4

Mr. Frothingham

1/11/4
28/4

Walther
26/4

26/4

See within Major-Genl. Gepp's letter
to H. Strang of 12/5

(Action
completed.)

EC/15

(Index.)

Kls.

Next Paper.

26117

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN ON THIS PAGE.

MAYfair 9400.



The War Office,

Curzon Street House,
Curzon Street,
London, W.1.

99

*Copy and
then send for
entry*

W.S. 1874

6401

XXXX reference 01.03/5550. (P.W.2.)

April, 1944.

Dear Sir William

W 5410

109

I have seen your letter of the 4th April forwarding to M. Gousev, the draft Prisoner of War Directive to S.H.A.E.F. and asking that Soviet Military representatives should join in informal conversations.

I am being continually asked by S.H.A.E.F. whether any contact with the Russians can be expected soon, since their planning on this very difficult and important subject is held up.

I should be most grateful therefore for anything further you can do to get the conversations started.

Yours

*Sincerely
L.C. Gyp*

Sir William Strang, K.C.M.G., C.B.,
Foreign Office,
S.W.1.

18th April, 1914.

Thank you for your letter of 17th April No. 0103/
5550. (P.W.2.)

213347/4712

I raised this question again with M. Gousev on
April 15th, and a record of the conversation has already
been sent to your Directorate.

M. Gousev said that he hoped to be able to give me
an answer in the near future to my suggestion that we
should have informal military conversations about the
Prisoners of War Directive.

I will not lose sight of the matter, but with the
Russians one always has to have great patience.

The conversations, when they start, will be under the
aegis of the European Advisory Commission, and I should
like some time before then to have a chance of discussing
with you the best tactics to adopt.

W. STRANG

Major General E.C. Gepp,
The War Office,
Curzon Street House,
Curzon Street,
W.1.

Mayfair 9400/Ext:571



The War Office,
Curzon Street House,
Curzon Street,
London, W.1.

101

Several files

is coming to fix

W6401

Your reference me on May 15 12th May, 1944.

No action required.

Dear Sir William W.S. 13/5/44 - 1/4/45

With reference to my letter to you of the 17th April, I wondered whether it would be of any help to you if I asked the Secretary of State to raise this question again at a meeting of the War Cabinet.

Do you think that now we have got an agreement about making the Germans prisoners of war on surrender that it is may help us to get into touch with the Russians about our men held as prisoners of war in Germany.

Yours Sincerely

Sir. Gey

Sir William Strang, K.C.M.G., C.B.,
Foreign Office,
Downing Street,
S.W.1.

File Number :—

W6597/G

10/4

W6597/109/48
 Visiting Bulgaria
 Washington
 Telegram No. 2136
 Dated: 26/4/48
 Received:

Release of refugees from enemy occupied territory. Question of evacuation to Spain.

Refer to F.O. tel. 343X (W6117/9)
 According to State Dept, matter has not been put to U.S. C.S., as it was decided to refer it back to U.S. Embassy in Madrid for clarification.

Last Paper.

W6401

References.

W6117/109/9

(Minutes.)

? Ask for Madrid to ascertain what further info the U.S. Commission has made to State Department

ref. submitted - Chairman
 29/4

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Tel. 506 to Madrid
 28/4
 Copied C.O. Rail
 (W.O.)
 29/4

20/4

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

5.5.10/10

Next Paper.

E W6843

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN ON THIS PAGE.

C

W 6597 103

[CYPHER]

DEPARTMENTAL NO.1.

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Viscount Halifax,
No. 2136

D. 1.46 a.m. 27th April 1944

26th April 1944

R. 10.50 a.m. 27th April 1944

Repeated to Madrid No. 153

—
Your telegram No. 3437.

TOP SECRET.

State Department inform me that this matter has not (repeat not) been put to United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, as it was decided in the first place to refer the question back to United States Embassy at Madrid for further clarification. In the meantime the matter has been held in abeyance.

O.T.P.

Registry
No. W 6597/109/G

S.C.

Draft.

H. H. [unclear],
[unclear]

Telegram.

506
Dated 2/12/41.....

On [unclear].

Department of [unclear].

Chy Ch. [unclear]
Ch. Rait.
W. [unclear]
2/14

Date

In [unclear] M.
FOR THE OFFICE, S.V.I.

April, 1941.

Despatched

M.

DEMP.

TOP SECRET.

Washington telegram No. 136, repeated
to [unclear] 133 [of April 1941: relief and
rescue of refugees through Spain].

Please report to your United
States office what further reply he has
~ [unclear] to [unclear]
to the State Department on this
matter.

ANSR.

NG TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

W 6597/108/G

[CYPHER]

DEPARTMENTAL NO.1.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO MADRID

No. 506

20th April, 1944.

D. 6.25 p.m. 28th April, 1944.

SSSSS

DEDIP

TOP SECRET

Washington telegram No. 2156, [of April 27th: relief and rescue of refugees through Spain].

Please ascertain from your United States colleague what further reply he has sent or proposes to send to the State Department on this matter.

OTF

File Number :—

W109

W684B/G

32 19+y

W6843/109/H⁸
 M. W. L. Tjaden
 to M. Crowe
 HDE/146/012
 Dated: 26 Apr.
 Received.

Evacuation of Refugees from The Continent.

(Trs. note by Sir F. Stewart
 (HDE/146/05) regarding plans to be made in case evacuation becomes an operational necessity.

Last Paper.

W6847

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

(See within)

I attended this meeting. The discussion turned mainly on the question of the provision of a) a transit camp, b) camps of final destination, which the W.C., & H.D. & Admiralty have accordingly undertaken to study. It was proposed to hold a further in about ten days at which I suggest I should raise the question of the interest of the authorities in the matter. I imagine the refugees will be mainly French who will want to be consulted about the maintenance & welfare of their people, & to which they should be asked to contribute fund & personnel.

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

CC6's

Next Paper.

W-086.

Genl. flight. & Walker

26513 F.O.P.
 We shall eventually have to mention this whole question to the French National Committee & probably

Lord Bessborough. But not until after the
next meeting.

Heath,
2/10

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN ON THIS PAGE.

The influx of 35,000 refugees, not to mention the possibility of many more as is contemplated in this paper, will obviously be a very serious problem for the Military Authorities in the first place and secondly for the Home Office and Ministry of Health. The latter, however, is evidently for consideration on military grounds, i.e. for the better facilitation of military operations in France. Refugee movement would be mainly concerned in arrangements for making or keeping contact with Allied Governments over arrangements for the maintenance of any of their nationals who come to this country in this way. Many aliens will presumably continue to be dealt with by the Home Office and the Central Committee. In view, however, of the reference to France it would appear reasonable that the French Department should be represented at to-morrow's meeting.

(Incidentally, it is worthy of note that the plan (e) appears to contemplate the final return of the refugees to France. This, however, will presumably be modified in practice since it is to be anticipated that there may be quite a number of persons who are not of French nationality amongst the refugees and who the French Government may indeed be very loth to receive back.)

Walker

Mr. Mack.

27th April, 1944.

Ans. 27/4

I have discussed with Mr. Walker and he has kindly agreed to discuss with French Dept. representation.

W. B. Mack

27/4

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

W Ref
W6843
100
G
1 MAY 1944
HOME DEFENCE EXECUTIVE,
Norfolk House,
St. James's Square
S.W.1.

HDE/146/012
TOP SECRET

26th April, 1944

Dear Crowe,

I enclose a copy of a note which Sir Findlater Stewart has circulated on the possible evacuation of refugees from the Continent in the early stages of "OVERLORD". You may wish to be present at the meeting which Sir Findlater will be holding at 3 p.m. on Friday.

Yours sincerely,

W.L. Tjaden

(W.L. TJADEN)

E.E. Crowe, Esq.,
Foreign Office.

The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.

It is issued for the personal use of..... Mr. E. E. Crowe.....

MOST SECRET.

Copy No. 30

TOP SECRET

SUBJECT: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SITUATION IN THE
WESTERN STATES OF "YUGOSLAVIA"

TO: Mr. E. E. Crowe, Director, Intelligence Division, S. I.

FROM: Mr. E. E. Crowe, Director, Intelligence Division, S. I.

RE: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SITUATION IN THE
WESTERN STATES OF "YUGOSLAVIA"

1. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SITUATION IN THE
WESTERN STATES OF "YUGOSLAVIA"

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40. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SITUATION IN THE
WESTERN STATES OF "YUGOSLAVIA"

File Number :-

10109

1944

W 7086/G

W 7086/109⁴⁸
 Home Defence
 Executive (Com.)
 KDE/146/012
 Dated: 29 Apr.
 Received.

Evacuation of Refugees from The
 Continent during "Overlord".

Minutes of meeting held on 28/4
 to discuss reception arrangements for
 refugees from France.

Last Paper.

(Minutes.)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

There is another meeting
 about this tomorrow.

I will attend.
 J. Walker

Sir J. Maylan, of the Home Office, has
 suggested to me that they shd. get in
 touch with Lord Bessborough at an
 appropriate moment, on the subject of
 relief, French speaking workers etc., for these
 refugees if they arrive. I said Lord B.
 had approached us and we shd., I thought,
 be glad for the H.O. to co-ordinate with his
 organisation.
 Ans K. 10/5.

(Action
 completed.)

(Index.)

Next Paper.

Mr. Mack. I agree. Lord Bessborough
 spoke to me about this question this
 morning. He said that the Anglo-
 French Societies here were all getting
 busy

busy, each with its own ideas
about what could be done for the
refugees. (I do not know how they
heard of this project.) Lord Bessborough
therefore wished to be in a position
to give them guidance as soon
as possible. I told him that I
was sure that his help would
be very welcome on the welfare
side and that we would get in
touch with him as soon as matters
were sufficiently far advanced.

(Mr. Randall or
Mr. Walter)

I think that the sooner
Lord Bessborough can be brought in
the better it will be.

W. B. Bessborough

10/5

Aug 12

10/11

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN ON THIS PAGE.

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.

It is issued for the personal use of Mr. A. Walker

MOST SECRET

Copy No. 29

TOP SECRET

HE/146/012

30th April, 1944

MEMORANDUM ON REFUGEE PROBLEMS, WITH OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS

INTENT of meeting to discuss reception arrangements for refugees from France, held in the Conference Room, 10th Floor, War Office, St. James's Square, S.W. 1, at 3 p.m. on Friday, 28th April, 1944

PRESENT:

Sir J. Finlater Stewart (In the Chair)

Sir Frank Widdowson,
Home Office

Sir John Moylan,
Home Office

Sir Robert Gray,
Security Executive

Jar-General G. L. Smith,
S.C., War Office

Jar-General R. Gurney,
S.C., War Office

Major-General R. H. H. H. H.,
S.C. (L), War Office

Lt.-Commander J. H. H. H.,
S.C., War Office

Lt.-Colonel J. H. H. H.,
S.C., War Office

Jar H. J. H. H.,
S.C., War Office

Jar H. J. H. H.,
S.C., War Office

Lt.-Colonel J. H. H. H.,
S.C., War Office

Lt.-Colonel J. H. H. H.,
S.C., War Office

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Jar H. J. H. H.,
S.C., War Office

ABSENT:

Jar H. J. H. H.,

Jar H. J. H. H.,

Jar H. J. H. H.,

GENERAL GURNEY explained that account had to be taken of the possibility that refugees might have to be moved out of the bridgehead area and, if that occurred, there was no alternative but to bring them to this country. He could give a categorical assurance that no refugees would be brought to this country unless their movement was essential for the success of operations.

GENERAL LAMIE and BRIGADIER DELL explained that Shoreham was the only place to which the ships carrying refugees could be taken. The War Office felt that they could not take responsibility for the people after the initial landing. The provision of accommodation presented serious difficulties which were aggravated by the fact that the flow, if it came, would begin at about 1 + 2, at which time there would be no suitable hatted accommodation, either temporary or permanent, available.

GENERAL GURNEY pointed out that the problem of dealing with the vast post-landing collection of men, women and children was not one which the War Office was organized to handle. Many nurses and medical attendants would be required, which could not be provided from the War Office sources, and he suggested that it might be possible to use the services of voluntary bodies like the W.V.S.

BRIGADIER DELL pointed out that, although the War Office could not take responsibility for the refugees, it could not simply ignore them. It had to take responsibility for the refugees after the landing. They had to be taken care of after the landing, and they could not rely on the military to do this.

GENERAL GURNEY pointed out that the Joint Committee of the Admiralty and the War Office had to consider the following:-

(a) The need for a large number of infection, and it was pointed out that the War Office had to be examined. It was pointed out that the War Office had to be examined for the need for a large number of infection, and it was pointed out that the War Office had to be examined for the need for a large number of infection.

(b) The need for a large number of infection, and it was pointed out that the War Office had to be examined. It was pointed out that the War Office had to be examined for the need for a large number of infection, and it was pointed out that the War Office had to be examined for the need for a large number of infection.

(c) The provision of a large number of infection, and it was pointed out that the War Office had to be examined. It was pointed out that the War Office had to be examined for the need for a large number of infection, and it was pointed out that the War Office had to be examined for the need for a large number of infection.

In discussion, it was pointed out that the War Office had to be examined. It was pointed out that the War Office had to be examined for the need for a large number of infection, and it was pointed out that the War Office had to be examined for the need for a large number of infection.

(1) The provision of a large number of infection, and it was pointed out that the War Office had to be examined. It was pointed out that the War Office had to be examined for the need for a large number of infection, and it was pointed out that the War Office had to be examined for the need for a large number of infection.

(2) The provision of a large number of infection, and it was pointed out that the War Office had to be examined. It was pointed out that the War Office had to be examined for the need for a large number of infection, and it was pointed out that the War Office had to be examined for the need for a large number of infection.

(1) Central Reception Committee

BRIGADIER DELL pointed out that the Committee existed at the War Office, and it was pointed out that the War Office had to be examined. It was pointed out that the War Office had to be examined for the need for a large number of infection, and it was pointed out that the War Office had to be examined for the need for a large number of infection.

There will be no part time students in the previous
population for 1961-1962.

... ATOM

[illegible][illegible]

() Application of the

5. surveys

...LAW ALL in the in the
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... ..

[illegible]

(1) It is noted that the majority of the respondents are concentrated in the first three categories, i.e., the "other" category and the "other" category.

Executive,
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

File Number :—

W109

W 7170 /G

W 7170 / 109 / 48

in Yencheng
Madrid

Tel No 712

Dated May 6
Rec'd May 7

Rescue of refugees from enemy territory:
evacuation to Spain

Refers to Y.O. tel No 506 of 28/4 Washington tel
No 2156 of 26/4 (W 6597).

U.S. Embassy have received no further
enquiry from the State Dept.

Last Paper.

W 7066

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Comesp. copied
Lt. Col. Rait (M. 1.9)

May 10

Tel. 4060 of 9/5 to
replied 568 to Madrid
copied Col. Rait

(Action
completed.)

(Index)

EC 175 / 48.

Next Paper.

7143

(Minutes.)

Copy correspondence to Lieut. Colonel C. M.
Rait (W.O., M. 3. 9).

The State Dept., finding the difficulty
involved in the proposal of the War Refugee
Board that refugees should be Iberian escape
routes, are perhaps, trying to persuade the
WRO to abandon the scheme and cannot
therefore, proceed as before. Further, they are
considering his scheme in relation to our tel.
No 2400 to WRO, to which we referred in
our tel. No 3437 (on W 6117/109/4)

Q. We should inform WRO and press
for a reply to both files - unless Sir
H. Ennion shows any light on State Dept
intention which might necessitate a modification
in what we should say. Dfr
Lieut. Col. Rait

26113 F.O.P.

Drifted
sent 11/5 9.54 - 11/5
B/S

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN ON THIS PAGE.

[CYHER]

DEPARTMENTAL NO.1.FROM MADRID TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Mr. Yencken.

D: 3.00 p.m. 6th May, 1944.

No. 712.

R: 12.50 a.m. 7th May, 1944.

6th May, 1944.

5 5 5

REDIP.

Your telegram No. 506. W 6507/6

United States Embassy have received no (repeat no) further enquiry from State Department as suggested in Washington telegram No. 2136 to you.

O.T.P.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No. W 7170/109/G

I.L.H.

Draft.

H.M. Ambassador,
Washington.

Telegram.

No. 4060

Dated ... May 9 ...

Repeat to:

Madrid. No. 568.

Cypher.

Departmental No. 1.

Cypher to
Col. Rait.
A.O. (M I 9).
A.W.
9/5

115
FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

10 May, 1944.

✓ Despatched 7.0 a M.

Your telegram No. 2136 of 26th
April: proposed rescue of refugees via
Spain.

H.M. Ambassador Madrid reports that
his United States colleague has received
no (repeat no) further enquiry from State
Department.

Please enquire from State Department
~~as what action U.S. Govt. proposes~~
what is present position; ~~we~~ we are anxious
to co-operate as closely as possible with
the United States Authorities in this
matter.

AnsR

(W 7170/109/G)

DEPARTMENTAL NO. 1

[CYPHER]

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

No. 4060
9th May, 1944

D. 7.0 a.m. 10th May, 1944

Repeated to Madrid. No. 568

77777

Your telegram No. 2136 [of 26th April: proposed rescue of refugees via Spain].

His Majesty's Ambassador Madrid reports that his United States colleague has received no (repeat no) further enquiry from State Department.

Please enquire from State Department what is present position and what action United States Government proposes; we are anxious to co-operate as closely as possible with the United States Authorities in this matter.

O.T.P.

File Number :-

103

W 7693/G

36

W 7693/109/18
Home Defence
Exec line
HDE/146/012
Dated: 9 May
Received:

Evacuation of Refugees from
the Continent during "Overlord"

Minutes of meeting held on 8/5 to
discuss the layout + staffing of the
proposed transit camp near
Shoreham for refugees from the
Continent.

Last Paper.

W 7170

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

Foraker

Amk.

16/2

(Action
completed.)

(Index.)

5330

Next Paper.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN ON THIS PAGE.

The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.

It is issued for the personal use of... *M. L. A. Hallen*.....

~~MOST SECRET.~~

Copy No. *34*.....

TOP SECRET

HDE/146/012

9TH MAY, 1944

EVACUATION OF REFUGEES FROM THE CONTINENT DURING
"THE BOMBING"

THE LIT CAMP AT SHOREHAM

MINUTES of a meeting held in the Conference Room, 6th Floor, Norfolk House, St. James's Square, S.W.1., on MONDAY, 8th May, 1944 at 10 noon.

PRESENT:

Cir. A. F. M. L. P. L. M. T. W. T.
(In the Chair)

| | |
|--|--|
| Air Marshal Morgan, Home Office | Air Marshal Gwynne, Home Office |
| Major-General B. L. M. L., I. A. S., War Office | Major-General R. Gurney, I. A. S., War Office |
| Brigadier R. L. L. L., I. A. S., War Office | Mr. L. L. L. L., Ministry of Works |
| Mr. L. L. L. L., Ministry of Health | Mr. L. L. L. L., Ministry of Health |
| Mr. L. L. L. L., Ministry of Food | Mr. L. L. L. L., Security Executive |
| Mr. L. L. L. L., Ministry of Home Security | Mr. L. L. L. L., Home Office |
| Chief Inspector W. R. Perks, Home Office | Mr. L. L. L. L., Security Service |
| Mr. R. L. L. L., Security Service | Mr. H. P. Milne, Security Service |
| Colonel J. L. L. L., Security Service | Lt.-Colonel J. L. L. L., Security Service |
| Lt.-Colonel J. L. L. L., I. A. S., War Office | Mr. L. L. L. L., Chief Secretary |

ABSENT:

Lt.-Colonel J. L. L. L.,
Mr. L. L. L. L.,
Mr. L. L. L. L.

Sir Findlater Stewart said that his object in calling the meeting was to discuss the lay-out and staffing of the proposed transit camp near Shoreham for refugees from the Continent, and to decide which Department should be responsible for the camp. The preparation of the site was already in hand as a result of instructions which General Lammie had issued to South Eastern Command; but the work could clearly not proceed very far until the precise nature of the accommodation and equipment to be provided was known.

BRIGADIER RIDDELL said that the site which was now being laid out was some four or five miles from Shoreham and to the west of the River Adur. South Eastern Command had been instructed to provide for 6,000 people in all, and they would probably do this by building perhaps five individual camps, all more or less contiguous. One of these would be used for the initial reception and de-lousing, one would be a hospital, and the remainder would be used for the accommodation of the refugees pending their transportation to their final destination; the hospital camp would be planned on the basis of 600 beds. South Eastern Command would be responsible for providing facilities to the standard of Army camps generally, including water supplies and cooking facilities; but any additional facilities and equipment which the Civil Departments felt should be provided for the refugees must be supplied by them.

MR. BEARN said the Ministry of Health would be well content with a 600 bed hospital; they contemplated the use of reserve space in nearby E.M.S. hospitals for the more serious cases of injury or sickness among the refugees, and it was hoped that accommodation of this kind for between two and three hundred persons would be available.

SIR FRANK NEWSAM suggested that it was not advisable from the security point of view to admit refugees to hospitals where they would be cheek by jowl with British civilians.

MR. BEARN said the Ministry of Health felt that some such arrangement would be necessary to deal with acute cases of illness or injury requiring a fully equipped hospital for treatment; amputations might, for example, be necessary, and there might well be severe cases of infectious disease.

CAPTAIN LIDDELL said the Security Service would not object to the use of E.M.S. hospitals in this way, provided only acute cases were taken to them and a careful record was kept of all refugees passing through them, so that they could be traced as necessary at a later date.

MR. TOSELAND said that the Ministry of Food would be prepared to arrange for the necessary foodstuffs to be delivered to the camp, and would, moreover, help wherever necessary to supplement the cooking facilities provided by means of mobile kitchens.

CAPTAIN LIDDELL said that the requirement of accommodation in the camp for the purposes of the Security Service could not be settled until it was known under what conditions the refugees would be housed at their final destinations; if, as seemed probable, they were not to be closely interned there, the Security Service must have facilities at the camp for holding those of the refugees who were not obviously innocuous for questioning before they were allowed to proceed further.

BRIGADIER RIDDELL said it should be realised that all the accommodation would be tentage for the most part, bell tents; there would probably be some marquees available for communal feeding and similar requirements, but there was no possibility of providing huts.

SIR FINDLATER STEWART said that, on the question of responsibilities, it would be the concern of the military authorities to get the refugees to the camps, the Ministry of War Transport helping by the provision of vehicles and drivers, and the Ministry of Health by the provision of ambulances. But it was clearly necessary to decide which Department would be responsible for the administration of the camp itself.

SIR FRANK BURNHAM said that whatever camps were held in custody in this country they were held under the powers of the Home Secretary; and the Home Secretary must therefore accept final responsibility for the administration of the camp. This was, however, not to say that they could provide the staff; their resources in this respect were nil, and they must look to the military authorities for the provision of staff, and to the Service and the other civil departments for orderlies and other personnel.

BRIGADIER RIDDELL said that the War Office were prepared to provide a military Commandant for each camp, together with Deputy Commandants for each sub-camp; it was no new thing for such military Commandants to be responsible to the Home Secretary in the execution of their duty.

GENERAL GURNEY said that the Director-General of the Home Guard had seen no objection in principle to the use of the Home Guard for sentry duty at the camp; he had, however, pointed out that he had no information as to the local resources, and upon these must clearly depend the extent to which Home Guard assistance could be supplied. As regards the provision of A.T.S., the War Office had not yet decided upon the camp except in the case of clerical personnel, a small number of which might be supplied.

MR. BURNHAM said that the Ministry of Health hoped to be able to provide the 20 doctors and the 40 nurses which it was estimated would be required; but there was an estimated requirement of 80 medical orderlies, and the Ministry of Health was in no prospect of obtaining these from its own resources. It had been suggested that they might be obtained from their reception centres for this purpose; but these centres, apart from skeleton staff, were run entirely by part-time personnel. Part-time workers in the camp must be local people, and could not come from much further afield than Brighton; during "OVERLORD" Brighton, itself might be heavily bombed, and one could not strip the town of its part-time reception centre workers at a time when they might well be needed.

MR. HOARE said the W.V.S. had been consulted as to the extent to which they might be able to help; almost all their personnel were part-timers, but in this emergency it was thought they might be able to supply interpreters, escorts and distributors of clothing. The W.V.S. could, however, help considerably while the refugees were en route to their final destinations, especially if they crossed London; they could, in particular, help with mobile collecting arrangements for the refugees in transit. As regards the Central Council of British Societies for Relief Abroad, it was not likely that much help could be obtained from that quarter.

DR FREDERICK ROBERTSON, who at the time was
 Vice-Chancellor of the University of London, said:-

- (1) the lay-out of the report at local
requirements of the local government
and complaints;
- (2) the starting of the report, with respect of
reviewing the report, the report, the
local government, the local government,
the report, the report, the report,
the report, the report, the report,
the report, the report, the report,
the report, the report, the report,

Under the Southern Eastern Contract, the Government has placed in those lines at the rate of \$100,000 per month, in violation of the contract, from the Civil War to the present.

... ..

- [illegible]

1. THE EFFERENT INDUCTIVE,
N. C. L. M.,
Ct.
9TH ... , 1904

File Number:—

100

W7694/G

W7694 109/48

Home Defence
Executive

+DE 146 012A

Dated: 10 May
Received:

Evacuation of Refugees from the
continent during "Overlord"

Minutes of meeting held on 9/5
to discuss the security problem
presented by an influx of refugees
from the continent in the early stages
of "Overlord"

Last Paper.

-93

References.

(Print)

(How disposed of.)

Off: to Col. Birch.

Raymondson

(Not folk here)

not: Mr. Walker

17/5

(Action
completed.)

(Index.)

CC 40/8

Next Paper.

(Minutes.)

See also within Note by Sir Findlater
Stewart +DE 146/012A of 9/5

+ HDE 146/012 of 10/5
circulating letters from the
Ady. + Air Mty. of 4/5 & 2/5

French Dept 24/5.

cf. 24/5

+ Belcher

24/5

See also within minutes of
meeting of 11/5

+ Belcher

22/5

+ 10

27/5

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN ON THIS PAGE.

treated like prisoners - we had our experiences of the Boer internment camps during the South African War to remind us of the dangers of such treatment. In their paper, the Security Service suggested alternative arrangements, which involved the preliminary sorting of the refugees in the transit camp at Shoreham into persons who were obviously innocuous and persons who should be held for more detailed examination; it was hoped that the large majority of the refugees would be in the first category, and they could proceed at once to their final destinations, where they would live more or less at liberty subject to registration with the police. The remainder who were held for examination would be sorted later, the dangerous people being interned in a closed camp and the others accommodated in the same manner as those who were held for immediate release.

MR. MORRIS said that S.D.S. would have preferred the second alternative, i.e. all the refugees until such time as they could be sorted out. But Mr. Morris said that altogether from the point of view, it would be better to sort them out, unless that were done, it would be difficult to call on them all when the time came to mobilise them. However, it was clearly impossible to do this, and S.D.S. would accept the proposal for the Security Service.

SIR JOHN WELLS said that it was a great deal of difficulty in collecting the refugees and in getting them for their return. All those who were interned in the closed camp would be required to register with the police and to report to them once a month; moreover arrangements would be made to ensure that they did not enter areas in which information of value to the enemy could be collected.

MR. WELLS stressed the importance of sorting the innocuous refugees from the dangerous ones; if ill-disposed persons were not sorted out, they might spread discontent and subversive activity throughout the whole mass. It was, moreover, vitally necessary that the refugees should understand why, although the majority of them were friendly to the Allied cause, they had to be treated as suspect and examined carefully before they could be released; this problem had occurred before in 1940, and at that time the nation had been admitted in the closed camps and interned for some time before they were able to report and asking for their co-operation. In the case of the return of the refugees to the Continent, it would not presumably be possible to send them back to the continent without from which they came; the return of the refugees would have been a great help behind the Allied lines in Germany and Italy.

MR. MORRIS said that the Security Service would give its full assistance to the type of ill-disposed persons likely to come into contact with the refugees.

MR. MORRIS said that, as pointed out in the Security Service report, the "backbone" of the resistance movement in the "backbone" of the resistance movement, i.e. the "backbone" of the resistance movement, would almost certainly be swept up in any large-scale operation. It was also pointed out that the "backbone" of the resistance movement, who might be the most dangerous, might be either friendly or ill-disposed, might be ready for action.

MR. WELLS pointed out that the Security Service, and it is the responsibility of the Security Service to the Government.

SIR FINDLATER STATED that at 1 that members of the
Fifth Organisation, which were re-eligible, first,
should be treated as prisoners of war rather than as
refugees, at any rate until such time as we could satisfy
ourselves that they were friendly to the Allies.

MR. J. H. L. said that the Ministry of Health were
proposing to route all the refugees in transit from
the Channel to London, where accommodation would presumably
have to be provided for them. There were therefore two
requirements:-

- (a) Transit accommodation in London for the bulk
of the refugees, having been certified
by the Security Service as innocuous, were
en route to their final destinations.
- (b) A holding camp for the remainder requiring
further examination by the Security Service.

The first element came under consideration, after examination by the
Security Service of the holding camp, were classified as
hostages might well be in the Isle of Man; if the M.I.5.
estimates were right only 10% of the refugees would pass
through the holding camp, the remainder 90% of those,
or 600 in all, would be sent to their final destinations.

MR. J. H. L. said that the Security Service were to be
asked to provide a holding camp for the preliminary
stage of the M.I.5. ; the holding camp to be the
following day under the auspices of the M.G.A. South
Eastern Command to discuss the layout and the facilities
to be provided for the Shoreham Camp, and M.I.5 should
also be present there and make their requirements
known.

MR. J. H. L. said that the Security Service were to be
asked to discuss the holding camp as far as possible with the French National Committee, who
would be able to help very considerably with the Security
Service in this regard.

MR. J. H. L. said that the Security Service were to be
asked to give a list of the facilities which were proposed
for the holding camp, in the light of the situation of
the holding camp; the Security Service would however
not be able to provide the problem to
the French National Committee in their cooperation.

THE RESULT:-

- (i) Agreement that the Security Service should
provide the holding camp for the subsequent
transfer of the refugees from the
continent.
- (ii) Agreement that the Security Service should provide:-
 - (a) at the holding camp, facilities for the
initial reception of the refugees into the
holding camp, and the transfer of the
refugees to their final destinations;

- (b) in London, transit accommodation for those refugees accepted as innocuous who were en route to their final accommodation, and a holding camp for those requiring further examination;
 - (c) possibly in the Isle of Man, an internment camp for the dangerous refugees;
 - (d) wherever it could be found, accommodation preferably in the form of requisitioned buildings for the refugees who were not to be interned.
- (iii) Invited the Security Service to arrange for representation at the meeting which was being called by the M.G.A. South Eastern Command for the following day, so that they could make known their requirements in the transit camp at Shoreham.

HOME DEFENCE EXECUTIVE,
Norfolk House,
St. James's Square, S.W.1.

APPENDIX I.

SECURITY RISK INVOLVED BY THE EVACUATION TO THE
UNITED KINGDOM OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION
FROM THE OVERLORD BEACH-HEAD

1. Whilst the military authorities have given an assurance that no refugees will be evacuated from the beach-head area unless their movement is considered essential for the success of the operation, they have nevertheless given notice that it may be necessary to evacuate to the U.K. up to a maximum of thirty thousand persons at a rate not exceeding two thousand per day beginning at about D + 2. The Security Service have been asked to assess the security risk which this proposition involves.
2. The problem is complicated by the fact that its dimensions are uncertain and by other factors which are not susceptible to accurate forecast. Thus it is not known whether the actual number of bodies which will have to be handled will be ten or ten thousand; nor is it known whether the evacuation will proceed over a period of one week or one month - a very material consideration when one comes to estimate the chances of the Germans successfully infiltrating agents into the area with the view to procuring their subsequent transfer to the U.K.
5. From a security standpoint the objectionable classes of persons who are likely to be brought to the U.K. under the evacuation plans fall into the following categories:
 - (a) Numbers of the German stay-behind network of agents who have been planted in the area and will, ex hypothesi, be swept up in any mass evacuation.
 - (b) Agents specifically infiltrated by the enemy into the area with the view to their being evacuated to the U.K.
 - (c) Collaborationists, Quislings, and other individuals ill-disposed towards the Allied cause.

There is abundant evidence of the existence of category (a) though it is hardly possible to estimate how thickly they will be spread over the ground in any particular locality. As to category (b), whilst there is no evidence, and it would seem most improbable, that the Germans will already have planted agents in likely areas for the purpose of procuring their evacuation to the U.K., this does not mean that the enemy will not speedily avail himself of the opportunity which the situation affords. It will be borne in mind that the Germans have had some experience of evacuation of civilian population by the Allied Command, e.g. Anzio. Category (c) is unlikely to be found in numerous strength amongst the peasant population but it would be unwise to assume that towns and villages will not hold a substantial quota.

4. It follows from the previous paragraph that amongst any substantial number of refugees an appreciable number of enemy agents falling within categories (a) and (b) must be anticipated apart from a more numerous but less dangerous proportion of the mischievous elements comprised in category (c). The problem is therefore to estimate the risk involved by allowing any of the above categories to be at large in this country in the immediate and more distant future. This risk is three-fold comprising subversive activities, sabotage, and espionage.
5. It is not considered that subversion is likely to constitute any undue risk or one which ought not to be accepted though it is right to point out that an active agitator might prove highly embarrassing, stirring up trouble amongst foreigners and foreign governments who are at present enjoying the hospitality of Great Britain.
6. The sabotage risk cannot be disregarded in the sense that it is quite possible, if not probable, that one or two saboteurs may contrive to get into the country through this channel and may even succeed in bringing some of his apparatus and equipment with him. It is not anticipated, however, that such an individual could successfully attack a target which would have any vital or important bearing upon the success of the Operation or the subsequent build-up and, looking at the matter on a long term footing, although saboteurs of this type might cause a few explosions and conflagrations, there appears to be little ground for thinking that, at this stage of the war, they could do any appreciable harm to the Allied cause.
7. There remains the espionage risk which must be considered both in relation to the operation itself and the subsequent prosecution of the war after the second front has been firmly established. There are at present in force a large number of special restrictions designed to slow up the normal channels through which enemy agents and other persons could communicate information which would be likely to assist the enemy and it may be safely assumed that these precautions should render it impossible for any agent reaching this country after D day to transmit valuable intelligence concerning the Operation to the enemy unless he brings with him a wireless transmitter. Even the most cursory examination at the port of arrival should ensure against any of the evacuated persons carrying with him a wireless set. For the foregoing reasons, inter alia, it is not thought that the security of the Operation in its early stages is likely to be prejudiced by the evacuation plans.
8. It must be recognised that although on a purely short time footing enemy agents coming here in the course of this evacuation would be innocuous, on a longer term they would constitute a very serious menace to security, the more so as they would be situated in the centre of what must continue to be the principal base for operations against the Continent. They would have come here carrying in their heads cover addresses in neutral territory and formulae for s/w in addition to s/w materials which they could bring in with them on their persons without the slightest chance of their being detected. In short, therefore, the evacuation plan affords the enemy a far safer channel through which to infiltrate his agents than anything which he has enjoyed hitherto in the course of the war and once he had obtained entry into the country the agent himself would in due course enjoy all the facilities for communication which until recently have been at the disposal of anyone who chose to use them. Moreover if it were decided to

provide against this danger by sending all evacuated persons back after three months, it must be borne in mind that the agent could carry back a certain amount of information from this country and re-open communication through a transmitter which he had buried in occupied territory.

9. There is only one complete safeguard against this, namely the holding in detention of all evacuated persons until such time as it is possible to return them to the Continent for, as has been pointed out, no security examination can, in the circumstances, be more than moderately effective. If mass detention is not considered practicable, the following measures would tend to reduce, though not to eliminate, the considerable danger to security which would inevitably arise.
- (a) A preliminary sifting should take place at the reception centre at the port of arrival with the view to passing out the large majority of refugees who are obviously innocuous, e.g. large families, peasants, children, elderly persons, etc. For this sifting it would probably be necessary to enlist the assistance of French Security and counter-espionage personnel and the aim would be to release some 90% of the total intake.
 - (b) A holding camp should be provided for the remaining 10% who would be examined, probably by means of a questionnaire, for the purpose of ascertaining whether they were ordinarily resident in the area or whether for any other reason their cases required fuller investigation. Here again French Security personnel would probably have to be used.
 - (c) The residue would have to be sent for examination at the L.R.C. Although this test could not in the nature of things be expected to operate as effectively as the ordinary L.R.C. examination of new arrivals, it would afford some extra safeguard.
 - (d) The Immigration Authorities and the Home Office should accept responsibility for recording full particulars of each individual refugee, together with all other information which would enable them to be traced readily should occasion arise to do so.
10. For the above reasons it is therefore submitted:
- (a) That the evacuation scheme is unlikely to afford any substantial security risk to the operation.
 - (b) That the sabotage risk either on a long term or short term footing is not a substantial one and can be accepted.
 - (c) That on a long term footing the plan constitutes a danger which can by no means be disregarded particularly if the Second Front develops unfavourably.
 - (d) That the only complete safeguard against this danger is 100% detention.
 - (e) That the danger may be reduced but not eliminated by the measures suggested in paragraph (9).

APPENDIX II

ROYAL VICTORIA PATRIOTIC SCHOOL, WANDSWORTH

Le Commandant de la Royal Victoria Patriotic School a Wandsworth vous présente ses compliments et à l'honneur de vous remettre ci-dessous une copie des règlements qu'il vous prie de bien vouloir observer pendant votre séjour ici.

Il espère que vous vous rendrez compte de la nécessité d'avoir un Centre d'Accueil de ce genre où les personnes arrivant dans ce pays auront l'occasion de donner les renseignements nous permettant de vérifier leur identité et leurs antécédents.

Il tient à attirer votre attention sur l'importance qu'il y a, tant dans votre propre intérêt que dans celui de la cause alliée, à observer strictement les règlements de ce Centre.

De la part du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté, le Commandant vous souhaite la bienvenue dans ce pays, et vous félicite de votre arrivée ici sain et sauf. Il vous suggère de ne pas manquer aussitôt que possible après que vous aurez quitté ce Centre, d'aller offrir vos services à la cause des Alliées.

CENTRE D'ACCUEIL - ROYAL VICTORIA PATRIOTIC SCHOOL

R E G L E M E N T S

1. Ce Centre d'Accueil a été établi à l'effet d'offrir l'hébergement temporaire aux sujets alliés et neutres qui arrivent en Grande Bretagne.

2. Il est du devoir des officiels de ce Centre de vous aider à prouver votre identité et à cet effet de voir tous les documents pouvant se trouver en votre possession et de vous demander tous les renseignements qu'ils jugeront nécessaire.

Votre intérêt est donc de répondre de façon franche et explicite aux questions qui vous seront posées.

3. Aussitôt que votre identité et votre bonne foi auront été établies, vous serez envoyé aux Représentants de votre pays en Grande Bretagne, et toute facilité vous sera donnée pour vous permettre d'atteindre votre destination.

En attendant, vous comprendrez que, pour des raisons de sûreté, aucune communication ne sera permise avec l'extérieur, soit par message, lettre, téléphone ou tout autre moyen.

.....

Je soussigné,.....ai pris connaissance des Règlements ci-dessus et comprends qu'il est de mon devoir de les observer pendant mon séjour dans ce Centre d'Accueil.

Signature:

Date:

1. The U.S. has no intention of interfering with the internal affairs of any country, but it will not tolerate any country which is a threat to the peace and stability of the world. The U.S. will support any country which is a threat to the peace and stability of the world.

2. The U.S. will support any country which is a threat to the peace and stability of the world.

(a) In the U.S., the U.S. will support any country which is a threat to the peace and stability of the world.

(b) In the U.S., the U.S. will support any country which is a threat to the peace and stability of the world.

(c) In the U.S., the U.S. will support any country which is a threat to the peace and stability of the world.

3. The U.S. will support any country which is a threat to the peace and stability of the world.

4. The U.S. will support any country which is a threat to the peace and stability of the world.

(U.S. ...)

i. l.

201 2-0 5

p. 1. 5 705/44

4th May, 1944

1. - Si. 'inlet' r St wert,

I referred to the meeting held yesterday on the 28th April last on the subject of accommodation for 2 p.m. Your letter of 15/4/012 refers. I have been making inquiries in the locality in order to ascertain what could be done in this matter by finding some place to live. It could not be practical to give up any camp site for a regular winter training school, etc., without very serious consideration as to the value of the site, but I have two suggestions.

L. r. i. n. g. 100

the Commission have been in the WFO office, and at the same time, I have been going to the Commission to get their authority to do the work that I am doing. I have been very busy, and I have been very busy with the work that I am doing. I have been very busy, and I have been very busy with the work that I am doing. I have been very busy, and I have been very busy with the work that I am doing.

5. I am sure that the "Globe" is one of those daily "time
sifters" that, in the morning, I will find a number of which
interest me, but that I will not read. I am sure that the "Western
Advertiser" is a daily paper which I will read from cover to
cover, and which I will find a number of which I will not read, but I
believe it a very much more "sifted" paper than the "Globe", but I
very much doubt. I will, however, read it, but possibly
not every word. I will not read it. The "Globe" will be all
right. Very truly,
Yours,
J. H. H.

in full retirement, C.
Executive.

COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

AISI/158/3903

AIR MINISTRY,
WHITEALL, S.W.1.

2nd May, 1944

My dear Petch,

With reference to paragraph (iii) of HDE/146/012 dated 29th April, 1944, I have been in touch with our Directorate of Organisation with regard to the availability of accommodation not being used by the R.A.F. I am afraid the only accommodation likely to become vacant in the near future is at Aberystwyth, Stafford-on-Avon and St. Andrews, each capable of holding 1,200 in requisitioned hotels and houses. There is also a possibility that Usworth, near Sunderland, at present being used as an airfield, may be made available shortly. This would house about 800. There is nothing in the way of food which could be given up.

I understand that as, and when, it is proposed to relinquish our buildings, the Regional Office concerned of the Ministry of Works is informed and that Department is therefore in the best position to advise us to the best advantage as to accommodation which can be made available.

I suggest that when the question of responsibility for control of these matters has been decided, the Department concerned should approach the Director of Organisation at the Air Ministry who will give every possible assistance.

Yours sincerely,
(Sigs.) J. L. G. GILBERT

M. Petch, Esq.,
General Services Executive,
Warwick House,
St. James's Square,
S.W.1.

The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.

It is issued for the personal use of *Mr. Alan Walker*

MOST SECRET

Copy No. *23*

TOP SECRET

HDE/146/012

13TH MAY, 1944

W 7694

EVACUATION OF REFUGEES FROM THE CONTINENT
DURING "OVERLORD".

MINUTES of a Meeting held in the Conference Room,
6th Floor, Norfolk House, St. James's Square, S.W.1.,
on THURSDAY, 11TH MAY, 1944 at 2.30 p.m.

PRESENT:

Sir C. Munro Stewart
(In the Chair)

| | |
|--|--|
| Sir Frank Newsam, Home Office. | Sir John F. Moylan, Home Office |
| Sir Herbert Creedy, Security Executive | Maj-General G. Lammie, D.Q., War Office |
| Major C.A. Roberts, A.C.S., War Office | Mr. P.S. Wells, Security Executive |
| Mr. R. Butler, Security Service | Lt.-Colonel H.J. Baxter, Security Service |
| Mr. W.H. Hanna, Admiralty | Mr. M.G. Kirk, Home Office |
| Mr. L.W. Clayton, Home Office | Mr. Alan Walker, Foreign Office |
| Mr. A.J. Aglen, Scottish Home Department | Mr. J. MacKenzie, Department of Health for Scotland |
| Mr. P. Faulkner, Ministry of War Transport | Mr. A. Jones, Ministry of War Transport |
| Mr. E. Batch, Ministry of Works. | Mr. J. Nicholson, Ministry of Labour |
| Mr. F. Adams, Ministry of Health | Mr. T. L. Gray, Ministry of Health |
| Mr. G.T. Milne, Ministry of Health | Mr. A.F. Munford, Home Forces |
| Capt. M.P. Newton, G-4 Division, SHAEF. | Wing Commander W.H. Calvert, Air Ministry |
| Squadron Leader J.A. Plowman, D of O., Air Ministry | Mr. S. Hoare, Ministry of Home Security |

SECRETARIAT

Lt.-Colonel H. Birch-Reynardson
Mr. L. Petch
Mr. W.L. Tjaden

THE MEETING had before them a note by the Chairman on the problem of finding accommodation for refugees from the Continent after they had left the initial transit camp at Shoreham, and copies of letters from the Admiralty and the Air Ministry indicating the extent to which they could contribute.

SIR FINDLATER STEWART said it had been agreed that, except for some small proportion of persons who were dangerous on security grounds, the refugees if they came could not be segregated within closed camps until their return to the Continent. It was for the meeting to discuss now the provision of:-

- (a) transit accommodation (in London) for those refugees, accepted as innocuous, who were en route to their final accommodation, and a holding camp in London for those requiring further examination;
- (b) an internment camp, possibly in the Isle of Man, for the dangerous refugees;
- (c) accommodation, preferably in the form of requisitioned buildings, for the refugees who were not to be interned.

GENERAL LAMMIE said that the War Office had made an investigation of requisitioned property available for the housing of the refugees. As far as could be ascertained, accommodation for 4,000 was at present available in War Office buildings; the accommodation was, however, widely dispersed and in blocks holding approximately 500. It was not known if it was suitable for the purpose in view, and it was unlikely that further War Office buildings would become available until some time after D day. In addition, the War Office were now releasing billets to a total of 5,000 at Scarborough and Skagness. If it were decided that the evacuees could be billeted on house-holders, quick action would be needed to take up the billets because holiday makers were booking the accommodation as soon as it became available.

MR. HANNAH said that the accommodation at certain Combined Operations Headquarters establishments now being closed down in Rosyth Command, which he had suggested in his letter of the 4th May to Sir Findlater Stewart might be available, comprised hutting, houses and an hotel. This accommodation was, however, as he explained in his letter, obtained from the War Office and was being returned to that Department.

GENERAL LAMMIE regretted that the War Office could not make the accommodation available, as all the accommodation being released by the Admiralty was required for important military purposes.

SQUADRON LEADER PLOWMAN said that accommodation at Aberystwyth, Stratford-on-Avon and St. Andrews was likely to be vacated by the Air Ministry shortly. The Air Ministry might have other plans for Aberystwyth and Stratford-on-Avon, but if not they would be returned to the Ministry of Works' pool, together with St. Andrews. The total accommodation at these places was about 3,600 in houses and hotels. Some airfield accommodation might also become available; this was, however, in remote places, and therefore possibly unsuitable for the housing of refugees.

MR. MILNE said that the main accommodation which the Ministry of Health might be able to offer was the emergency hostels erected for essential workers in the vicinity of certain large cities against the risk of wide-spread air raid destruction. The War Office occupied many of these on the understanding that they would be evacuated at 24 hours notice should they be required to house workers whose home had been destroyed by enemy action. It was still thought necessary to retain the hostels behind the ports on the East and South coasts for their original function, but perhaps the War Office could release some of the accommodation elsewhere. The Ministry felt that there were objections to the refugees being installed in these camps, since they could not be removed at such short notice as the War Office occupants; the Ministry were therefore reluctant to suggest the use of the hostels by the refugees if other accommodation could be found. Large houses which might be requisitioned were, if available, usually unsuitable, as the water supply and other amenities could not generally be adapted for several families. As for billeting, the Ministry were reluctant to billet refugees compulsorily on British householders; this had not been done so far, and there were grave objections to such a course.

MR. MACKENZIE said that the Department of Health for Scotland had emergency accommodation near Glasgow and at Bridge of Weir provided for bombed-out essential workers. The Department had agreed with the Ministry of Health to house 500 Gibraltarians from Wembley in the accommodation near Glasgow; but there remained the hatted camp for 1,200 at Bridge of Weir, and also 17 empty mansions, mostly in remote places, holding about 800.

GENERAL LAMMIE said he did not think the War Office could agree to the surrender of the emergency accommodation referred to by Mr. Lindsay, except in the exact terms of the agreement. Its present use was of greater operational importance than the housing of refugees.

SIR FINDLATER STEWART suggested that the War Office and the Ministry of Health should decide to what extent this accommodation could be earmarked for housing the refugees, and if agreement could not be reached they should submit the problem to their Ministers.

GENERAL LAMMIE agreed to have enquiries made by Commands, into the use to which the emergency accommodation was put and the amount which could be spared. He asked that the Ministry of Health should supply him with a list of such accommodation. He thought that some space might be available in the Isle of Man in addition to that needed for the small number of refugees who, for security reasons, would have to be interned. There was also considerable accommodation available in Northern Ireland, as mentioned in Mr. Hanna's letter. It should not be forgotten that, when the evacuees had recovered from their ordeal, they should be able to look after themselves, and were also a potential source of labour supply, e.g. in domestic service. Private houses and country mansions might in the event be suitable for housing them, and voluntary billeting with householders might be considered.

SIR FRANK NEWSAM said that, in addition to any transport difficulties there might be, there were political objections to sending refugees to Northern Ireland when British citizens were not allowed there. Accommodation in addition to that for the

refugees who were to be interned might, however, be available in the Isle of Man if transport objections were not insuperable. . He agreed with General Lammie that when released from the transit accommodation in London the refugees must be expected largely to look after themselves.

THE MEETING then discussed the provision of transit accommodation in London for those refugees accepted as innocuous and en route to their final accommodation, and the provision of a holding camp in London for those requiring further examination.

MR. LINDSAY said that, including the use of a recreation ground at Sydenham, the Ministry of Health had been able to find accommodation in London for 4,800.

SIR JOHN MOYLAN said that the Patriotic Schools had accommodation for 250, and the Battersea Grammar School for a further 400, of those requiring further investigation. Canons Park, Edgware, held 1,000, and this also could be used as a holding camp. . He thought ample accommodation in London should be made available for security examination, as there might be considerable difficulty in completing the examination at Shoreham.

LT.-COLONEL BAXTER said the Security Service anticipated no great difficulty in clearing 90% of the evacuees at Shoreham after a short examination. 200 a day should therefore be the maximum which the Security Service would have to examine in London. Up to 4 to 5 days would be needed to clear those requiring further examination in London, and this gave a figure of 800 to 1,000, for which special camp accommodation would have to be provided. He thought the Patriotic Schools and Battersea Grammar School should not be used for this purpose, and that Canons Park should be the holding camp.

SIR FRANK NEWSAM said the Home Office had hoped that the Ministry of Health could produce more accommodation in London than the 4,800 plus the 1,000 at Canons Park. The minimum operations only should be carried out at Shoreham, e.g. health and short security examinations, and the provision of essential clothing. As the evacuees would stay for 2 to 3 days at the most in Shoreham, they would need a longer rest in London to recover from their experiences. Accommodation for at least 10,000, plus the accommodation in the holding camp, should therefore be provided in London. Perhaps covered grand-stands such as those at Wembley and White City could be used. From the point of view of control these large buildings were preferable.

MR. BATCH, referring to Mr. Lindsay's figures, said that accommodation for 2,000 out of the 4,800 to 5,000 was at the Lower Sydenham Sports Ground. Existing sports buildings could be used there, but tents would be necessary as well; the War Office had promised tentage for 2,000 and he understood that this was probably the greatest extent to which the War Office could help in the provision of tents. He did not know if Wembley and other stadia were available, but would make enquiries, and if accommodation could not be found in London for 10,000 evacuees without requisitioning these sports stadia, the Ministry of Works would do so provided the Home Secretary supported such action.

SIR FINDLATER STEWART said that Mr. Toseland of the Ministry of Food had been unable to come to the meeting, but had asked for the question of the stage at which ration cards would be issued to the refugees to be considered, e.g. would they be fed in bulk in the London transit camp as well as at Shoreham, or would ration cards be issued at Shoreham.

SIR FRANK NEWSAM said that ration cards, identity cards etc. would be issued when the refugees reached their final destinations.

MR. LINDSAY said that staffing difficulties might make accommodation for 10,000 refugees in London an impracticable proposition. The W.V.S. would not be available for whole time work, although, of course, they would be of great help.

SIR FINDLATER STEWART suggested that skeleton staffing would be sufficient at first for one half of the accommodation, and complete staffing might be secured by calling for volunteers when and if the emergency arose.

MR. FAULKNER said that there were considerable objections from the point of view of transport to the accommodation of large numbers of the refugees in Scotland, Northern Ireland or the Isle of Man.

MR. JONES suggested that there might be difficulties in London in the provision of vehicles for conveying the refugees from the Southern railway termini to suburbs such as Wembley. He wondered if any of the Green Line Coaches held as an agency ambulances could be used to supplement London Transports' motor-bus resources.

MR. WALKER said the Foreign Office would like to have particulars of any refugees who were not of French nationality.

MR. NEWSAM:-

- (i) Invited the Ministry of Health to secure, if possible, transit accommodation in London for 10,000 evacuees, in addition to the holding camp for 1,000 at Campden Park.
- (ii) Invited the Ministry of Works to ascertain what sports stadia were available and suitable for the accommodation of refugees, and, if other suitable accommodation up to 10,000 was not available, to requisition sports stadia to the extent necessary.
- (iii) Invited the Ministry of Health to discuss with the War Office the extent to which the emergency huttred accommodation, provided near certain large towns to house essential workers in the event of severe air-raid damage, could be made available for housing refugees.
- (iv) Noted that other accommodation in the Isle of Man, and possibly Northern Ireland, might be made available.
- (v) Noted that the Ministry of War Transport would settle with the Ministry of Health any transport difficulties which might arise in transporting the refugees from Southern railway stations to transit accommodation in London.

(vi) Noted that the Home Office would provide the Foreign Office with details of refugees of other than French nationality as soon as such information became available.

HOME DEFENCE EXECUTIVE,
Norfolk House,
St. James's Square, S.W.1.

Registry

No.

W 7694/109/3

E.A.W.

~~Draft.~~

Lt.-Col. H. Birch-Reynardson,
Norfolk House.

(from Mr. Walker)

forwarding to

FOREIGN OFFICE (Refugee Department),

3, Cleveland Row,

St. James's, S.W.1.

17 May, 1944.

Secret.

[Dear Col Birch-Reynardson]

May I call your attention to what seems to me to be an ^{slight} inaccuracy, ~~though not a~~ ~~serious one~~, in the record of the meeting of the 11th May regarding the evacuation of refugees from the continent during "Overlord"? The record ~~says~~ ⁹⁻¹⁰ that the Foreign Office would like to have "particulars of any refugees who were not of French nationality". What I said, or at least intended to say, was that we wanted to have particulars of all nationalities included in the ^a evacuation and not merely those regarding the French (who might be presumed with a fair show of probability to form the majority of persons so evacuated). As it stands the record rather implies that we are only interested in details of non-French refugees, which is far from being the case. If you agree, this would mean altering the record somewhat in the following manner: "of all refugees, whether of French or other nationality".

This/

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

This would imply a parallel alteration in
(vi) (last paragraph) of the record which
refers to the undertaking given by Sir F.
Newsam to supply details of all nationalities.

*I am sending a copy
of this letter to Sir F.
Newsam at the Home
Office.*

Ans. R.

Yours sincerely

(Sd) E. A. Walker

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

(W 7694/109/G).
Secret.

FOREIGN OFFICE (Refugee
Department),
3, Cleveland Row,
St. James's,
S.W.1.

17th May, 1944.

[Dear Col Birch-Reynardson]

May I call your attention to what seems to me to be a slight inaccuracy in the record of the meeting of the 11th May regarding the evacuation of refugees from the continent during "Overlord"? According to the record I stated that the Foreign Office would like to have "particulars of any refugees who were not of French nationality". What I said, or at least intended to say, was that we wanted to have particulars of all nationalities included in the evacuation and not merely those regarding the French (who might be presumed with a fair show of probability to form the majority of persons so evacuated). As it stands the record rather implies that we are only interested in details of non-French refugees, which is far from being the case. If you agree, this would mean altering the record somewhat in the following manner: "of all refugees, whether of French or other nationality". This would imply a parallel alteration in (vi) (last paragraph) of the record which refers to the undertaking given by Sir Frank Newsam to supply details of all nationalities.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Sir Frank Newsam at the Home Office.

Lieutenant-Colonel
H. Birch-Reynardson,
Norfolk House.

Yours sincerely
(Ed) (E.A. Walker)

File Number :—

59
1

W 7789/G

GENERAL

37

W 7789/109/18
V. scout. Halifax
Washington
Telegram no 2500
Dated: 12 May
Received: 8

Relief + rescue of Refugees via Spain
Refers to cover 4060 (W 7789/18)
states that matter has been further
discussed with State Dept. in its
present position.

Last Paper.

2794

References.

W 7789/109/18
SDS/109/18

(Print.)

(Minutes.)

Cop. W.O. (P.I. 9. - Colonel Rait)

It is satisfactory to know that the issue of
the Rait is in progress.

Q. W. did. col. H.M. change d'affaire
in Madrid to get into track with the
U.S. colleague, find out if a modus
operandi can be reached and what
Mr. Kays are thinking about point 2(b).

W.F.T.E.

Jan. L. Henderson

15/5.

Continue Dept 2nd 4/5

J. L. H.

21/5

(How disposed of.)
Covers
Copied Col. Rait
Tel. Madrid 587
9.55

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

Next Paper.

7922.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN ON THIS PAGE.

[CYPHER]

W 7789
DEPARTMENTAL NO. 1

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Viscount Halifax
No. 2500
12th May, 1944

D. 4.38 p.m. 13th May, 1944
R. 12.10 a.m. 14th May, 1944

Repeated to Madrid No. 170

aaaaaaa

Your 4060. W 7789/107/6

TOP SECRET

Matter has been further discussed with State Department official responsible. It appears that he had previously been in error in informing us that the question had already been referred back to Mr. Hayes for clarification. Position is that Dr. Schwarz has been instructed by War Refugee Board to go to Madrid and discuss with Mr. Hayes to see if he can resolve difficulties regarding JDC agent Sequerra and also general point referred to in paragraph 2 of Madrid telegram to you No. 494. In the meanwhile we are informed that the issue of licence has been held in abeyance.

2. Dr. Schwarz is now in Madrid and State Department expects soon to hear from Mr. Hayes result of current discussions and whether latter still holds to his objections or has been able to agree with Dr. Schwarz on a satisfactory modus operandi. State Department have promised to get in touch with us again when this report comes in.

3. Presumably final point referred to in paragraph 2(b) of Madrid's telegram No. 494 will not (repeat not) be subject to discussion between Schwarz and Hayes so that even if the other difficulties are satisfactorily resolved this will still be outstanding. We are impressing on State Department that in that event we should still want this point to be referred to Chiefs of Staff before any final decision is taken on the issue of licence.

O.T.P.

Registry
No. W 7789/109/G

I.L.H.

Draft.

H.M. Ambassador,
Madrid.

Telegram.

No...5587

Dated .15/5/44...

Cypher.

Departmental No. 1.

Central Department.

a - a.

correct.

Copy to:

War Office, M.I.9.,
(Col. Reit).

16/5

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1. 120

May, 1944.

Despatched

M.

Washington telegram to Foreign Office
No. 2500, repeated to you as No. 170 [of
12th May: rescue of refugees via Spain].

Please find out from your United
States colleague if a modus operandi has
been reached, and what opinion he holds
after his discussions with Mr. Schwartz
regarding the risk to JDC and other
American organisations attendant on their
carrying out the clandestine operations
referred to.

AmR.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

W7789/109/G.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM.

121

[CYPHER]

DEPARTMENTAL NO.1.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO MADRID.

No. 587.
15th May, 1944.

D. 11.25.p.m. 15th May, 1944.

6 6 6 6 6

Washington telegram to Foreign Office No. 2500,
repeated to you as No. 170 [of 12th May: rescue of
refugees via Spain].

Please find out from your United States colleague if a
modus operandi has been reached, and what opinion he holds
after his discussions with Mr. Schwartz regarding the risk
to JEC and other American organisations attendant on their
carrying out the clandestine operations referred to.

[OTP]

File Number :-

N 27

W 7922/G

256

W 7922/109/48

M: Playfair
(T.Y.)

Dated: 14 April

Received:

Refugee Children in France.

Returns document reporting on
Dr. Kullmann's visit to Switzerland

Last Paper.

W 7789

References.

(Print)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

We are reading by college of St. H.
Kullmann's memorandum on his visit
to Washington which contains includes
one on Dr. Kullmann's visit to
Switzerland. It is not identical with
this but contains a great deal of the
same information (See W 7967/16/48).
Perhaps we could tell Mr. Playfair
if we are not having this correct.

(Mr. Tucker): From Capt. W. H. 15.
Central to Capt. W. H. 15.
Mr. W. H. 15.
Mr. J. H. 15.

C. Clouston
19/5

Yes: by phone.

Mr. Playfair is agreeable - but it is
should go to the extent 19/5.

This refers to

the document in W 7967/16/48 which has now
been copied to Mr. W. H. 15.

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

Next Paper.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN ON THIS PAGE.

146

File Number:—

146

Your Reference —

Treasury Reference



TREASURY CHAMBERS, 123
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
~~W. 1~~ LONDON, S.W.1

14th April, 1944.

Dear Walker,

I ought to have returned this very interesting document to you long ago. I apologise for the delay. If you have it copied we should be glad to have a copy of it to keep.

Yours ever,

Ell Playfair
W7922

E.A. Walker, Esq.,
Foreign Office Refugee Department.

SECRET1st March, 1944.REFUGEE CHILDREN IN FRANCE

Dr. Kullmann, during his visit to Switzerland, went very thoroughly into the question of refugee children in France. He had discussions with the Swiss Foreign Office, Dr. Rothmund, Head of the Federal Police, who deals with refugee matters, the Emergency Committee on Children in France, and with representatives of various refugee organisations. His investigation made it clear that there are three distinct aspects of the question.

First, the concealment, protection and care of the children whilst still in France.

Second, the legal removal of the children from France with the consent of the French and German authorities.

Third, the secret escape of children to, and their reception by, neutral countries.

Hitherto, our attention has been directed more towards the second and third aspects than the first. It now appears that the first is at present the most important, and may well remain so.

2. The number of refugee children in France who are orphans or who are separated from their parents is about 6,000 (Six thousand). They are scattered throughout the country in small groups, mostly in the region between Avignon and Lyons but with some groups in the North. Most of them have false identity certificates, clothing cards and ration books. Catholic and Protestant organisations and French families are doing splendid work. They are hiding the children at great risk to themselves and are sharing the little they have with them. There are several organisations with their headquarters at Geneva which are giving practical assistance of great value. One of them for instance is providing for the maintenance of three thousand children, and has travelling social workers who visit the children in France. Their work is extremely dangerous and several of

the workers have been arrested in France and deported. The organisation is also building up in Geneva a card index of the children, and has already finished six hundred cards. It maintains a regular clandestine courier service with France for this purpose and is collecting information regarding the true identity of each child, its false identity, a record of finger prints, a photograph, a brief statement of what is known about the parents, record of nationality, age, relatives abroad, emigration prospects, and so on. This work is obviously of very great importance for post-war purposes.

There is, of course, always the danger that a group of children or individual children will be detected and deported. For instance, the Gestapo carried out a recent raid in the Lyons suburbs with the purpose of rounding up children with a view to deportation. The underground movement succeeded in saving the great majority of the children. The outstanding fact, however, that emerges from this side of the problem is that a great deal has been done and is being done to save the children by action in France itself, and that although there are risks attached to the workers and to the children themselves, a very large measure of success has been attained.

3. The second aspect of the problem is the legal removal of the children with the consent of the French and German authorities. It will be remembered that we asked the Swiss Government to make an approach to the French authorities, with a view to the grant of exit permits. The Swiss Government is willing to make the approach through its Minister at Vichy, but has doubts as to whether such an approach may not imperil the safety of some of the children hidden in France. Some of the organisations not only share those doubts but are very apprehensive lest a move of this kind will not prejudice their work and the safety of the children. The position at present is that the Swiss Minister in Vichy has been instructed to make the approach with a view to exit permits being granted to Spain and Portugal if, after consultation with the competent Catholic and Protestant groups in France, he is satisfied that the approach will not imperil rather than enhance the safety of the children concerned. The

Federal Government will inform us of the action taken in due course. The Swiss Foreign Office and the Ministry of Justice and Peace take the view that it is very unlikely that the approach, if made, will obtain a favourable response from the French and German authorities.

4. The third aspect is the secret escape of children to, and their reception by, neutral countries. So far as Switzerland is concerned, the information given to Dr. Kullmann is very satisfactory indeed. Since the 1st November up to the middle of February, the Swiss Government has received seven hundred such children. Further, it had already decided early in December to admit up to fifteen hundred children in the first place, if they could escape from France across the Swiss Frontier. The points on the frontier for crossing have been fixed, and the necessary instructions given to the frontier authorities. Private organisations in Switzerland have agreed to accommodate and maintain the children. It is understood that the number of fifteen hundred is not intended as an ultimate maximum, and that if more children were able to escape, the same liberal policy would be pursued. The Swiss Government in their discussions with Dr. Kullmann did not attach any conditions to the reception of these children, e.g. certificates for Palestine, but it does look to the Intergovernmental Committee to help with their settlement after the war.

Here again the question arises, in regard both to general policy and to particular groups, whether it is safer for the children to stay in concealment, or to take the risk of leaving their hiding places with the prospect of definite security if the attempt is successful. Opinion is divided. Some organisations are apprehensive about the policy of escape, while others favour it. Clearly, the decision has to be made by people on the spot who can judge of the relative risks and can take full and timely account of changing circumstances.

5. The question is what practical assistance can the Intergovernmental Committee give?

(a) As regards exit permits to Spain and Portugal, the Intergovernmental Committee will be wise to leave the question of an approach to the

French and German authorities to the discretion of the Swiss Government, acting in close consultation with the voluntary organisations and private bodies intimately concerned with the welfare of the children.

(b) As regards the reception of children in Switzerland, who succeed in escaping from France, the Swiss Government has asked for no specific assurances from the Intergovernmental Committee, but clearly there is a moral obligation resting on the Intergovernmental Committee to do its utmost after the war to relieve Switzerland of the responsibility for these children. Further, the voluntary organisations which are looking after the children already in Switzerland, and which have given a guarantee to the Swiss Government to look after other children who may be admitted there, have raised a technical question with Dr. Kullmann, on the manner in which they are at present receiving assistance for that purpose from American organisations, and in particular, the Joint Distribution Committee, the American Friends Service Committee, and the Unitarian Service Committee. This point will be raised in a further memorandum on the general question mentioned in (c).

(c) With regard to the concealment, maintenance, and care of the children in France, and the preparation of records which will preserve the identity of the children and be of the utmost value after the war, the Intergovernmental Committee can help by giving financial or other assistance to the private organisations which are engaged in this work. They are working partly on a cash basis, but mostly on a credit basis, by giving guarantees that money spent on this work in France will be repaid after the war. This system will be described at greater length in a further memorandum dealing with the more general question of Rescue, Concealment and Preservation Operations in various occupied and satellite countries of Europe, and in particular with the part that is being played in these operations by organisations centred in Switzerland. But it may be said here that so far as the limited case of children in France is concerned, Dr. Kullmann has no doubt, after his very thorough investigation, that more could be done, first, if the financial resources of the organisations concerned were increased, and second, and still more important,

if the credit transactions were placed on a sounder basis. The practical question, therefore, is how can this be done? This obviously raises questions of blockade policy which, although outside the competence of the Intergovernmental Committee, must be fairly and squarely put by it before the American and British Governments, who are primarily concerned with it.

6. I have marked this memorandum "Secret" because it contains much which, if it became public, would definitely prejudice not only the future work but the work that has been done, and would jeopardise the lives of children in France. It is absolutely essential that no publicity should be given to the operations which are going on.

H.W. EMERSON.

Director.

1st March, 1944

129

RESCUE, CONCEALMENT AND PRESERVATION OF REFUGEES IN THE OCCUPIED
AND SATELLITE COUNTRIES OF EUROPE.

1. The material for the examination of this large and important subject has been obtained mainly from an extremely thorough investigation made by Dr. Kullmann during his visit to Switzerland, and so far as Poland is concerned, by information that has been obtained from the Polish Government regarding the activities of the National Committee for Jews in Poland. I will take first the operations which are being carried on in this connection from Switzerland as a base. Dr. Kullmann discussed this matter with the Swiss authorities, with the American Minister, the Polish Minister, the International Red Cross, the Mixed Committee (International Red Cross and League of Red Cross Societies), and with representatives of many voluntary organisations. He also had talks with emissaries from various occupied countries and with persons who are acting in liaison between the voluntary organisations and those countries. He saw a number of reports relating to work that was going on and special memoranda were given to him regarding the scope of the problem and the opportunities for extending the work already in progress. He was surprised and gratified at the wide scope of the work already being done, which far exceeded what he had previously thought possible. The links between the voluntary organisations and the people they are helping differ for different countries. As regards some of the satellite countries, notably Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Slovakia, the voluntary bodies in Switzerland are able to give some forms of assistance through the delegates in those countries of the International Red Cross or through representatives of the Mixed Committee. For most of the occupied countries (Poland, Belgium, Holland, France and Northern Italy) the liaison has to be maintained by emissaries going backwards and forwards between these countries and Switzerland in a clandestine manner.

As in the case of children in France, three methods of assistance

are pursued - first, concealment in the country of residence, second, escape to other countries by legal means, and third, escape to, and illegal entry into, other countries by secret means. The second method can almost be ruled out, except for a few exit permits from the Balkan countries, which may be expected to increase in number as the war goes more and more in favour of the Allies. With regard to escape into other countries, there are the following possibilities:-

- (a) Escape over the Pyrenees into Spain. This is now on a small scale.
- (b) Escape into Switzerland. In regard to this, the organisations working in Switzerland are under both a legal and moral obligation not to embarrass the Swiss Government.
- (c) Escape from occupied countries into satellite countries. The most important of these is Hungary, into which many Jews are escaping with the tacit connivance of the Hungarian authorities, who shut their eyes to the fact that once there, the refugees take the necessary measures for their concealment. A considerable number of refugees (mainly but not entirely Jews) are also escaping from Poland into Roumania. The number given to me by a representative of the Polish Government was 4,000 during 1943, of whom about sixty per cent were Jews. Thus, the method of escape to other countries is producing results which are far from negligible. None the less, it was the considered opinion of the many persons concerned, with whom Dr. Kullmann discussed the subject, that at the present time the method of preservation on the spot is productive of the biggest results and that it can be carried out on a still larger scale in occupied Europe, provided the necessary resources in cash, credit or kind, are available. The main reasons are first, that there are many persons in the occupied countries well disposed towards the refugees, who are willing to take very considerable risks in protecting and hiding them, and second, that bribery is rampant among German officials

and subordinates, so that the necessary documents and other facilities for concealment can be obtained.

2. A description may now be given of the methods by which assistance in occupied and satellite countries is financed.

(1) Purchase of goods in neutral countries.

- (a) Medicaments and concentrated foodstuffs, e.g. lactic products, vitamins etc. can be purchased in Switzerland. Other foodstuffs are not available.
- (b) A parcel service for individuals. Little is being done or can be done in this direction from Switzerland. A substantial number of parcels containing sardines and dried fruit are being sent from Portugal, but many of the parcels are lost, and it is not a practical way of helping persons in concealment.
- (c) Large purchases of foodstuffs can be made in Roumania and Hungary. Many purchases are now being made by the Mixed Committee of the Red Cross, through its own network of buyers, and it is assisting people in distress in Roumania, Transnistria, Bulgaria and Hungary, and proposes to extend assistance to Croatia and Slovakia. The necessary resources are placed at the disposal of the Mixed Committee, either in cash in Swiss Francs from purely Swiss sources, or in cash grants from outside, made available by licence, or credit facilities raised in the country of assistance by some other agency, and made available to the local agents of the Mixed Committee.

The Mixed Committee of the Red Cross can, of course, only engage in straightforward operations of relief, and can not have anything to do with concealment, rescue etc. by secret methods.

(2) Clandestine operations are financed partly by cash and partly on credit.

(a) Cash

Cash is made available, either in Swiss Francs from Swiss sources or from outside through licence. An example of the provision of funds by licence is the recent grant of a licence by the United States Treasury to the Joint Distribution Committee by which \$100,000 has been placed at the disposal of the International Red Cross, through the Joint Distribution Committee, for certain purposes.

(b) Credit

Hitherto, credit transactions have far exceeded those in cash. One of the leading Jews in Switzerland, who for years has done excellent work for the refugee cause, has been able to raise credits in occupied and satellite countries on his guarantee that the loans so granted will be repaid after the war. The guarantees are verbal, nothing being given in writing. He himself has not the resources to meet these loans, but he relies, with confidence, on the Joint Distribution Committee honouring his pledges after the war. Hitherto, it has been possible to raise very large credits, but there is a limit to what can be done on the present security. Moreover, a complication may arise if transactions in cash, afforded by licences from outside, compete too freely with credit transactions. There is apprehension lest the persons who, in the past, have been willing to give credit in occupied and satellite countries, will be equally willing if they think they can get cash, or if other persons are able to get cash while they are not able. This is a feature which has to be watched. Unless it is possible to create a cash basis for all operations, it will be necessary to take care that cash transactions do not undermine the credit market. Individuals and organisations in Switzerland will be in the best position to advise on this aspect. Again credit transactions may be in the form of a promise to pay in Dollars after the war or in Swiss Francs, blocked until the end of hostilities. As between these two, there is a preference in some

countries in favour of the latter.

(3) Dr. Kullmann believes the attitude of the Swiss Government towards the technical side of these operations to be as follows, but this must not be regarded as authoritative:-

(a) Swiss monetary interests are not affected in so far as credit is raised in occupied or satellite countries against United Nations' Currencies accounts, e.g. Dollar account, blocked until the end of the war.

(b) Where Swiss Francs are involved, the Swiss authorities are unlikely to object if the transfer licences are established in Swiss Francs, and not in Dollars.

(c) The Swiss authorities are likely to object to operations involving Swiss Francs, should licences in dollars be provided. In such cases they may probably ask for an equivalent value of goods being imported into Switzerland under navicerts or on release of gold. Failing this, the Swiss National Bank would be unable to release Swiss Francs against Dollars at the official rate. Release might be refused altogether, or granted only under heavy discount, e.g. 2.28. Swiss Francs per Dollar instead of 4.28.

The point mentioned in (c) above was raised with Dr. Kullmann by several voluntary bodies. Their work in Switzerland itself, as distinct from that in other countries, is largely financed by Dollar remittances from American organisations. The Swiss National Bank takes the view that such remittances, under transfer licences, cannot be paid in Swiss Francs at the official rate of 4.9. Swiss Francs to the Dollar unless goods are imported to the corresponding value. The equivalent rate is sometimes as low as 2.8. Swiss Francs. The organisations naturally ask that arrangements, if possible, should be made which will bring the value of the Dollar remittances into line with the official rate. This apparently involves the grant of either additional navicerts for the import of goods or the release of gold in New York.

3. The facts that clearly emerge from the above account, necessarily condensed, of the position of Switzerland as a base for

operations to save refugees now in occupied or satellite countries, are first, that organisations are in existence for the purpose, are very active and are doing excellent work. Second, that the work can be greatly extended if greater resources are placed at their disposal. This is clearly a matter which comes within the province of the Intergovernmental Committee and which it is its duty to represent to the competent authorities, viz, the American and British Governments. The issues involved affect the blockade policy, the vital question being how far are the Governments concerned willing to relax the blockade and under what conditions, with the object of extending the work of preservation and rescue of refugees in Europe. The subject is too technical for me to express an opinion of any value. But there is one aspect of it about which something may be said. I appreciate the political difficulties which may arise because the majority of the persons getting assistance belong to one community, viz. the Jews. But I imagine, though I have no precise information on the subject, that the Allied Governments have been carrying on, with the necessary facilities, an underground movement designed to get certain of their nationals out of Europe, and that for this purpose, it is necessary to carry out much the same sort of transactions as those involved in the present case. To this extent there are precedents. Again, taking the most narrow point of view, it is relevant that part at least of such resources as are spent in enemy territory are used to corrupt the officials of the enemy and to undermine a system of terror which he has established. This is a credit to be set off against the debit.

4. Independently of the investigation carried out by Dr. Kullmann in regard to Switzerland, I had myself occasion just before his return to examine similar operations in Poland. It arose out of a report by the Jewish National Committee of Poland of the most appalling atrocities in that country against the Jews, with incidental mention of what the Committee was doing to save them. I attach a copy of this report. I checked the accuracy of the report with an official of the Polish Government. He said that the information and facts given in the report were generally correct, although estimates of surviving Jews cannot be verified. There is in Poland a secret council working under the Deputy-Prime Minister. Under the council is a special department concerned with Jewish interests. This department has two sections - one

W 8267 / G

W 8267 / ~~109~~ / 48

Supreme Allied
Headquarters

April 10
May 23

Civilian Relief in Italy.

Extract from Political Affs
Meeting, held at
the Supreme Allied Command's
Conference Room on 10th April.

Last Paper.

(Minutes.)

W 7992

References.

W 8102 / 21 / 48)

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action
completed.)

(Index.)

6/6

Next Paper.

W 8271

Sir C. MacKerr - Sir H. C. C. appointed.

Mr. Slater C. C. Italy without carrying
out the task of selection of immigrants, which
he was to have performed on behalf of the
Agency. We are now taking measures to secure
permanent representation of the Agency in Italy.

We have asked Romain, Alfano to C. C. as
have any influence needed by the military
authorities in N. Africa regarding admission of
them from the Fiddle. But we have from
a message to Sir K. Ennis from M. M. C.
that, while military authorities in Washington
favour admission, State Dept. and W. R. B.
oppose it, since they wish to keep Fiddle in
position against a possible influx of refugees
on the Pyrenees when the allies invade France.
Mr. Murphy suggests the introduction into

Italy /

of new American civilian organization -
in connection with relief work from
by Civil Affairs Relief Dept or
S. H. B. W.

122 L. Hudson
25/1-

Relief Dept }
Sir G. Rendel } to Sir
S. H. B. W. }
S. H. B. W. }

The W.O. (Col. Manning Taylor,
C.A.) is getting impatient over the
infiltration of American civilian agencies into
Italy. The Joint Distribution Board is
a separate organization, but it is wholly
devoted to American interests - quite
understandably. Could not the COBSRA
organization be given more of a role in
Italy?

Amsth.

25/1-

This paper is over 1 1/2 months old, but
it shows that the tendency is now to admit
civilian agencies (chiefly American) to carry out
relief work other than the British & American
Red Cross which were originally given the
main monopoly. S.F.H.Q. Telegram
MAT 196 of 16/5 was not quite clear &
F.O. Telegram No. 1097 to the Resident Minister
Algiers has been issued in an endeavour to
obtain a clear picture as to the agencies
operating in relief work (see W. 8102/24/48).
On receipt of a reply further action is required
to British Voluntary Society representation can be considered.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN ON THIS PAGE.

There are now proposals being considered by the
 Military that UNRRA shall be represented at A.F.C.,
 & that UNRRA Observers should be sent to Italy
 to advise UNRRA on how the displaced persons
 problems is being handled in Italy. All the
 indications are that UNRRA and the volunteer
 societies will be given more responsibilities in
 Italy. Consultation with COBSRA will be necessary
 as soon as the situation is a little clearer.

W. H. H. L. L.
 30/1/5

I am glad to see that the Supreme Allied
 Commander's ~~policy~~ ^{policy} ~~is~~ ^{is} excluding ~~all~~ ^{all} ~~other~~ ^{other}
~~voluntary organizations~~ ^{voluntary organizations} ~~from~~ ^{from} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~American~~ ^{American}
 & British Red Cross Societies looks like
 heading down. In Hall's mind is
 recommending ~~that~~ ^{that} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~Red Cross~~ ^{Red Cross} ~~be~~ ^{be} ~~excluded~~ ^{excluded}
 31.44

This paper now overruled by events.

X H. H. L. L. 3/1/5

TOP SECRET

Enter cor place
w Rif. Gen

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Extract from Political Committee Minutes of Meeting held in the
Supreme Allied Commander's Conference Room at 10.30 hours, Friday,
10th April, 1944.

6. CIVILIAN RELIEF IN ITALY.

WS267

(Paper No. PC (44) 8)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper inviting them to approve four recommendations made by the Vice-President of the Inter-Governmental Committee on refugees for improving arrangements for the dispensation of adequate relief, and for the repatriation or evacuation of non-Italian displaced persons in Italy, particularly Jews.

MR. MURPHY reported that, as regards the first recommendation, he had already given his concurrence in the proposal to appoint Sir Clifford Heathcote-Smith as Resident Representative in Italy of the Inter-Governmental Committee.

MR. MACMILLAN observed that, with reference to the second recommendation, a representative of the Jewish Agency, Mr. Shertok, was already in Italy for the purpose of inspecting Palestinian units. It had been suggested that Mr. Shertok might also be charged with selecting candidates for immigration to Palestine, and with issuing certificates. This proposal had the approval of the High Commissioner for Palestine. Mr. Macmillan recommended that approval should be given in principle to the appointment of a representative of the Jewish Agency in Italy to work under Sir Clifford Heathcote-Smith, but that the representative selected should be approved by the Supreme Allied Commander, after consultation with the High Commissioner for Palestine.

MR. MACMILLAN stated that, in considering the third recommendation, it should be borne in mind that in the opinion of Mr. Murphy and himself, the French authorities would only be prepared to agree to accommodate Jewish refugees from Italy in the camp at Fedala, if they were assured that the refugees would only remain there temporarily in transit for other destinations.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that he approved the fourth recommendation, that the present policy of excluding from Italy Allied Red Cross organizations other than the British or American should be maintained.

MR. MURPHY stated that he would be in favor of permitting the Friends organization and the American Joint Distribution Committee to operate in Italy. The function of the Joint Distribution Committee would be to set up local committees among the Jewish refugees to organize mutual assistance.

COLONEL SPOFFORD reported that the suggestion that these two organizations should be admitted to Italy had already been made to the Allied Control Commission, whose views were awaited. If the proposals were approved, both organizations would operate under the direction of the Displaced Persons Sub-Commission of the Allied Control Commission.

THE COMMITTEE:-

a. Took note that the proposal for the appointment of a Resident Representative in Italy of the Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees had been approved.

b. Directed that the Military Government Section inform the Jewish Agency:

1. That they might appoint a representative in Italy for the purpose of selecting immigrants for Palestine, and issuing certificates

provided/

TOP SECRET

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provided that the representative nominated was approved by the Supreme Allied Commander;

ii. That the Supreme Allied Commander would agree to the appointment of Mr. Shertok.

c. Directed that the Military Government Section investigate the possibilities of making arrangements to use the Fedala camp for the accommodation of Jewish refugees from Italy, in transit for other destinations.

d. Agreed that the policy of excluding from Italy, Allied Red Cross organizations other than the British and American should be maintained.

e. Agreed to defer consideration of the suggestion that the Friends organization and the American Joint Distribution Committee should be permitted to operate in Italy until the views of the Allied Control Commission had been received.

File Number :—

109
~~W4450~~

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W8271 /G 148

W8271/109, 1/4 #4

S. H. A. E. F

May 15
May 23

Plan for Refugees and
Displaced Persons.

Transmits third draft of
Outline Plan for Refugees and
Displaced Persons. Letter with
draft attaching to 2. Army
Memorandum 1 (U.S.) Army Order.

Last Paper.

W7922

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Off. M. Beebe
S. H. A. E. F.
M. Beebe
May 22

(Minutes.)

See within

(See within letter to Mr.
C. Peake enclosing copy of the
Randall's minute of the 22 May)

Mr. S. Randall to see
Walker
24/5

Aug. K.
24/5

This is an interesting and important paper,
and I had a chance of seeing it before I
took part in the meeting of the European
Committee of UNRRA, and before I had
a chance of discussion with Mr. Scott
(the head of the European Displaced Persons Division
of UNRRA), with Mr. Ignashenko (the Soviet representa-
tive), and others. It makes it very much more difficult
to represent the views of U.S.G. vis-à-vis the
other representatives in or out of the U.S.G. if I
could not see it in time, and I shall be most
interested to see what can be done to see the better
in the future.

2. I do not know whether there is any point
in my commenting on the paper since our official
comments on it seem to have gone in; but I should like
to make a few remarks on the criticisms of the definitions
of refugees and displaced persons respectively in
the paper. On the 1st of the paper, these definitions
are given, and it is to be defined as follows: "A
refugee is a person who, to give effect to the provisions
of the Charter of the United Nations, and both the United
Kingdom and the United States are parties to the
Agreement, it seems unfortunate that their military
at critical

(Action
completed.)

(Index.)

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REV

Next Paper.

26513

26513 P.O.P.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN ON THIS PAGE.

UNRRA and is immediately forward the Russian High Command on this subject (see Mr. Letter to Mr. Stanton, 2/46 of 31st May). Mr. L. Shenko the Soviet Refugee Office on UNRRA, told me yesterday morning, before I had seen this paper, that he thought it might be a very good plan for UNRRA to get the Russian High Command to get together on this question. I gathered that Mr. Shenko was going to pursue this matter, and it will probably be pursued by the Displaced Persons Sub-Committee of UNRRA. It would surely save a lot of trouble all round if these various approaches to the problem could somehow be linked together.

E. I do not know who is responsible for the paper, but I think it could be a good idea. I could be put in touch with its author, and if it is to be taken to make sure that the Soviet Department of UNRRA is kept informed of the progress of what is proposed in UNRRA. It seems to me that at present we are doing in almost completely water-tight compartments.

C. W. Rendell

31st June, 1944.

Mr. Hall Patch
Mr. L. Shenko
Mr. Rendell

See Sir G. Rendell's para 6 above. The military may conceivably wish to use the services of foreign voluntary societies (e.g. American & British Red Cross) ^{operate} + not UNRRA. It is only if UNRRA is ^{to be} by the military or the independent government that the foreign voluntary societies have to work under the aegis of UNRRA.

I think there would be great advantage if Sir G. Rendell could be kept in touch with the military for dealing with displaced persons, as he not only represents H.M.C. on the European Committee of UNRRA, but is also the British Member of the Technical Sub-Committee on Displaced Persons.

J. L. Hall Patch

copy of

See within Sir G. Rendell's letter to Mr. Hall Patch of 9/6

1. L. H.
31/7

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

A. Randall

The teacher who
sent to me by sheep.

If you have any comments
we could pass them on
to Charles Parker.

I also teach the
directive on displaced
persons is passed by
the Acts Com. Any
I have his back in the
course?

Dr. Turnbull

Please see
attached minutes. 22/5/7 suggest
George Rendell Sh. see all
these documents. A. Randall
22/5

I have sent my copy to be entered, but in the meantime will only comment that it would, I think, be desirable that the definitions in paragraph 2 of Part I of the outline plan should be made to conform to internationally accepted practice. This practice makes displaced persons one large category of which refugees are one division. There are international conventions regarding refugees and in these it is laid down that a refugee is a person who has had to leave his place of normal residence for another country, and is proved not to enjoy in law or in fact the protection of the government to which he was formerly subject. In particular this includes stateless persons who have been deprived of their former nationality and have not acquired any other.

The broad definition of displaced persons should, I suggest, be that now given as refugees, forced labour, etc. If this suggestion is adopted, then under classifications in paragraph 3 the word "refugees" should be cut out of the title and put among the categories.

Of course, if SHAEF wishes to keep the loose and inaccurate definition of refugees which is common in the newspapers, covering persons who are more properly called fugitives, I suppose the point could be reluctantly conceded, but in view of the fact that later on the Intergovernmental Refugee Committee is mentioned I think we should strongly recommend that the word "refugee" be retained only for the category who are the subject of international conventions.

If this is accepted it follows that in paragraph 4 it would be impossible to talk of persons being refugees within their own countries, and some revision of paragraph 5 will also be necessary.

A. W. F. R. *Randall*

22nd May, 1944.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

RESTRICTED

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
G-5 Division

Enter Green

68271

SHAEF/G-5/9

15 May, 1944

SUBJECT: Outline Plan for Refugees and Displaced Persons.
(Third Draft)

TO : See distribution below.

Reference SHAEF/G-5/9 dated 18 April 1944.

1. Herewith attached third draft of Outline Plan for Refugees and Displaced Persons, together with draft directive to 21 Army Group and 1 (US) Army Group. The Appendices already forwarded to you with the second draft are not included. Their security classification should now be down-graded to Restricted.
2. The third draft incorporated most of the recommendations submitted by Divisions on the second draft. It has also been modified to conform with CCS Directive for Military Government in Germany prior to Defeat or Surrender. (C.C.S. 551.17 April 1944)
3. Will you please submit your comments or concurrences to reach G-5 not later than 0900 hrs. on 18 May 1944.
4. Unless Divisions wish to make further major policy changes, the third draft will be submitted to the Chief of Staff as the Final Draft. In this case a covering memorandum to the Chief of Staff will be circulated to Divisions on 19 May for their formal concurrence

A. E. GRASETT,
Lieut-General
ACOS, G-5 Div.

MM/ip

Distribution:

G-1
G-2
G-3
G-4
Public Relations
Psychological Warfare
Medical
Engineers
Signals
European Allied Contact Section
Political Officer (BR)
Political Officer (US)

RESTRICTED

DRAFT

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
G-5 Division

SHAEF/G-5/

May 1944

SUBJECT: Refugees and Displaced Persons.

TO : 21 Army Group
1 (US) Army Group

1. You will prepare plans for dealing with refugees and displaced persons in your area of responsibility.

2. The policy of the Supreme Commander which you will execute with regard to refugees and displaced persons in areas under your control, is:

- a. To prevent any hindrance to military operations which might be occasioned by their massing or uncontrolled movement.
- b. To prevent outbreaks of disease among refugees and displaced persons which might threaten the health of the military forces.
- c. To relieve, as far as practicable, conditions of destitution among refugees and displaced persons.
- d. To set up an organization to effect the rapid and orderly repatriation of displaced persons, which can be handed over in due course to the appropriate civilian authorities.

Your responsibility towards refugees and displaced persons will normally be discharged through the Allied national authorities concerned. If, however, these authorities in any area do not carry out your requirements you will take direct action as required by military necessity.

3. SHAEF outline plan based upon this policy is attached, and will be used by you as a basis for detailed planning.

4. Responsibility.

a. SCAEF.

- (1) Conclusion of the necessary agreements with USSR and other Allied authorities, and with UNGRA.
- (2) Coordination of planning and operations of Army Groups and Allied national authorities.

b. Army Groups

Preparation and execution of detailed plans for all operations, including personnel estimates.

By Command of General EISENHOWER

W.B. SMITH
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff

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R E S T R I C T E D

OUTLINE PLAN FOR REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

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15 May 1944.

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OUTLINE PLAN FOR REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

Part I

1. STATE OF PROGRESS

Outline

1. To prepare an outline plan for the care and disposition of refugees and displaced persons for all military operations in the SCHE area of responsibility;

- a. To eliminate or reduce interference with military operations.
- b. To provide a smooth transfer of responsibility from military authorities to civilian authorities at the earliest practicable date.

2. THE PLAN

- a. Refugees. Civilians now outside the national boundaries of their country, who desire to return to their homes but require assistance to do so, who are:
 - (1) temporarily homeless because of military operations;
 - (2) at some distance from their homes for reasons related to the war.
- b. Displaced Persons. Civilians outside the national boundaries of their country by reason of the war, who are:
 - (1) desirous but are unable to return home, or find homes without assistance,
 - (2) to be returned to enemy or ex-enemy territory.

CLASSIFICATIONS

3. Types of refugees and displaced persons:

Evacuees
War or Political Refugees
Political Prisoners
Forced or Voluntary Laborers
Total Workers and other workers of semi-military organizations not treated as members of forces under German command.
Deportees
Intruded persons
Excluded persons
Civilian Internees (other than POWs)
Enemy POWs
Stateless persons

ANALYSIS OF POLICY

4. Present estimates. Present estimates indicate that there are 1,550,000 displaced persons and refugees in Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany (excluding German refugees), Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Norway. Of these 2,550,000 are refugees within their own countries, 8,935,400 are displaced persons and forced laborers. They speak at least 20 different languages, come from 20 countries and are the concern of as many governments. Their care and disposition present not only technical and administrative problems of great magnitude but complex political problems as well.

5. Distribution by Countries.a. France

- (1) 1,000,000 Refugees
- (2) 681,000 Displaced Foreigners in France
- (3) 2,835,000 Displaced Germans in foreign countries
(See Appendix A)

b. Belgium

- (1) 1,000,000 Refugees
- (2) 10,000 Displaced Foreigners in Belgium
- (3) 700,000 Displaced Germans in foreign countries
(See Appendix A)

c. Denmark

- (1) 10,000 Refugees
- (2) 1,000 Displaced Foreigners in Denmark
- (3) 10,700 Displaced Germans in foreign countries
(See Appendix A)

d. Germany

- (1) 7,750,000 Displaced Foreigners in Germany
- (2) 1,000,000 Displaced Germans in foreign countries
(See Appendix A)

e. Luxembourg

- (1) ----- Refugees
- (2) 1,000 Displaced Foreigners in Luxembourg
- (3) 2,000 Displaced Germans in foreign countries
(See Appendix A)

f. The Netherlands

- (1) 250,000 Refugees
- (2) 100,000 Displaced Foreigners in the Netherlands
- (3) 100,000 Displaced Germans in foreign countries
(See Appendix A)

g. Norway

- (1) 10,000 Refugees
- (2) 1,000 Displaced Foreigners in Norway
- (3) 10,000 Displaced Germans in foreign countries
(See Appendix A)

The number of displaced persons in each country cannot be totaled to arrive at a grand total, for the 10,000,000 displaced persons in the other countries are not included in the total for each country. The total number of displaced persons in each country is the sum of the number of displaced persons in each country to which they are assigned.

6. Refugees in Germany

The number of refugees in Germany is not known on the date, September 1, 1945, and is being determined.

7. Displaced Persons

It is not possible to estimate a number of displaced persons who are expected to be in the U.S.A. by 1946, in the event which operations will be undertaken.

8. Collapse or Surrender.

Under collapse or surrender conditions, the problem of displaced persons is likely, within a matter of days, to assume vast proportions before the ground organization for dealing with it is fully established. However, German authorities, if in control, will have a direct interest in preventing uncontrolled self-liquidation of displaced persons who might form themselves into roving bands of vagabond, pillaging looters on trek to their homes. But revolution, or the partial or complete breakdown of central and local government authority in Germany, concomitant with surrender or collapse, would endanger millions of Allied nationals. Their fate will be regarded as a gauge of Allied capacity to deal effectively with major European problems.

9. Probable Effect of Surrender or Collapse.

In the event of German surrender or collapse, it cannot be assumed that German instructions broadcast to displaced persons in Germany will be effective. Displaced military personnel is not to be used to organize industrial workers to control independent movements. In the event of internal breakdown in Germany, it may be assumed that mass migrations accompanied by pillaging and looting will develop within a matter of days unless Allied military authorities intervene. Displaced persons in workers' camps will lose their employment. It is essential to ensure that they, Allied nationals in concentration camps, and those concentrated industrial plants, continue to receive food and supplies.

10. Plans for the Displaced Persons Problem.

It is assumed that Allied authorities will cooperate fully in all measures proposed to expedite repatriation procedures. The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) Council at its meeting in Atlantic City, agreed on an broad policy to be followed (see Resolutions and Reports of the United Nations Conference on the Displaced Persons, November 10 - December 1, 1945, U.N. Doc. E/CN.R.4/D.1/1, 1945). The UNRRA Council, Polish, Czechoslovak, and French authorities have independently prepared plans and selected agencies for dealing with the repatriation of their nationals. Their plans and policies are prepared in accordance with the following. These plans, the UNRRA Council, and Allied authorities are based on the following underlying principles:

- a. The repatriation of Allied displaced persons should be expedited to the greatest possible extent.
- b. That, wherever possible, provision should be made for their continued employment in their own countries.
- c. That displaced persons should be encouraged to spread out and not be concentrated in one place.
- d. That the UNRRA Council should be kept advised of all of these principles, and should be kept informed of all developments, and will provide the necessary financial and administrative control of the plans of Allied authorities, and will be responsible for the execution of these plans.

11. Responsibility for the Displaced Persons Problem.

- a. The UNRRA Council should be responsible for the repatriation of Allied displaced persons, and should be responsible for the execution of these plans, and should be responsible for the execution of these plans.
- b. Allied P/As should be responsible of G-1 Division.
- c. Enemy P/As should be responsible of G-1 Division.

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- d. Members of the Todt and other para-military organisations whom the military commander does not treat as members of the forces under German command will be dealt with as displaced persons.
 - e. The return to their own countries of persons demobilized from enemy military organisations or para-military organisations treated by military commanders as forces under German command, will be a responsibility of the Allied demobilizing authority.

12. Shelter Facilities.

At Appendix 'I' there is given a study on the location of concentration camps, labor camps and other housing, which might be used for displaced foreigners in Germany and German occupied countries of western Europe.

At Appendix 'J' there is a study on housing destruction in western Europe.

13. Potential Movement and its Directions.

At Appendix 'K' there is a statement on the maximum and probable movement of displaced persons, giving estimated numbers, and probable directions. Movement will tend to canalize at geographical barriers rather than at international frontiers. Thus movement from Germany to France, Belgium and Holland will be canalized at the crossings of the Rivers Rhine, Mosel and Ems.

14. The movement of large numbers of persons may not in all cases actually impede military operations, but it may later give rise to problems of feeding, housing, medical attention and quarantine, varying in accordance with the devastation of the areas to which these persons have moved.

15. Return and Repatriation.

Repatriation of displaced persons will not normally be undertaken during mobile phases of military operations unless dictated by military necessity. It will, however, generally be desirable to permit or to assist refugees in the zones of operations and communications to return to their own homes as soon as the military situation permits. It may be essential to move them in order to relieve the supply situation in particular areas. If civilian labour is required in any particular part of the military area, it may be necessary to move and employ refugees and displaced persons for this purpose.

16. Responsibility of Allied National Authorities

Allied national authorities will have full responsibility for refugees within, and for displaced persons returned to, their countries by Allied military authorities, except that in military zones their responsibility will be discharged under the direction of the military commander.

17. Agreements necessary with Allied National Authorities other than USSR.

SHAEF will negotiate agreements or working arrangements with Allied European authorities to accomplish the following:

- a. Issuance of Stanfast Instructions, and instructions to frontier guards to direct persons attempting self-repatriation into processing Centres.
- b. Adoption of uniform policy for dealing with displaced persons including adoption of undertaking to register displaced persons in accordance with SHAEF procedures, and reciprocal acceptance of registration and medical clearance records.
- c. Establishment of procedures requiring notification to and agreement from the appropriate military commander before sending displaced persons, whether allied or enemy, into any military zone.
- d. Adoption of procedure to permit transit across their countries of displaced persons being transported under authorisation of the military authorities to Reception Centres in a third country.

- c. Establishment of procedure for attachment of National Liaison Officers for assignment to military HQs to assist in the supervision and control of displaced persons of their own nationality and to issue repatriation visas.
- f. Establishment of procedure for acceptance or interchange, with other Allied national authorities, of Liaison Officers to assist in supervision and control of displaced persons of their own nationality, and to issue repatriation visas.
- g. Establishment of procedure whereby UNRRA and foreign Voluntary Relief Societies may assist in dealing with displaced persons in particular areas, or countries.
- h. Adoption of an undertaking to admit to their territories all of their nationals who may have been displaced by the war into other countries, without discrimination on account of race, religion or political belief.

18. Agreements necessary with USSR.

SHAEF will negotiate agreements or working arrangements with USSR to accomplish the following:

- a. Adoption of standfast policy for all occupied enemy and Allied liberated territory.
- b. Adoption of uniform policy for dealing with refugees and displaced persons, including reciprocal use and acceptance of approved registration and medical clearance records.
- c. Execution with other Allied national authorities of necessary agreements to regulate the repatriation process, including acceptance of National Liaison Officers with powers to issue repatriation visas.
- d. Establishment of procedure regulating movement of displaced persons across line of demarcation between zones of occupation, including notification and transit clearance.
- e. Adoption of reciprocal undertaking to arrange for care and maintenance of Allied displaced persons until they can be repatriated.
- f. Reciprocal acceptance of displaced persons returning to their homes.
- g. Adoption of procedure to permit transit across their zones of displaced persons being transported under authorisation of the military authorities to Reception Centres in a third country.
- h. Reciprocal attachment of Allied Liaison Officers for displaced persons to military agencies dealing with problem in each zone.
- i. Determination of policy concerning repatriation or return of German refugees and displaced persons, and of nationals of satellite countries, including status of members of para-military organisations.

19. Functions and responsibilities of SHAEF Missions to Allied National Authorities.

- a. In policy matters concerning refugees and displaced persons, SHAEF and Army Groups will deal with Allied national authorities through the SHAEF Missions, when these are accredited to the Allied national authorities concerned.
- b. The SHAEF Missions will advise SHAEF and Army Groups on the execution of agreed plans for dealing with refugees and displaced persons in hiatus areas, and will draw attention to any failure on the part of the Allied national authorities to control refugees or displaced persons likely to react unfavourably on the military situation.

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20. Responsibility of UNRRA for Refugees and Displaced Persons.

Responsibility for the care and relief of refugees and displaced persons in military areas, or in parts of these areas, may be delegated to UNRRA at a time and to an extent to be determined by SCAEF. In hiatus areas UNRRA will assume similar responsibilities when so requested by the national authorities concerned.

21. Agreements necessary with UNRRA.

SCAEF will negotiate an agreement with UNRRA to accomplish the following:

- a. UNRRA to agree to assist SCAEF during the military period if so requested.
- b. Determination of conditions under which assistance will be rendered by UNRRA.

22. Responsibility of the Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees.

The Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees has, by UNRRA resolution, been given responsibility for persons whose return to their former homes or countries cannot be accomplished in a relatively short time. Stateless persons and persons persecuted because of their race, creed or political affiliations will, if they cannot be repatriated by UNRRA, become the responsibility of this committee. (H.R.S.C. Cmd 6497).

23. Surrender Terms.

The following instructions will be given to the German Authorities by SCAEF if they are not adequately covered under the terms of surrender:

- a. Issue of standstill instructions to German and other enemy displaced persons and personnel of para-military organisations, within Germany and in territory occupied by Germany at the time of surrender.
- b. Control, care of, and repatriation of Allied nationals displaced in Germany or in territory occupied by Germany at the time of surrender to be carried out only under directions from the Supreme Commander and the Soviet Military Commander.
- c. Continuation of German responsibility for care, maintenance, shelter, medical attention for Allied displaced persons in Germany, and in territory occupied by Germany at time of surrender.
- d. Release of food, sanitary, medical and clothing stocks held in Germany, to permit equalization of rations for such displaced persons with those of German civilians.
- e. Issue of instructions as directed by SCAEF to foreign nationals in Germany.
- f. Safeguarding all police, labour office registers and records of displaced persons of Allied nationality in Germany or occupied territory.
- g. To provide for continuance of wages and benefits to workers and remittances to their families when due, and for the establishment of administrative machinery to settle claims of Allied nationals who are or were workers in German industries.
- h. Production on demand of full information regarding the number, nationality, location, employment and condition of Allied nationals in Germany, and in territory occupied by Germany at the time of surrender.
- i. Submission, on demand, of lists of workers' internment and concentration camps and places of confinement of political prisoners, their location and character, and the nature of the accommodation.

LIST II

OUTLINE PLAN

SECTION I

ORGANISATION

24. Responsibility for Planning.

Displaced Persons Branch, G-5 SHAEF, will be responsible for the preparation of outline plans. Army Groups and Special Staff, G-5, will be responsible for the preparation of detailed plans.

25. Displaced Persons Executive (DPX)

The Displaced Persons Executive (DPX) is that part of the Civil Affairs organisation assigned to specific tasks in connection with the discharge of SCAEF's responsibility for refugees and displaced persons. It will consist of the existing G-5 Displaced Persons Branch and administrative, public safety/traffic control, public health, engineer, transport, supply, and welfare officers.

26. Organisation of Displaced Persons Executive.

- a. DPX Staff Officers will be assigned to Formations/T's down to and including Corps, and to SHAEF Missions when these are accredited to Allied national authorities. A cadre of DPX officers will accompany the first Allied element proceeding to BERLIN after surrender.
- b. Pools of DPX specialist officers and EM/OR will be held at Army HQ and will be used to reinforce Civil Affairs detachments as may be required. When SCAEF hands over control of liberated areas to national authorities, a proportion of the DPX pools will be attached to the SHAEF Mission concerned.
- c. ATS and WAC personnel may be used for welfare and administrative activities in areas and at times deemed suitable by military commanders.

27. Allied Liaison Officers.

- a. European Allied national authorities will be requested by SHAEF to have available specialist officers, who will be empowered to issue repatriation visas, and help as necessary in controlling their displaced nationals.
- b. Provision will normally be made at the rate of one Liaison Officer for each 10,000 displaced persons of the particular nationality estimated to be in the area of operations.
- c. The following procedure will be operative:
 - (1) CA detachments desiring the assistance of national Liaison Officers for displaced persons will make requests for them through command channels.
 - (2) Army Groups will make requests for them through SCAEF Missions, or SHAEF where there is no mission, from the Allied national authority concerned.
 - (3) In Allied territory they will be accredited to and accepted by the national authority or the country in which they will be operating. They will be called forward, as required, by military commanders and attached to the military formation concerned.
 - (4) In enemy territory, the Liaison Officers will be accredited to SCAEF.

28. UNRRA Liaison Officers.

- a. UNRRA Liaison Officers will be attached to DEX - SHAEF and to lower Formations/Hqs as necessary, at a time and in areas to be decided by SCAEF in consultation with UNRRA. The initial attachments to DEX SHAEF will be made during the planning stage.
- b. Military commanders will recommend to SCAEF when and to what extent it will be desirable to invite the assistance of UNRRA.

SECTION II

OPERATIONS IN THE FIELD.

APPLICABILITY

29. In the initial stages, the plans to meet the situation of an opposed advance diverge in certain respects from those required to meet collapse or surrender conditions. The two are therefore shown separately:

- a. Opposed advance - paras 30-31
- b. Collapse or surrender - paras 32-33

OPPOSED ADVANCE

30. Standfast Policy

a. Standfast Order

Refugees and displaced persons will normally be instructed by the military commander to stand fast until their movement can be organized by military or Allied national authorities. In exceptional circumstances, however, a military commander may decide to initiate movement in certain areas.

- b. Nationals of the United and associated nations and neutrals confined, interned or otherwise under restraint by German authorities, except P/W and US and BR civilian internees, will be freed from confinement by CA detachments, and transferred to Assembly Centres, where they will be held as may be appropriate pending other disposition under military control, or in restricted residence. Their presence will be communicated to their respective national authorities through National Liaison Officers, or other appropriate channels.

c. Responsibility for carrying out Standfast Order.

- (1) Military commanders will issue standfast orders by means of leaflets, broadcasts, resistance groups, and other available means, when the military situation requires or permits.
- (2) European Allied national authorities have been requested by SHAEF to issue similar instructions to their nationals.
- (3) German authorities, as their jurisdictions are occupied, will be instructed by military commanders to disseminate standfast orders to refugees and displaced persons of enemy nationality. They will be required to pass on SCAEF standfast instructions to Allied displaced persons in their territory, for whose food, shelter and medical care they will continue to be responsible until such time as the Allied military authorities can arrange for their control, movement, or repatriation.

31. Movement Control.

a. Responsibility for control.

Military commanders will determine the routes which can be utilized by refugees and displaced persons, and establish traffic control machinery to keep routes required for military traffic clear of refugees. They will report immediately any unusual flow or concentration of refugees in their areas.

- (1) In early stages of operations, and in the absence of responsible local authorities, military commanders will be prepared to direct and control refugees and displaced persons within formation areas, employing military police and combat troops only, until indigenous police can be organized by Civil Affairs.
- (2) In later stages of operations, in division and corps zones traffic control of refugees and displaced persons will be a joint responsibility of Provost and Civil Affairs detachments. In Army and L/Z of C zones, it will be primarily a responsibility of Civil Affairs.
- (3) Military commanders will be responsible for the provision of suitable signs to post on highway routes, Information Bureaux and Assembly Centres for the guidance and information of refugees and displaced persons.

b. Canalization of Movement in Division and Corps Zones.

- (1) Collecting Points will be established at suitable intervals along refugee routes in the rear of division zones and in the forward area of corps zones, to facilitate canalization of movement away from the forward areas.
- (2) Transit Points/Areas will be established at suitable intervals along refugee routes in the central and rear areas of corps zones, where emergency rations, first aid, improvised shelter for the sick and wounded, and information will be provided to assist the rearward movement to Assembly Centres when refugees and displaced persons cannot be temporarily absorbed in the area.
- (3) Military Police, or, if available, civil police under Civil Affairs direction, will organize from the Collecting Points groups for rearward movement to Transit Points/Areas and Assembly Centres under designated refugee leaders, with military escorts if necessary.
- (4) Civil Affairs Officers will everywhere facilitate security checks. All British Indians discovered will be transferred immediately, or their presence reported to Counter-Intelligence Staffs.

c. Canalization of Movement in Army and L/Z of C zones.

- (1) Civil Affairs detachments will request local indigenous authorities in liberated territory, and instruct them in occupied enemy territory, to set up Information Bureaux in each commune, town, or city, in which or about which there are large numbers of refugees or displaced persons.
- (2) Civil Affairs detachments will furnish local authorities and unit commanders with information regarding the location of and facilities provided at Assembly Centres, and the routes and transport available for reaching them.
- (3) Information Bureaux should disseminate this information among refugees and displaced persons. In addition, they should be prepared to advise refugees and displaced persons concerning relief services furnished by local authorities.

d. At Appendix 'L' there is given schematic Diagram of Canalization of Movement.

COLLAPSE OR SURRENDER

32. Standfast Policy

Standfast Order

- a. Refugees and displaced persons will be instructed to stand fast until their movement can be organized by Allied military and national authorities.

b. Responsibility for carrying out Standfast Order.

- (1) Military commanders will issue standfast orders by means of leaflets, broadcasts, resistance groups and other available means.
- (2) European Allied national authorities have been requested by SHAEF to issue similar instructions to their nationals, and in particular to instruct their frontier officials to prevent attempts at mass self-repatriation.
- (3) German authorities will be instructed by the military commander to disseminate his standfast orders to refugees and displaced persons of enemy nationality. They will be required to pass on SCAEF standfast instructions to Allied displaced persons in their territory, for whose food, shelter and medical care they will continue to be responsible until such time as the Allied military authorities can arrange for their control, movement, or repatriation.

33. Movement Control.

a. First Phase.

- (1) SCAEF will despatch Civil Affairs detachments by air if internal conditions in Germany permit, or military commanders will send forward Civil Affairs detachments with adequate escort in advance of the main body of occupation troops, to key centres along strategic routes to organise and supervise indigenous authorities for the control of refugees and displaced persons.
- (2) Initially, it may be necessary to require evacuation in whole or in part of selected frontier towns in Germany, for use as Assembly Centres, to which displaced persons attempting self-repatriation may be directed. SHAEF will request Allied national authorities concerned to establish reception centres on their side of the frontier opposite these German frontier Assembly Centres. Until Assembly Centres in Germany can be fully organised it may be necessary to send displaced persons to these Reception Centres for initial processing.

b. Second Phase.

Responsibility for control

- (1) Military commanders will determine the routes which can be utilised by refugees and displaced persons, and establish traffic control machinery to keep routes required for military traffic clear of refugees. They will report immediately any unusual flow or concentration of refugees in their areas.
- (2) In the absence of responsible local authorities, military commanders will be prepared to direct and control refugees and displaced persons within formation areas, employing military police and combat troops only, until indigenous police can be organised by Civil Affairs.
- (3) CA Officers will accompany any traffic control organisation which may be sent ahead of the main body of military forces to organise indigenous authorities to assist in clearing the roads for military traffic.
- (4) Military commanders will be responsible for the provision of suitable signs to post on highway routes, Information Bureaux and Assembly Centres for the guidance and information of refugees and displaced persons.
- (5) Civil Affairs detachments will request local indigenous authorities in liberated territory, and instruct them in enemy occupied territory, to set up Information Bureaux in each commune, town, or city, in which or about which there are large numbers of refugees or displaced persons.
- (6) Civil Affairs detachments will furnish local authorities and unit commanders with information regarding the location of all facilities provided at Assembly Centres, and the routes and transport available for reaching them.

- (7) Information Bureaux should disseminate this information among refugees and displaced persons. In addition, they should be prepared to advise refugees and displaced persons concerning relief services furnished by local authorities.

PROCESSING CENTRES.

34. Processing Centres are accommodation areas.

- a. Accommodation in these areas may be in billets, camps or public buildings.
- b. A Processing Centre may be an Assembly Centre, A Reception Centre or a Border Control Station. An Assembly Centre may be adapted to serve as a detention camp for enemy displaced persons in liberated territory.

35. Combined Functions of Centres.

A centre may be a combined Assembly Centre/Reception Centre/Border Control Station or a combination of any two of these. For instance, a French centre near the Belgian-French frontier will serve as a Reception Centre for displaced Frenchmen returning from Belgium. It will also serve as an Assembly Centre for processing displaced Belgians in France seeking repatriation. At the same time it would serve as a Border Control Station for displaced persons attempting to cross the frontier. (See diagram at Appendix 'II').

36. Assembly Centres.

These will be established under the direction of Civil Affairs detachments for the temporary care of refugees and displaced persons, for whom food, clothing and medical facilities will have to be provided until they can be returned to their homes, absorbed in the area, provided with gainful employment, or, in the case of displaced persons, repatriated.

- a. Location. Assembly Centres will be set up in Army zones and in I/Z of C. Wherever possible, they will be sited at existing camps, and public buildings where accommodation is known to be available. Other factors to be considered in the selection of camps are availability of sanitary, public health and medical facilities; proximity of supply routes and approach roads not likely to be required for military traffic, transport and feeding facilities. Where necessary, existing accommodations will be adapted by local authorities, using local resources under the direction of Civil Affairs detachments. When this is not possible, military commanders may make the necessary provision from any army resources available.
- b. General Functions.
 - (1) The provision of shelter, food and emergency clothing.
 - (2) The control of disease and epidemics, and the provision of medical attention.
 - (3) The facilitation of security examinations and the collection of intelligence, and furnishing information regarding the presence of Axis nationals and British Indians to the appropriate authorities.
 - (4) The employment of existing Red Cross facilities to permit refugees and displaced persons to communicate with and obtain information concerning the whereabouts and condition of their families.
 - (5) Arrangements for employment of centre occupants.
 - (6) Registration.
- c. Particular Functions with regard to refugees.
 - (1) Return to their homes or billeting at the earliest possible moment.
 - (2) Where organised bodies of refugees are to be sent from one Army Group zone, including AFHQ, into another, military commanders will notify and secure agreement from the military commander into whose zone they are to be moved.

d. Particular functions with regard to displaced persons.

- (1) Grouping for accommodation and classification according to family groups, nationalities and desired destinations.
- (2) Compilation of reports on presence and number by nationalities
- (3) Under conditions of opposed advance, so far as practicable, after identification and examination, Allied displaced persons will be given opportunity to join the armed forces of their country, if represented in the theatre, or to serve in labour battalions organised by the military, provided their loyalties to the Allies have been determined, and they qualify physically and otherwise. They should not be allowed to disperse until plans are made for their employment or other disposition.
- (4) Where organised bodies of displaced persons are to be sent from one Army Group zone, including AFHQ, into another, military commanders will notify and secure agreement from the military commander into whose zone they are to be moved.

37. Reception Centres.

- a. Function. These will be established under the direction of Civil Affairs detachments for the purpose of receiving and providing temporary care for displaced nationals returning to the country in which the Reception Centre is located.
- b. SHAEF will request Allied national authorities to set up Reception Centres in areas under their control. Reception Centres will not normally be established in military areas, except that it may sometimes be necessary to establish them there in static phases of operations. In this case, they will be set up in Army zones and in I/Z of C. Factors to be considered in the siting of Reception Centres are as indicated for Assembly Centres.

38. Processing Centres for Enemy Nationals.

- a. It will not be desirable to accommodate enemy and Allied displaced persons in the same Processing Centres.
- b. The operation of Processing Centres as laid down in paras 34-36 for Allied nationals will be modified as required. The military commander or the Allied national authorities concerned may establish these Centres as detention camps.
- c. Where practicable, enemy nationals, other than nationals of the country under occupation, will be identified and registered. CA Detachments will arrange for internment or curtail in a manner to be prescribed by the military commander the activities of those whose freedom of movement would, in the judgment of the military commander, endanger the security of the armed forces, or be otherwise undesirable.
- d. German authorities will be instructed by CA detachments to set up, separate from Allied centres, Assembly Centres for Italians, Austrians and other satellite nationals displaced within Germany.
- e. Military commanders in the SHAEF area of responsibility will notify and secure agreement from AFHQ before sending such displaced persons into the AFHQ zone.

39. Processing Centres in Liberated Areas.

SHAEF will request Allied national authorities to establish appropriate Centres in liberated areas under their control.

40. Processing Centre Administration.

Allied nationals who are refugees or displaced persons will be required to assume responsibility, as far as possible, for the internal administration of Processing Centres. They should be employed for staff and administrative work in fatigue parties, and in every other possible way. The responsible Civil Affairs Officers will appoint suitable refugees or displaced persons who, in conjunction with local authorities, will act as administrative officers. Similar arrangements may be made, wherever appropriate, in Processing Centres for enemy nationals. At Appendix 'N' there is given a draft instruction on Assembly Centre administration.

41. Employment of Displaced Persons.

The employment for military purposes, of displaced persons will be governed by the "Policy of the Supreme Commander for Civilian Labour utilized by the Military Forces in Liberated and Occupied (Enemy) Territories" to be issued separately by this Headquarters as an Administrative Memorandum.

42. Procedure for dealing with Persons claiming P/W or Civilian Internee Status.

Persons found outside P/W camps who claim to be P/W, or members of Allied military forces who have evaded capture by the enemy and are uncovered in the course of military operations, and BR/US civilians found outside civilian detention camps who claim to be civilian internees will be cared for as displaced persons and reported to the nearest P/W authorities, who will investigate all such cases and determine whether or not such claimants are in fact entitled to that status. Those found not to be entitled to the status of P/W or civilian internee will be deemed displaced persons. CA detachments will, through the appropriate SHAEF Mission or National Liaison Officer for displaced persons, request the military commanders of the claimants' nationality for instructions as to their disposition. Those accepted as P/Ws or civilian internees by P/W authorities will be the responsibility of that agency for care and repatriation.

43. Registration.

- a. All displaced persons will be registered.
- b. Refugees will not be registered.
- c. In all areas under command SCAEF the registration forms used will be identical. Specimens of these forms, and instructions on their use are shown at Appendix 'O'.
- d. The instructions will be issued in 19 languages. SCAEF will furnish forms and instructions to Allied national authorities for use in liberated areas under their control, and to the USSR. SHAEF Mission will represent to the Allied national authorities concerned the importance of proper and uniform registration of all displaced persons in order to determine the final allocation of financial responsibility, the settlement of legal claims, and similar purposes.

44. Returns.

The following reports will be forwarded by Civil Affairs Detachments concerned, as indicated, through the usual channels to DPX at any HQ:

- a. Displaced Persons Assembly Centre Report Form giving notification of the establishment and location of Processing Centres as established. (Specimen form is shown at Appendix 'P').
- b. Displaced Persons Assembly Centre Report Form showing nationality, sex, and age group of displaced persons awaiting repatriation at each such Centre. Reports will be rendered weekly. (Specimen form is shown at Appendix 'P').
- c. Duplicate copies of Displaced Persons Registration Forms for all displaced persons at Processing Centres who have been refused repatriation visas by National Liaison Officers, with relevant particulars. Reports will be rendered weekly.
- d. Duplicate copies of Displaced Persons Registration Forms for all displaced persons at Processing Centres who have been issued repatriation visas by their National Liaison Officers. Reports will be rendered as completed.
- e. A Return will be rendered weekly showing the numbers of refugees awaiting return home by military or public transport, and the areas to which they are to be returned.

45. Responsibility of Civil Affairs Detachments.

Civil Affairs Detachments will supervise local authorities in establishing Processing Centres to control and care for refugees and displaced persons. They will be responsible for supervising the administration of Processing Centres. They will call forward DPX specialists and National Liaison Officers as necessary to assist them in supervising the execution of all measures for dealing with refugees and displaced persons, including their housing, feeding, medical care, employment, registration, organisation, transport and the submission of Reports.

46. Responsibility of Allied National Liaison Officers.

Allied National Liaison Officers when called forward will assist Civil Affairs Detachments in supervising and controlling their nationals in Processing Centres and in the area of responsibility of the formation to which they are attached. They will also:

- a. Assist in the identification, registration, classification and disposition of their nationals
- b. Procure repatriation clearance from their governments of their nationals.
- c. Issue repatriation visas
- d. Prepare reports on numbers and condition of their nationals in formation areas
- e. Furnish information to their nationals.
- f. Recommend plans for the repatriation of their nationals when practicable.

47. Responsibility of UNRRA Liaison Officers.

UNRRA Liaison Officers will, as they become available, and are called forward by military commanders, be assimilated into the military organisation for refugees and displaced persons, and will be attached to formations, including SHAEF Missions, to observe and assist in the execution of plans for dealing with refugees and displaced persons.

SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT.

48. Supply Estimates.

Provision for refugees and displaced persons will be included in normal Civil Affairs supply estimates. Their needs will be considered as part of local civilian requirements, and will be treated separately only insofar as may be necessitated by peculiar conditions of billeting, feeding, management, or control. The maximum use will be made of local resources and organisations. Where local resources and supplies at the disposal of Civil Affairs are inadequate, the minimum essential provision will be made from other military resources.

49. Scale of Issue.

Rations of food and other authorised supplies for refugees and displaced persons in Processing Centres, and elsewhere, will, except under special circumstances, conform to the scale prevailing for the general population of the area concerned.

50. Normal Method of Issue and Accounting.

Supplies will be issued on pre-payment to indigenous authorities or agencies for the use of refugees and displaced persons. In an emergency, issues may be made in accordance with ruling instructions without pre-payment, but any authority or agency receiving such supplies will be informed that payment will eventually be made a matter of settlement between the government concerned. SHAEF will request Allied national authorities to reimburse their local authorities for expenditure incurred on behalf of refugees and displaced persons who are not normally a responsibility of the local community.

51. Emergency Method of Issue and Accounting.

Where there is no responsible indigenous authority or agency to take over the supplies, the C&O will receipt and issue vouchers and will specify on these vouchers that no local authority or agency could be utilised for the purpose of distributing supplies.

52. Transportation.

- a. In those areas in which SHAEF has assumed control all transport by military or public carrier will be carried out in accordance with SHAEF Movement and Transportation Policy.
 - (1) Civil Affairs Staff Officers will initiate requests for transportation based in the case of displaced persons on visaed Registration Cards and in the case of refugees on the weekly returns (Paragraph 44 c. refers) forwarded to their headquarters.
 - (2) Executive Orders for movement will be issued through normal Mov/TC channels.

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(3) Copies of movement orders will in all cases be forwarded to the appropriate SHAEF Mission for transmittal to the government concerned.

b. In hiatus areas, where the SHAEF movement organization is not represented, movement of refugees and displaced persons will be the responsibility of the Allied national authority. When an Allied national authority informs a SHAEF Mission that it desires to move refugees or displaced persons into a military zone, SHAEF Mission will request clearance from the military commander concerned, and will notify the national authority of the military commander's decision.

53. Signals.

The signal communications used for controlling the movement of refugees and displaced persons must largely depend on the availability of existing civil telecommunications. The establishment of an Army system of signal communications for this purpose is beyond Army resources. Where a military organization is set up to control movement, it will be the responsibility of the formations providing the troops to find the necessary communications, both within the organization employed, and to the superior headquarters concerned.

Foreign Office,

S.W.1.

SECRET

22nd May, 1944.

Despatched 163
22/5 R.

I was sent a copy of DMSP/65/9 of the 15th May containing an outline plan for Refugees and Displaced Persons (Third Draft).

I have asked Alec Randall for his comments, and he has sent me a minute of which I enclose a copy for such use as you may care to make of it.

You should shortly be receiving from William Young, if you have not received it already, our draft directive on Displaced Persons which was recently approved by the A.C.I.O. Committee and has been sent to him for use at the European Advisory Commission.

(Signed) J.M. Troutbeck.

J. M. Troutbeck, Esq., C.I.O., A.C.,

A.C.I.O.

Mr. Randall.

With Sir George Rendel's compliments.

48, Lowndes Square,

S.W.1.

RD/67.

9th June 1944.

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WS 27/10

My dear Hall-Patch,

With reference to paper RC(44)54 of June 5th enclosing a progress report by the Director of the UNRRA Division on Displaced Persons, I am a little uneasy by the reference in paragraph 3 of the report to the plans being prepared by SHAEF to deal with the question of UNRRA participation in the Displaced Persons problem.

You will remember that I recently wrote a long minute on W.8271/109/G. containing a plan for dealing with Displaced Persons prepared by SHAEF which seemed to me to have some rather unsatisfactory features. I do not know whether this is the plan referred to, but I hope that whoever is dealing with SHAEF over this question will do whatever is possible to make sure that the liaison between SHAEF and UNRRA on this subject is as close as possible.

I hope, however, that my fears may be unfounded. I gather that General Gullion, who has now come over to take charge of the Displaced Persons section of SHAEF, is well disposed towards UNRRA, and that UNRRA has already sent a number of its people to work with SHAEF, so that I hope that gradually all this will get ~~sorted up~~ cleared up.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Randall.

Yours ever,

G.W.RENDEL.

E. L. Hall-Patch Esq., C.M.G.,
FOREIGN OFFICE.

File Number :—

W 109

W 8337/G

W8 337 / 109 / 146

HDE (Com:)

HDE / 46 / 0 / 2

Dated: 20 May
Received:

Evacuation of Refugees from The Continent during "Overlord".

Minutes of a meeting held on 18/5
to clear certain points which had to be
settled before the H/Health could assess
the amount of accommodation that
would be available for the final housing of
refugees

(Minutes.)

Last Paper.

W8271

References.

~~W8271/2 + 3/4~~

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

At an earlier meeting I made
the P.D. point that we should
like to have particulars of all
refugees evacuated from France or
elsewhere for communication to the
H/Health concerned. Sir S.
Newman undertook to supply us
with the necessary data.

French Dept.
20/5

A. Walker
25/5

Ans'l. 25/5.

See within HDE / 46 / 0 / 2 of 28/5

(Action
completed.)

6/5. 27/5

(Index.)

W8

A.D.
H/6

Next Paper.

W 8337

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN ON THIS PAGE.

File Number :-

h. 1. 1.

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MOST SECRET

Copy No. 32

TOP SECRET

REF/146/012

20th May, 1944

W8337

EVACUATION OF REFUGEES FROM THE CONTINENT DURING "OVERLORD"

Minutes of a Meeting held in the Conference Room,
6th Floor, War Office House, St. James's Square, S.W. 1,
on Thursday, 18th May, 1944, at 2.30 p.m.

PRESENT:

Sir S. Findlater Stewart (In the Chair)

Sir Frank Newsam,
Home Office

Sir C. G. R. ...
Home Office

Mr. ... Kirk,
Home Office

Mr. ... Beach,
Ministry of Health

Mr. ... Lindsay,
Ministry of Health

General ... G. ...
War Office

Lt.-Colonel H. J. Baxter,
Security Service

Lt.-Colonel J. ... Robt.,
Security Service

SECRETARIAT:

Lt.-Colonel ...
Mr. ...

SIR FINDLATER STEWART is in the chair. On calling the meeting to order, he said that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the evacuation of refugees from the continent during the "OVERLORD" operation. The Ministry of Health could not accept the evacuation of refugees who could be available for the evacuation of the refugees. The two main questions regarding the evacuation were:-

- (a) Whether some of the refugees could be evacuated in Northern Ireland;
- (b) Whether the War Office could give up some of the Ministry of Health's evacuation, since they were subject to the evacuation of the War Office, and it be required for the evacuation of the War Office.

He would also like to discuss the evacuation of the refugees from the continent during the "OVERLORD" operation. The Ministry of Health could not accept the evacuation of refugees who could be available for the evacuation of the refugees. The two main questions regarding the evacuation were:-

(a) Evacuation in Ireland.

SIR FINDLATER STEWART said that it would contribute very considerably to the evacuation of the refugees from the continent during the "OVERLORD" operation. The Ministry of Health could not accept the evacuation of refugees who could be available for the evacuation of the refugees. The two main questions regarding the evacuation were:-

to this: but it would be rather the refugees, at any rate in the early stages, would be liable to wander far afield, particularly if their feeding was arranged on a communal basis and they did not hold individual ration cards.

LT.-COLONEL ROBB said that the Security Service would not be quarantining in this country, but in view of the vast amount of stage they would not oppose the use of accommodation in Northern Ireland. This was on the understanding that the only refugees sent to Northern Ireland would be the obviously innocent people who were cleared at once by the Security Service at Shoreham; for the rest part these would be women and children. The main security risk was that enemy agents infiltrated into this country with the refugees could, once in Northern Ireland, easily cross the border into Eire; and therefore the Security Service would oppose the quarantining in Northern Ireland of any of the people who had not given immediate clearance at Shoreham.

SIR FRANK NEWSAM said there was no political objection to the use of Northern Ireland. Travel to Ireland was very practically restricted, and there might be serious public complaint if, while these restrictions were still in force, large numbers of refugees were sent to Northern Ireland. The Security Service, of course, was insuperable, but he felt it was one for consideration by Ministers. The Home Office had made enquiries, and had ascertained that, if Northern Ireland could be used, it should be possible to accommodate between 8,000 to 10,000 refugees there.

(b) Accommodation in Great Britain

MR. FRANK LAMBERT said that the proposal to accommodate 15,000 refugees, of which the proposal to put some in Northern Ireland went through, the number to be disposed of in Great Britain would be reduced by between 8,000 and 10,000; and if, as was hoped, transit accommodation for 10,000 was provided in London, this could be a permanent home for that number when the flow ceased. The small number of suspect refugees would be accommodated in the Isle of Man, and the problem was to find accommodation for the balance of 15,000.

MR. LAMBERT said that the transit accommodation in London, which particularly the Government tented camp for 2,000 at Sydenham, would not be suitable as permanent accommodation; he therefore felt it would be safer to say that 15,000 could be accommodated in London and Northern Ireland, leaving 10,000 to be dealt with elsewhere. To fill this gap the War Office had offered just over 4,000 places in the barracks in the South, and 1,000. The difficulty of the Ministry of Health was that the War Office accommodation might not always be situated in areas where the necessary administrative staff could be provided; the Ministry of Health did not themselves have any staff available and, wherever a group of refugees was accommodated, it would be necessary to send a staff to local authorities to help them to deal with the refugees. Health officials present examined the War Office accommodation from this point of view, and it was decided that all of it could be used.

At the end, the Scottish Office had indicated that an earlier meeting that they could have, to discuss the use of Weir hostels, and some 800 in small groups elsewhere in Scotland. The only other places in sight were the Ministry of Health hostels provided in the region of the large towns for essential workers. The War Office had offered 10,000 of these were at present occupied by the War Office. An early decision was therefore required as to whether this could be made available for occupation by the refugees; in all, the hostels could accommodate 11,400 people.

GENE AL LITTLE said that the Ministry of Health hostels were occupied by the War Office on the understanding that they would be vacated on fairly short notice, of varying length, as they were required for the accommodation of essential workers whose homes had been bombed. The accommodation was, in fact, required for important military purposes, and, in particular, that in the North West provided transit camps for incoming U.S. troops. The War Office need for the hostels was therefore of the priority, and still it must give place to the purpose for which the hostels were originally provided, it did not necessarily follow that it should not take precedence over the accommodation of refugees. All Command knew that the refugees had to be evacuated at short notice if required for the military purpose, and he had no objection to making any emergency arrangements they had in mind for the evacuation of the troops at present quartered in them should notice to quit suddenly be given. He had no doubt that his Command had already given their attention to this problem; but, in view of the very acute shortage of accommodation at the present time, it was far from being an easy one to solve.

THE NEW YORK TIMES said in an article that the decision was partly due to the rivalry between a few competing military agencies. It was military considerations alone which could dictate the evacuation of refugees from the Continent, and it was therefore for military reasons that they had to be housed in this country. This was the consideration against such a plan, and the need of the hostels for the military purposes for which they are at present being used. It was a further point that the reception of the refugees, once they arrived in this country, would if anything take a higher priority than the provision of homes for the other bombed-out civilians. British civilians who had to be billeted, whereas it was not so for the question of the refugees.

(c) Letter of authority to the station foreman

(i) Under the said Circular, the following are the points for consideration:-

- (a) the use of accommodation in Northern Ireland for the quartering of refugees;
- (b) the surrender by the War Office of the Ministry of Health hostel accommodation, if and when it was required for refugees.
- (ii) Invited General Lammie to send to Sir Findlater Stewart a note setting out the difficulties with which the War Office would be faced, if the Ministry of Health hostels had to be surrendered in this way, for inclusion in the report to Ministers.
- (iii) Invited Sir Findlater Stewart to secure the agreement of S.H.A.E.F. to General Lammie's suggestion that Commands, when asked to report further on the accommodation they might be able to make available, should be informed of the purpose for which the accommodation was required.*
- (iv) Noted that General Lammie would arrange for the War Office to help in every possible way with the equipment of War Office accommodation which was made available for the housing of refugees.
- (v) Agreed that the existing arrangements should be sufficient to deal with small groups of refugees landing at other ports, provided the numbers were not large.
- (vi) Invited Sir Findlater Stewart to call the attention of S.H.A.E.F. to the necessity for ensuring that the instructions that Shoreham was the only port to be used for the landing of refugees were known to all officers, both Naval and Military, U.S. and British, who were likely at any time to be in charge of landing craft.

HOME DEFENCE EXECUTIVE,
Norfolk House,
St. James's Square,
S.W.1.

*S.H.A.E.F. agree that Commands may be so informed, provided they are not told the nationality of the refugees.

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~~MOST SECRET~~

W8337 Copy No. 32

TOP SECRET

SUBJECT: EVACUATION OF REFUGEES FROM THE CONTINENT DURING
"OVERLORD".

FROM: Sir S. Findlater Stewart, Chairman, Home Defence
Executive, Norfolk House, St. James's Square, S.W.1.

REF: HDE/146/012 DATE: 28th May, 1944.

TO: Mr. E. Batch, Ministry of Works
Mr. S. Hoare, Ministry of Home Security
Mr. P. Faulkner, Ministry of War Transport
Mr. C.S. Toseland, Ministry of Food
Mr. J.S. Nicholson, Ministry of Labour
Mr. W. Marshall, Admiralty
Mr. W.N. Hanna, Admiralty
Mr. A.J. Aglen, Scottish Office
Mr. J. MacKenzie, Department of Health for Scotland
Mr. E.A. Walker, Foreign Office
Maj.-General R. Gurney, D.P.S., War Office
Maj.-General A.W. Gullion, G-5, S.H.A.E.F.,
Brigadier R.A. Riddell, Q.(Ops.), War Office,
Lt.-Col. J.A. Sullivan, S.H.A.E.F.,
Lt.-Col. R.L. Telfer, G.H.Q., Home Forces,
Lt.-Col. H.J. Baxter, Security Service
Lt.-Col. J.G.F. Robb, Security Service
Wing Commander W.H. Calvert, Air Ministry
Lt.-Col. W.D. Walker, G.H.Q., Home Forces.

I circulated on May 20th the minutes of a meeting which was held here on May 18th to discuss certain problems which had arisen in connection with the evacuation of refugees from the Continent in the early stages of "OVERLORD". It was agreed at that meeting that I should prepare a report to Ministers asking for a decision on:-

- (a) the use of accommodation in Northern Ireland for the quartering of refugees;
- (b) the surrender by the War Office of the Ministry of Health hostel accommodation, if and when it was required for refugees.

In the report which I put up to the Lord President's Committee I propounded the following questions:-

- (i) Ought Northern Ireland to be used? If so, can the necessary shipping be provided?

/(ii) Can

- (ii) Can the risk be taken that the Ministry of Health hostels now occupied by the War Office, and the Department of Health for Scotland hostel at Bridge of Weir, will not be required for people rendered homeless by blitzes?
- (iii) Should the reservation of accommodation for the possible evacuation of Gibraltarians from London in connection with the "CROSSBOW" threat be cancelled?
- (iv) Should the War Office be asked to give up the 6,100 places in the Ministry of Health hostels which they could, at a cost, arrange to vacate, when all other suitable accommodation has been filled?

The Lord President's Committee answered all these questions in the affirmative, and it can now be taken as definite that between 8,000 and 10,000 refugees will be quartered in Northern Ireland, that the Department of Health for Scotland hostel at Bridge of Weir may be used for the quartering of refugees, and that, when all other available accommodation is filled, the Ministry of Health will be able to accommodate a further 6,100 in hostels at present occupied by the War Office.

(Sgd.) S.F. STEWART.

